Albert Gallatin
America to the store of precious metals, he continued the study in the
spirit of his predecessors, and favored the world with instructive
papers. Mr. Gallatin's contributions to this science are remarkable for
minute research and careful deductions.
In 1843 President Tyler tendered the Treasury portfolio to Mr. Gallatin.
The venerable financier looked upon the offer as an act of folly to
which a serious answer seemed hardly necessary. Yet as silence might be
misconstrued, he replied that he wanted no office, and to accept at his
age that of secretary of the treasury would "be an act of insanity." He
was then in his eighty-third year. The offer of the post was but an
ill-considered caprice of Mr. Tyler.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 10: Cents are omitted as confusing figures.]
[Footnote 11: The first Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
This was under the Supplementary Treasury Act.]
[Footnote 12: Excess of receipts, notwithstanding the purchase of
Louisiana and payments on account of principal and interest of the
debt.]
[Footnote 13: These were the banks of New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
and Baltimore. Seven presidents formed the committee. John A. Stevens of
New York was chairman, by request of the Secretary of the Treasury. The
other members were named by him. The sum advanced to the government was
one hundred and fifty millions of dollars in coin.]
[Footnote 14: At Portland, $120,000; Salem, $183,600; Boston, $75,300;
Providence, $67,800; Richmond, $49,000; Norfolk, $103,000; Charleston,
$354,000.]
[Footnote 15: Report of Secretary Dallas, September 20, 1816.]
[Footnote 16: Act of March 3, 1817.]
[Footnote 17: _Democratic Review_, xii. 641.]
[Footnote 18: Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means.]
CHAPTER VII
IN THE CABINET
The general principles which Mr. Jefferson proposed to apply in his
conduct of the government were not principles of organization but of
administration. The establishments devised by Hamilton, in accordance
with or in development of the provisions of the Constitution, were
organic. The new policy was essentially restrictive and economic. The
military and naval establishments were to be kept at their lowest
possible limit. The Treasury Department was to be conducted on strictly
business principles. The debt was to be reduced and finally paid by a
fixed annual appropriation. The revenue was to be raised by imposts on
importation and tonnage, and by direct taxation, if necessary. The
public land system was to be developed. A scheme of internal
improvements by land and water highways was to be devised. All these
purposes except the last had been declared by the opposition during the
last part of Washington's second term and during Adams's presidency, and
had been lucidly expounded by Madison, Gallatin, Giles, Nicholas, and
others of the Republican leaders. On all these subjects Mr. Gallatin
was in accord with his chief. Only upon the bank question were they at
issue. Mr. Jefferson detested or feared the aristocracy of money, while
Gallatin, with a clearer insight into commercial and financial
questions, recognized that in a young country where capital was limited,
and specie in still greater disproportion to the increasing demands of
trade, a well-ordered, well-managed money institution was an enormous
advantage, if not an imperative necessity to the government and the
people.
Peace was necessary to the success of this general policy of internal
progress, but peace was not to be had for the asking. It was not till
half a century later that the power of the western continent as a
food-producing country was fully felt by Europe, and peace with the
United States became almost a condition of existence to millions in the
old world, while this country became independent, in fact as in name, to
the fullest meaning of the word. Peace was not menaced during
Jefferson's first administration, for the Federalists had left no legacy
of diplomatic discord to embarrass their successors. The divisions of
opinion were on home affairs. The Republican party was the first
opposition which had reached power since the formation of the
government. The Federalists had not hesitated to confine the patronage
of the executive to men of their own way of thinking. The Republicans
had attacked that principle. There were men even in the ranks of
Jefferson's administration who scouted the idea that the President of
the United States could become "the President of a party." But practice
and principle are not always in accord, even in administrations of
sentimental purity, and the pressure for office was as great in 1800 as
it has ever since been on the arrival of a new party to power. Beyond
all other departments of government, the Treasury depends for its proper
service upon business capacity and a knowledge of the principles of
accounting and office routine. Mr. Gallatin was well aware of the
difficulties his predecessors had encountered in finding and retaining
competent examining and auditing clerks. As there was no reason to
suppose that all this talent was to be found in the ranks of the
Republican party, and his common sense pointed out the folly of limiting
the market of supply, he early (July 25, 1801) prepared a circular to
collectors, in which he informed them "that the door of office was no
longer to be shut against any man because of his political opinions, but
that integrity and capacity suitable to the station were to be the only
qualifications required; and further, the President, considering freedom
of opinion or freedom of suffrage at public elections imprescriptible
rights of citizens, would regard any exercise of official influence to
sustain or control the same rights in others as injurious to the public
administration and practically destructive of the fundamental principles
of a republican Constitution." But Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison
opposed this simple declaration of a principle which has since been the
base of every attempt at reform in the civil service. Mr. Jefferson
answered that after one half of the subordinates were exchanged, talents
and worth might alone be inquired into in the case of new vacancies.
