A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and
bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will,
and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be
the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the
soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are
the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be
moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with
giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but
the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the
spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are
restored.
MISCELLANEOUS.—When some person asked him how it happened that since
reason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the
progress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he
answered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the
progress greater then? For in that in which it has now been more
cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. At present it
has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving syllogisms, and
progress is made. But in former times it was cultivated for the purpose
of maintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to
nature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are
different, and do not expect, when you are laboring at one thing to
make progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent
upon this, the keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and
living so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a
man.
It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold
(soft) cheese with a hook. But those who have a good natural
disposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to
reason.
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.—When the
administrator came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean,
Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire
of you who are philosophers, as those who come to a strange city
inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is
the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go
in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the
things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to
man—soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It
remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we
say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus
sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and
accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man
said that it was not, and added, Far be that from him. Is it not fit
then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best? It is
certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is
better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the
best, are they better, or the good things of the worse? The good things
of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of
the will or not within the power of the will? They are within the power
of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power
of the will? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend?
On itself? But that cannot be conceived; for there must first exist a
certain substance or nature ([Greek: ousia]) of good, by obtaining
which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On
what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it
shall depend on things of the soul, the substance (nature) of the good
is discovered; for good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are
rationally delighted another thing; nor if that which precedes is not
good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing
which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But
you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would
then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your
doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the
pleasure from things of the body; and again that those bodily things
must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the
good.
Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making
them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have
such persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the
persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as
this which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this
end, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic art which is
the best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand
is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that
which precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three:
those which are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which
are directed towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, the
chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to
value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things,
[Greek: ta proaegoumena]). What are these? Engaging in public business,
marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents,
and generally, having desires, aversions ([Greek: echchlinein]),
pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do
these things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted
by nature? Free, noble, modest; for what other animal blushes? what
other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame?
and we are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these
things, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our
activity, in order that it may keep us constant in acts which are
conformable to nature.
HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES ([Greek:
phantasias]).—As we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions,
so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances; for these
appearances also propose questions to us. A certain person’s son is
dead. Answer; the thing is not within the power of the will: it is not
an evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think of
it? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. Cæsar has
condemned a person. It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an
evil. The man is afflicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends
on the will: it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. That
is a thing within the power of the will: it is a good. If we train
ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; for we shall never
assent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being
comprehended. Your son is dead. What has happened? Your son is dead.
Nothing more? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened? Your ship
is lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened? He has been
led to prison. But that herein he has fared badly, every man adds from
his own opinion. But Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters.
Why? because he has made you capable of endurance? because he has made
you magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you the
power of being evils? because it is in your power to be happy while you
are suffering what you suffer? because he has opened the door to you,
when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain!
Hear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you would like to
know. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, once
when I was present, being vexed with his own friends and as if he was
suffering something intolerable, said: “I cannot bear it, you are
killing me; you will make me such as that man is,” pointing to me.
TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON A SUIT.—When a
certain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a
suit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the reason of his
going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter.
Epictetus replied: If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you
will succeed or fail, I have no rule ([Greek: theoraema]) about this.
But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have right
opinions ([Greek: dogmata]), you will fare well; if they are false, you
will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For
what is the reason why you desired to be elected governor of the
Cnossians? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up
to Rome? Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and
expense? I must go. What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opinions
are the causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the
cause may be, such also is the effect! Have we then all sound opinions,
both you and your adversary? And how do you differ? But have you
sounder opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so. And so does he
think that his opinions are better; and so do madmen. This is a bad
criterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your
opinions and have taken some pains about them. And as now you are
sailing to Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and you
are not content to stay at home with the honors which you had, but you
desire something greater and more conspicuous, so when did you ever
make a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and
casting them out, if you have any that are bad? Whom have you
approached for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What age?
Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are ashamed of me
(knowing the fact) when you were a boy, did you examine your own
opinions? and did you not then, as you do all things now, do as you did
do? and when you were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and
yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you were
deficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged in public
matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gaining reputation, who
then seemed your equal? And when would you have submitted to any man
examining and showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you wish
me to say to you? Help me in this matter. I have no theorem (rule) for
this. Nor have you, if you came to me for this purpose, come to me as a
philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what
purpose then have philosophers theorems? For this purpose, that
whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and continue to be
conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a small thing? No; but the
greatest. What then? does it need only a short time? and is it possible
to seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it.
Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone
or a statue: for you saw me and nothing more. But he meets with a man
as a man, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn
my opinions: show me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let
us examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it away; if you
have any, show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher.
Not so (you say): but this is only a passing visit, and while we are
hiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says.
Then you go away and say: Epictetus was nothing; he used solecisms and
spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges? Well,
but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), I
shall have no land as you have none; I shall have no silver cups as you