A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
brought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but examine this
only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the
will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them
trustworthy or constant, or brave or free; do not name them even men,
if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature
which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy
deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the
courts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes
them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes
them do whatever else men do against one another through this one
opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the
things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear
that in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is,
and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble
yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have
associated a long time and are companions, but when you have
ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as
you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else
is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is
a communion of honest things and of nothing else.
But you may say, Such a one treated me with regard so long; and did he
not love me? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the
same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of
his beast? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a
vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter? But this
woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long. And how long did
Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of
many? But a necklace came between them: and what is a necklace? It is
the opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was
the thing which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife,
that which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a
mother. And let every man among you who has seriously resolved either
to be a friend himself or to have another for his friend, cut out these
opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he
will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he
will not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next
place, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and
completely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike
himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of
his ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the
greatest importance; but he will be harsh to no man, being well
convinced of Plato’s doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth
unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other
respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge together, and sail
together, and you may be born of the same parents, for snakes also are:
but neither will they be friends, nor you, so long as you retain these
bestial and cursed opinions.
ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING.—Every man will read a book with more pleasure
or even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters.
Therefore every man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if
it is signified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then
that there is no faculty of expression: for this affirmation is the
characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious
man, because he undervalues the gifts which come from God, just as if
he would take away the commodity of the power of vision, or hearing, or
of seeing. Has then God given you eyes to no purpose? and to no purpose
has he infused into them a spirit so strong and of such skilful
contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things
which are seen? What messenger is so swift and vigilant? And to no
purpose has he made the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and
elastic that the vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a
manner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without the presence
of which there would be no use in any other thing?
Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things
which are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing and
hearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which
contribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine
and oil give thanks to God: but remember that he has given you
something else better than all these, I mean the power of using them,
proving them, and estimating the value of each. For what is that which
gives information about each of these powers, what each of them is
worth? Is it each faculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of
vision saying anything about itself? or the faculty of hearing? or
wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog? No; but they are appointed as
ministers and slaves to serve the faculty which has the power of making
use of the appearances of things. And if you inquire what is the value
of each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you? How then can
any other faculty be more powerful than this, which uses the rest as
ministers and itself proves each and pronounces about them? for which
of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them
knows when it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it
which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from objects to
which it ought not to apply them and does apply them to other objects?
Is it the faculty of vision? No, but it is the faculty of the will.
What is that faculty which closes and opens the ears? what is that by
which they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved by
what is said? is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than the
faculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing that it is amidst
all the other faculties which are blind and dumb and unable to see
anything else except the very acts for which they are appointed in
order to minister to this (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty
alone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each of the rest; will
this faculty declare to us that anything else is the best, or that
itself is? And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see?
But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain person, and in
what manner, who tells us? The faculty of the will. And whether we
ought to believe what is said or not to believe it, and if we do
believe, whether we ought to be moved by it or not, who tells us? Is it
not the faculty of the will?
But if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all things, what
must I say? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of the
will, when it is right ([Greek: orthae]). For it is this which uses the
other (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both small
and great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who is
not good becomes good: but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is
through this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we
blame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this
which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look
after it, makes happiness.
What then is usually done? Men generally act as a traveller would do on
his way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being
pleased with it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your
purpose: you were not travelling to this inn, but you were passing
through it. But this is a pleasant inn. And how many other inns are
pleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing
through. But your purpose is this, to return to your country, to
relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen,
to marry, to beget children, to fill the usual magistracies. For you
are not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where
you were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the
kind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the
aid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must
advance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty
which makes use of the appearances of things; and since it is necessary
also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be effected by a
certain mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharpness,
some persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one
captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another again by
sophisms, and still another by some other inn ([Greek: paudocheiou]) of
the kind; and there they stay and waste away as they were among sirens.
Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of using
conformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires
not to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into
that which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor
ever to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled,
conforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well
satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able
from your whole soul to utter these verses:
Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny.
TO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT VALUED
(ESTEEMED) BY HIM.—A certain person said to him (Epictetus): Frequently
I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any
answer; and now, if it is possible, I entreat you to say something to
me. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in anything
else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art,
will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully?—I do
think so.—He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able
to benefit others, will speak skilfully; but he who is rather damaged
by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art
of speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others
benefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they
hear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some
damaged? There are both among these also, he said. In this case also
then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear
unskilfully are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in
hearing also, as there is in speaking? It seems so. If you choose,
consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom
does it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to
whom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a
statue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art?
This also requires the aid of art. Then if speaking properly is the
business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit
is the business of the skilful man? Now as to speaking and hearing
perfectly, and usefully, let us for the present, if you please, say no
more, for both of us are a long way from everything of the kind. But I
think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear
philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so?
Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that he
who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is
this world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the
good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither
understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is
false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire
according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to