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Albert Gallatin

John Austin Stevens

whose leaders were Mr. Gallatin's immediate friends and warm supporters. Both Jefferson and Burr were accused of bargaining to secure enough of the Federalist vote to turn the scale. That Mr. Jefferson did make some sacrifice of his independence is now believed. Whether Mr. Gallatin was aware of any such compromise is uncertain. If such bargain were made, General Samuel Smith was the channel of arrangement, and in view of the inexplicable and ignominious deference of Jefferson and Madison to his political demands, there is little doubt that he held a secret power which they dared not resist. Gallatin felt it, suffered from it, protested against it, but submitted to it. The fear was that Congress might adjourn without a conclusion. To meet this emergency Mr. Gallatin devised a plan of balloting in the House, which he communicated to Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Nicholas. It stated the objects of the Federalists to be, 1st, to elect Burr; 2d, to defeat the present election and order a new one; 3d, to assume _executive_ power during the interregnum. These he considers, and suggests alternative action in case of submission or resistance on the part of the Republicans. The Federalists, holding three branches of government, viz., the presidency, a majority in the Senate, and a majority in the House, might pass a law declaring that one of the great officers designated by the Constitution should act as president pro tempore, which would be constitutional. But while Mr. Gallatin in this paragraph admitted such a law to be constitutional, in the next he argued that the act of the person designated by law, or of the president pro tempore, assuming the power is clearly "unconstitutional." By this ingenious process of reasoning, to which the strict constructionists have always been partial, it might be unconstitutional to carry out constitutional law. The assumption of such power was therefore, Mr. Gallatin held, usurpation, to be resisted in one of two ways; by declaring the interval till the next session of Congress an interregnum, allowing all laws not immediately connected with presidential powers to take their course, and opposing a silent resistance to all others; or by the Republicans assuming the executive power by a joint act of the two candidates, or by the relinquishment of all claims by one of them. On the other hand, the proposed outlines of Republican conduct were, 1st, to persevere in voting for Mr. Jefferson; 2d, to use every endeavor to defeat any law on the subject; 3d, to try to persuade Mr. Adams to refuse his consent to any such law and not to call the Senate on any account if there should be no choice by the House. In a letter written in 1848 Mr. Gallatin said that a provision by law, that if there should be no election the executive power be placed in the hands of some public officer, was a revolutionary act of usurpation which would have been put down by force if necessary. It was threatened that, if any man should be thus appointed President he should instantly be put to death, and bodies of men were said to be organized, in Maryland and Virginia, ready to march to Washington on March 4 for that purpose. The fears of violence were so great that to Governor McKean of Pennsylvania was submitted the propriety of having a body of militia in readiness to reach the capital in time to prevent civil war. From this letter of Mr. Gallatin, then the last surviving witness of the election, only one conclusion can be drawn: that the Republicans would have preferred violent resistance to temporary submission, even though the officer exercising executive powers was appointed in accordance with law. Fortunately for the young country there was enough good sense and patriotism in the ranks of the Federalists to avert the danger. On the suggestion of Mr. Bayard it was agreed by a committee of sixteen members, one from each State, that if it should appear that the two persons highest on the list, Jefferson and Burr, had an equal number of votes, the House should immediately proceed in their own chamber to choose the president by ballot, and should not adjourn until an election should have been made. On the first ballot there was a tie between Jefferson and Burr; the deadlock continued until February 17, when the Federalists abandoned the contest, and Mr. Jefferson received the requisite number of votes. Burr, having the second number, became vice-president. Mr. Gallatin's third congressional term closed with this Congress. In his first term he asserted his power and took his place in the councils of the party. In his second, he became its acknowledged chief. In the third, he led its forces to final victory. But for his opposition, war would have been declared against France, and the Republican party would have disappeared in the political chasm. But for his admirable management, Mr. Jefferson would have been relegated to the study of theoretical government on his Monticello farm, or to play second fiddle at the Capitol to the music of Aaron Burr. In the foregoing analysis of the debates and resolutions of Congress, and the recital of the part taken in them by Mr. Gallatin, attention has only been paid to such of the proceedings as concerned the interpretation of the Constitution or the forms of administration with which Mr. Gallatin interested himself. From the day of his first appearance he commanded the attention and the respect of his fellows. The leadership of his party fell to him as of course. It was not grasped by him. He was never a partisan. He never waived his entire independence of judgment. His ingenuity and adroitness never tempted him to untenable positions. Hence his party followed him with implicit confidence. Yet while the debates of Congress, imperfectly reported as they seem to be in its annals, show the deference paid to him by the Republican leaders, and display the great share he took in the definition of powers and of administration as now understood, his name is hardly mentioned in history. Jefferson and Madison became presidents of the United States. They, with Gallatin, formed the triumvirate which ruled the country for sixteen years. Gallatin was the youngest of the three.