A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion
proposition maintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so
that the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a
conjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it
fulfils what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog,
preserved? (When they severally keep their promise.) What is the wonder
then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like manner is
lost? Each man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the
carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But
if a man accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his
art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the
modest man, and immodest actions destroy him; and actions of fidelity
preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on
the other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters:
shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the
faithless man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an angry
temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more
avaricious.
For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with
learning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we have
long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice
opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also
put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the
expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able
to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things
(in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and
some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which
participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the
indifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of
our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of
those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed.
Philosopher, where are the things which you were talking about? Whence
did you produce and utter them? From the lips, and thence only. Why
then do you corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat the
weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? For it is one
thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to
eat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become
sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is
stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you
have no other advantage from it except so far as to appear to possess
it. For what is the difference between explaining these doctrines and
those of men who have different opinions? Sit down now and explain
according to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you
will explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus
himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the
many? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you
not see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian, or an Egyptian?
and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say,
This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the
affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted
that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew.
HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES.—Consider who you
are. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothing
superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to
it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from
subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by
reason. You have been separated from wild beasts; you have been
separated from domestic animals ([Greek: probaton]). Further, you are a
citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient
(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable
of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the
connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise
(profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate
about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as
the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the
constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion
nor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole.
Therefore, the philosophers say well, that if the good man had
foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own
sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are
assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the
whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now
because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the
things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we
were made among other things for this.
After this, remember that you are a son. What does this character
promise? To consider that everything which is the son’s belongs to the
father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor
to say or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all
things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After
this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is
due to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your
brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which
are independent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may
have the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a
thing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat,
to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the
advantage.
Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are
a senator; if a youth, that you are a youth; if an old man, that you
are an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined,
marks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I
say to you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In
the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer,
you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the
brother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear
not to have changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead
of a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous
wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But (I
suppose) you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And
does the loss of nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art
of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if
you shall lose modesty, moderation ([Greek: chtastolaen]) and
gentleness, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first
mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will,
and the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have
them nor to lose them is shameful; but as to the second, not to have
them and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a
misfortune.
What then? shall I not hurt him who has hurt me? In the first place
consider what hurt ([Greek: blabae]) is, and remember what you have
heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will
(purpose, intention, [Greek: proaireeis]), and the evil also in the
will, see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man has
hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by
doing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves
(mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is any
detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; and
where the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is (you
suppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an
unjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip,
nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than
(security to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest
and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except
only in the school so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore our
proficiency is limited to these few words; but beyond them it does not
exist even in the slightest degree.
WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS.—The beginning of philosophy, to
him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door is a
consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things;
for we come into the world with no natural notion of a right-angled
triangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of a half-tone; but we
learn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art;
and for this reason those who do not know them do not think that they
know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and
becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and
improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever
came into the world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we
all use these names, and we endeavor to fit the preconceptions to the
several cases (things) thus: he has done well; he has not done well; he
has done as he ought, not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has
been fortunate; he is unjust, he is just; who does not use these names?
who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he
defers the use of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or
sounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already
taught as it were by nature some things on this matter ([Greek:
topon]), and proceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit
([Greek: oiaesin]). For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful
and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it
to particulars? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly? In that lies
the whole question; and conceit is added here; for beginning from these
things which are admitted men proceed to that which is matter of
dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this
power of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them
from being perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt the
preconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this
(assume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not seem so to
another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does
he not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of you
can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have
contrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything
better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that
you do? Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem
to him right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not
sufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming
([Greek: tou dochein]). What is this?
Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the
disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of
the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only
“seems,” and a certain investigation of that which “seems” whether it
“seems” rightly, and a discovery of some rule ([Greek: chanonos]), as
we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a
carpenter’s rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked
things.—This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all
things are right which seem so to all? And how is it possible that
contradictions can be right?—Not all then, but all which seem to us to