A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my
mind, or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for
the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament
over what happens?
Come, then, do you also having observed these things look to the
faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring
now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given
to me by thee and powers for honoring myself through the things which
happen. You do not so; but you sit still, trembling for fear that some
things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what
does happen; and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence
of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given
us these faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything that
happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king
and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance,
subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our
own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of
hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as
your own, use them not; you do not even see what you have received, and
from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even
acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit,
betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God.
Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of
soul and manliness; but what powers you have for finding fault making
accusations, do you show me.
HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN MAY PROCEED TO THE
CONSEQUENCES.—I indeed think that the old man ought to be sitting here,
not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble
talk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any
young men of such a mind, that when they have recognized their kinship
to God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and
its possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to
us for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw
off these things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and
to depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labor that your teacher and
instructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should
be. You should come to him and say: Epictetus, we can no longer endure
being bound to this poor body, and feeding it, and giving it drink and
rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the
wishes of these and of those. Are not these things indifferent and
nothing to us; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner
kinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to the
place from which we came; allow us to be released at last from these
bonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers
and thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and
think that they have some power over us by means of the body and its
possessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any
man. And I on my part would say: Friends, wait for God: when he shall
give the signal and release you from this service, then go to him; but
for the present endure to dwell in this place where he has put you.
Short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for
those who are so disposed; for what tyrant, or what thief, or what
courts of justice are formidable to those who have thus considered as
things of no value the body and the possessions of the body? Wait then,
do not depart without a reason.
OF CONTENTMENT.—With respect to gods, there are some who say that a
divine being does not exist; others say that it exists, but is inactive
and careless, and takes no forethought about anything; a third class
say that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about
great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a
fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about
things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and
not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and
Socrates belong, who say:
I move not without thy knowledge.—Iliad, x., 278.
Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of
these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there
are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if they
exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be
right to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after
things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in
fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and
good man then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind
to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the
state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed
with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how
shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I
become free? For he is free to whom everything happens according to his
will, and whom no man can hinder. What then, is freedom madness?
Certainly not; for madness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I
would have everything result just as I like, and in whatever way I
like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that
freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to
wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be
not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the
matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No,
but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And
how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in
every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of
no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man’s
whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the
chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will
inconsiderately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to
wish that everything may happen as it does. And how do things happen?
As the disposer has disposed them? And he has appointed summer and
winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such
opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he has given
a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions.
What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce
with them? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit
to them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to
nature? But you are unwilling to endure, and are discontented; and if
you are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you call
them knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents and
children, and brothers and neighbors. But you ought when you are alone
to call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to
think yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you ought
not to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and
assembly, and so accept all contentedly.
What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be
what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? Let him be
alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? Let him be a bad son,
and lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? Let him be a bad
father. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he
is there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there
he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there
willingly. Must my leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of
one poor leg find fault with the world? Will you not willingly
surrender it for the whole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not
gladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and
discontented with the things established by Zeus, which he, with the
Moirae (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your
generation, defined and put in order? Know you not how small a part you
are compared with the whole. I mean with respect to the body, for as to
intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less; for the
magnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height,
but by thoughts.
HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS.—When some one asked,
How may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered: If he can eat
justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately, and
orderly, will it not be also acceptable to the gods? But when you have
asked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has
brought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house,
then not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this acceptable
to the gods? How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave?
Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus
for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the
same descent from above? But if you have been put in any such higher
place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not
remember who you are, and whom you rule? That they are kinsmen, that
they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus? But I
have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what
direction you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the
pit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men? but towards
the laws of the gods you are not looking.
WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES.—When a man was consulting him how he should
persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied:
Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If
it did (or if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowing
something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter’s
material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of
the art of living is each man’s life. When then is my brother’s? That
again belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of
the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like
reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every
circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable
to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says.
How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me
and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.
When the man who was consulting him said, I seek to know this, How,
even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in
a state conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is
produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say
to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires
time: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is
then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour,
and would you possess the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a time and
so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.
THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS (FAULTS) OF OTHERS.—Ought
not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means
say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken
and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the
faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the
faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If