[9] To this political combination Gallatin brought a knowledge of constitutional law equal to their own, a knowledge of international law superior to that of either, and a habit of practical administration of which they had no conception. The Republican party lost its chief when Gallatin left the House; from that day it floundered to its close. In the balance of opinion there are no certain weights and measures. The preponderance of causes cannot be precisely ascertained. The freedom which the people of the United States enjoy to-day is not the work of any one party. Those who are descended from its original stock, and those whom its free institutions have since invited to full membership, owe that freedom to two causes: the one, formulated by Hamilton, a strong, central power, which, deriving its force from the people, maintains its authority at home and secures respect abroad; the other, the spirit of liberty which found expression in the famous declaration of the rights of man. This influence Jefferson represented. It taught the equality of man; not equality before the law alone, nor yet political equality, but that absolute freedom from class distinction which is true social equality; in a word, mutual respect. But for Hamilton we might be a handful of petty States, in discordant confederation or perpetual war; but for Jefferson, a prey to the class jealousy which unsettles the social relations and threatens the political existence of European States. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 4: Lord Sheffield to Mr. Abbott, November 6, 1812. _Correspondence of Lord Colchester_, ii. 409.] [Footnote 5: Gallatin later described Jackson as he first saw him in his seat in the House: "A tall, lank, uncouth looking individual, with long locks of hair hanging over his brows and face, while a queue hung down his back tied in an eelskin. The dress of this individual was singular, his manners and deportment that of a backwoodsman." Bartlett's _Reminiscences of Gallatin_.] [Footnote 6: The phrase "stop the wheels of government" originated with "Peter Porcupine" (William Cobbett) and was on every tongue.] [Footnote 7: Charles C. Pinckney, when ambassador to France, 1796.] [Footnote 8: Jefferson to William Duane, March 28, 1811. Jefferson's _Works_, vol. v. p. 574.] [Footnote 9: Jefferson was born in 1743, Madison in 1751, Gallatin in 1761.] CHAPTER VI SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY _Funding_ The material comfort of every people depends more immediately upon the correct management of its finances than upon any other branch of government. _Haute finance_, to use a French expression for which there is no English equivalent, demands in its application the faculties of organization and administration in their highest degree. The relations of money to currency and credit, and their relations to industry and agriculture, or in modern phrase of capital to labor, fall within its scope. The history of France, the nation which has best understood and applied true principles of finance, supplies striking examples of the benefits a finance minister of the first order renders to his country, and the dangers of false theories. The marvelous restoration of its prosperity by the genius of Colbert, the ruin caused by the malign sciolism of Law, are familiar to all students of political economy. Nor has the United States been less favored. The names of Morris, Hamilton, Gallatin, and Chase shine with equal lustre. Morris, the Financier of the Revolution, was called to the administration of the money department of the United States government when there was no money to administer. Before his appointment as "Financier" the expenses of the government, military and civil, had been met by expedients; by foreign loans, lotteries, and loan office certificates; finally by continental money, or, more properly speaking, bills of credit emitted by authority of Congress and made legal tender by joint action of Congress and the several States. The relation of coin to paper in this motley currency appears in the appendix to the "Journal of Congress" for the year 1778, when the government paid out in fourteen issues of paper currency, $62,154,842; in specie, $78,666; in French livres, $28,525.[10] The power of taxation was jealously withheld by the States, and Congress could not go beyond recommending to them to levy taxes for the withdrawal of the bills emitted by it for their quotas, _pari passu_ with their issue. When the entire scheme of paper money failed, the necessary supplies for the army were levied in kind. In the spring of 1781 the affairs of the Treasury Department were investigated by a committee of Congress, and an attempt was made to ascertain the precise condition of the public debt. The amount of foreign debt was approximately reached, but the record of the domestic debt was inextricably involved, and never definitely discovered. Morris soon brought order out of this chaos. His plan was to liquidate the public indebtedness in specie, and fund it in interest-bearing bonds. The Bank of North America was established, the notes of which were soon preferred to specie as a medium of exchange. Silver, then in general use as the measure of value, was adopted as the single standard. The weight and pureness of the dollar were fixed by law. The dollar was made the unit of account and payment, and subdivisions were made in a decimal ratio. This was the dollar of our fathers. Gouverneur Morris, the assistant of the Financier, suggested the decimal computation, and Jefferson the