This was a miserable shuffling policy which defeated itself. For a
Federalist to retain office when such a discrimination was applied was
of itself a degradation. Mr. Jefferson here threw away and forever lost
the power to establish the true system, and fixed the curse of patronage
upon American administration. The true principle may be stated in the
form of an axiom. Administrations should rely for continuation upon
measures, not on patronage. Gallatin yielded with reluctance to the
spirit of persecution which he did not hesitate to say disgraced the
Republican cause, and sank them to a level with their predecessors.
Notwithstanding his aversion, he was compelled to follow the policy of
the cabinet. Its first result was to divide the Republican party, and to
alienate Burr, whose recommendation of Matthew L. Davis for the naval
office at New York was disregarded. Had the new administration declined
to make removals except for cause, such a dispute would have been
avoided. As it was, the friends of Burr considered the refusal as a
declaration of war. Appointments became immediately a part of the
machinery of Republican administration, as it had been part of that of
their predecessors, and each was carefully weighed and considered in
its reference to party quite as much as to public service.
Already looking forward to the next presidential election, Gallatin was
anxious for an agreement upon Jefferson's successor, and even before the
meeting of the first Congress of his term he advised the President on
this point, and he also proposed the division of every State into
election districts by a general constitutional provision.
Jefferson submitted the draft of his annual messages to the head of each
department, and invited their comments. Gallatin was minute in his
observations, and it is interesting to note the peculiar precision and
caution of his character in the nice criticisms of language and style,
sometimes declaratory, sometimes non-committal, but always and obviously
reasonable, and often presenting a brief argument for the change
proposed. In these days of woman's rights it is curious to read "Th. J.
to Mr. Gallatin. The appointment of a woman to office is an innovation
for which the public is not prepared, nor am I."
Gallatin suggested a weekly general conference of the President and the
secretaries at what is now styled a cabinet meeting, and private
conferences of the President with each of the secretaries once or twice
a week on certain days and at fixed hours. The business to come before
the House was also to be considered, and the policy to be pursued
determined upon. Unfortunately in this case again Jeffersonian theory
did not accord with Jeffersonian practice. Even erratic Randolph
complained of the want of system at these cabinet meetings, where each
was at liberty to do and say as he chose; a severe trial, this, to
Gallatin. In 1845 Mr. Gallatin wrote to Edward Coles that it was "quite
unusual to submit to the cabinet the manner in which the land or naval
forces authorized by Congress, and for which appropriations had been
made, should be employed," and added that on no occasion, in or out of
cabinet, was he ever consulted on those subjects prior to the year 1812.
In the difficulty which arose with the Barbary powers Mr. Gallatin
earnestly urged the payment of an annuity to Tripoli, if necessary for
peace. He considered it a mere matter of calculation whether the
purchase of peace was not cheaper than the expense of a war. This policy
was to be continued for eight years, at the end of which he hoped that a
different tone might be assumed. In a note on the message of 1802,
Gallatin expressed the hope to Jefferson that his administration would
"afford but few materials for historians." He would never sacrifice
permanent prosperity to temporary glitter.
Mr. Gallatin's counsel was sought, and his opinion deferred to, on
subjects which did not fall directly within the scope of administration.
Even on questions of fundamental constitutional law his judgment was not
inferior to that of Madison himself. In one notable instance he differed
from Mr. Lincoln, the attorney-general, whom he held in high esteem as
a good lawyer, a fine scholar, "a man of great discretion and sound
judgment." This was in 1803, when the acquisition of East Louisiana and
West Florida was a cabinet question. Mr. Lincoln considered that there
was a difference between a power to acquire territory for the United
States and the power to extend by treaty the territory of the United
States, and held that the first was unconstitutional. Mr. Gallatin held
that the United States as a nation have an inherent right to acquire
territory, and that, when acquisition is by treaty, the same constituted
authorities in whom the treaty power is vested have a constitutional
right to sanction the acquisition, and that when the territory has been
acquired Congress has the power either of admitting into the Union as a
new State or of annexing to a State, with the consent of that State, or
of making regulations for the government of the territory. Mr. Jefferson
concurred in this opinion, while at the same time he thought it safer
not to permit the enlargement of the Union except by amendment of the
Constitution. Mr. Gallatin's view was practically applied in the cases
named, and later in the annexation of Texas, although he disapproved of
the latter as contrary to good faith and the law of nations. He advised
Jefferson, also, not to lay the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired
before the House until after its ratification by the Senate, taking the