A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
may possess unchanged—what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of
the rich, desire without attaining any end, and avoidance ([Greek:
echchlisin]) which fails in the attempt? About security in these things
you have been anxious.
Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and
then to have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see
building a battlement all around and encircling it with a wall? And
what doorkeeper is placed with no door to watch? But you practise in
order to be able to prove—what? You practise that you may not be tossed
as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what? Show me
first what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and show me
the scales or the medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on
measuring the dust? Ought you not to demonstrate those things which
make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they
wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in
the administration of the universe?
ABOUT FREEDOM.—He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is
neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose
movements to action ([Greek: hormai]) are not impeded, whose desires
attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would
avoid ([Greek: echchliseis aperiptotoi]). Who then chooses to live in
error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust,
unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives
as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow,
fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to
avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of
the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that
which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not
one; nor then do we find any bad man free.
Further, then, answer me this question, also: does freedom seem to you
to be something great and noble and valuable? How should it not seem
so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and
valuable and noble to be mean? It is not possible. When then you see
any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own
opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not
only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a
government (province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves
who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so
for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.
This is admitted also. Do you think that freedom is a thing independent
and self-governing? Certainly. Whomsoever then it is in the power of
another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not
look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or
inquire about his being bought or sold, but if you hear him saying from
his heart and with feeling, “Master,” even if the twelve fasces precede
him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, “Wretch
that I am, how much I suffer,” call him a slave. If, finally, you see
him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave, though he wears
a praetexta. If, then, he is doing nothing of this kind do not yet say
that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to
compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune, and if you
find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia;
say that his master is from home; he will return soon, and you will
know what he suffers.
What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him
his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor
provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be
discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from
hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then
is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore
in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a
general way; but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it
possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others
can be free from hindrance? No. Is it possible for him to be unimpeded?
No. Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then, whether we have nothing
which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or
whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of
others. What do you mean? When you wish the body to be entire (sound)
is it in your power or not? It is not in my power. When you wish it to
be healthy? Neither is this in my power. When you wish it to be
handsome? Nor is this. Life or death? Neither is this in my power. Your
body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than
yourself. It is. But your estate is it in your power to have it when
you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please? No. And
your slaves? No. And your clothes? No. And your house? No. And your
horses? Not one of these things. And if you wish by all means your
children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it
in your power? This also is not in my power.
Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends
on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of
the kind? I know not. Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is
any man able to make you assent to that which is false? No man. In the
matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction.
Granted. Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that
to which you do not choose? He can, for when he threatens me with death
or bonds he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then you
despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him? No. Is
then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours? It
is my act.
When you have made this preparation, and have practised this
discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that
which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those
which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern
yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep
your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and
turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear
any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? About the things
which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and
who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede
them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be
afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not
yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you
been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own
and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your
power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have
you come to the philosophers? was it that you may nevertheless be
unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed
you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to
you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is
present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are
within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a
proper and regulated desire; but of the things which are not in the
power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow
any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure
hasty.
Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you
angry and do you blame the giver if he takes anything from you? Who are
you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God)
introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you
fellow-workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he
introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and
as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his
administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival
for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been
permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads
you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard
and seen? No; but I would still enjoy the feast. The initiated too
would wish to be longer in the initiation; and perhaps also those at
Olympia to see other athletes. But the solemnity is ended; go away like
a grateful and modest man; make room for others; others also must be
born, as you were, and, being born, they must have a place, and houses,
and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why
are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the
world? Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife.
What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who
made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you
not give way to him who is superior? Why then did he introduce me into
the world on these conditions? And if the conditions do not suit you,
depart. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants
those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that
they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the
solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly, he will
not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ([Greek:
panaeguris]) for they did not when they were present behave as they
ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they
lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not
seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received
for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind,
manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom. For what
purpose then have I received these things? To use them. How long? So
long as he who has lent them chooses. What if they are necessary to me?
Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary; do not
say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not
necessary.
You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray to
be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my
poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do
not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you
may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? Not
because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free,
because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not
possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of
laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed,
everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he
would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed
you for it; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his
leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends,
country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from
whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and
his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have
yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would
any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to
inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of
the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered
that everything which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf