A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES.—It is circumstances
(difficulties) which show what men are. Therefore when a difficulty
falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has
matched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. Why,
that you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplished
without sweat. In my opinion no man has had a more profitable
difficulty than you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an
athlete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now sending a scout
to Rome; but no man sends a cowardly scout, who, if he only hears a
noise and sees a shadow anywhere, comes running back in terror and
reports that the enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and
tell us: “Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome; terrible is death;
terrible is exile; terrible is calumny; terrible is poverty; fly, my
friends, the enemy is near,” we shall answer: “Begone, prophesy for
yourself; we have committed only one fault, that we sent such a scout.”
Diogenes, who was sent as a scout before you, made a different report
to us. He says that death is no evil, for neither is it base; he says
that fame (reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has this spy
said about pain, about pleasure, and about poverty? He says that to be
naked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground
is the softest bed; and he gives as a proof of each thing that he
affirms his own courage, his tranquillity, his freedom, and the healthy
appearance and compactness of his body. There is no enemy near, he
says; all is peace. How so, Diogenes? “See,” he replies, “if I am
struck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man.” This is
what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and tell us one thing
after another. Will you not go back, and you will see clearer when you
have laid aside fear?
ON THE SAME.—If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are
not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the
will, and the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us,
why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about
which we have been busied are in no man’s power; and the things which
are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have
we still?
But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? Has not Zeus
given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free
from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own
subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of
orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what
is your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity)
is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things
from you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But
how do you act? When you seek what is not your own, you lose that which
is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind
do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy
of confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others
besides? “Well, but he has not given these orders,” you will say.
Produce your præcognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), produce these proofs
of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what
you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you
have meditated on; and you will then see that all these things are from
God.
If I have set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to
be a slave; if on my poor possessions, I also make myself a slave. For
I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake
draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he
guards; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard,
that part your master will attack. Remembering this, whom will you
still flatter or fear?
But I should like to sit where the Senators sit. Do you see that you
are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself? How then
shall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be a
spectator at all, and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give
yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over,
seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself.
For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves,
who put ourselves in straits; that is, our opinions squeeze us and put
us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and
revile it, and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone,
what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a
stepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he
accomplishes something. Strip him. What do you mean by him? Lay hold of
his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do
you.
This was the practice of Socrates; this was the reason why he always
had one face. But we choose to practise and study anything rather than
the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say:
“Philosophers talk paradoxes.” But are there no paradoxes in the other
arts? And what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man’s eye in
order that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the
surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder,
then, if in philosophy also many things which are true appear
paradoxical to the inexperienced?
IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND WHAT AIDS WE SHOULD PROVIDE
AGAINST THEM.—Appearances are to us in four ways. For either things
appear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; or
they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to
be. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the
mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys
(troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of
Pyrrho and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply
the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which
some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a
remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek
aid against habit. What aid, then, can we find against habit? The
contrary habit. You hear the ignorant say: “That unfortunate person is
dead; his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off
by an untimely death and in a foreign land.” Hear the contrary way of
speaking. Tear yourself from these expressions; oppose to one habit the
contrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and
discipline of reason; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we
ought to have manifest præcognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), cleared of
all impurities and ready to hand.
When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness,
that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary
thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I
am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way.
I will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give
to another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing
anything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something
noble. Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our
power to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death; discover for me
the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not
visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do
you wish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from
the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the
origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this
should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according
to my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the
eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to
be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil.
Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to
tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and
abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not
care for me, what are they to me? Yes, but you will be an impious man.
In what respect, then, will it be worse for me than it is now? To sum
up, remember that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing,
piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem
necessary (true)?
THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN; AND WHAT ARE THE SMALL AND THE
GREAT THINGS AMONG MEN.—What is the cause of assenting to anything? The
fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to
that which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of
the understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the
false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof
of this? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night.
It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not
possible. Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the stars
are even in number. It is impossible. When then any man assents to that
which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as
false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato
says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have
we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit
and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the
unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not,
and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful
to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea?
“’Tis true I know what evil I shall do,
But passion overpowers the better counsel.”
She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her
husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but
she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will
not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow
except that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why
then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered
about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of a
human creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity
the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the
faculties which are supreme?
Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every
act is the appearance (the opinion), whether the thing appears good or
bad. If good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the
penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one
person, and he who suffers another person—whoever remembers this will
not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not
revile or blame any man, nor hate, nor quarrel with any man.
So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the
appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is
nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared to
Alexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It appeared to Helene to
follow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a
gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only
would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a
matter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such
great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many
men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing? But what