Albert Gallatin
ground that until then it was not a treaty, and urging that great care
should be taken to do nothing which might be represented as containing
any idea of encroachment on the rights of the Senate. He personally
interested himself in the arrangements for taking possession of New
Orleans, and, considering the expense as trifling compared with the
object, urged the dispatch of an imposing force of not less than fifteen
thousand men, which would add to the opinion entertained abroad of our
power, resources, and energy; five thousand of these to be active
troops; ten thousand an enrolled reserve. The acquisition of Louisiana
was the grand popular feature of the foreign policy of the first term of
Jefferson's administration. The internal management left much to be
desired.
While his general views were exalted, and his principles would stand the
nicest examination in their application, Mr. Jefferson was not fortunate
in his choice of methods or men. It is not enough for an administration
to be pure; it should be above suspicion. This his was not. Time has not
washed out the stain of his intimacy with William Duane, the editor of
the infamous "Aurora." Citizen Duane, as he styled himself in the first
days of the administration, quarreled with Gallatin because he would not
apply the official guillotine, and thereafter pursued him with
uncompromising hostility. Of favoritism in appointments Mr. Gallatin
could not be accused. During his twelve years in the Treasury he
procured places for but two friends; one was given an obscure clerkship
in the department; the other, John Badollet, was made register in the
land office at Vincennes, against whom Gallatin said in the application
for appointment which he reluctantly made, there was but one objection,
"that of being his personal and college friend."
The dispositions for the sale of lands in the western territory, the
extinguishment of titles, and the surveys fell under Mr. Gallatin's
general supervision, and were the objects of his particular care. So
also was the establishment of the authority of the United States in the
Louisiana territory. In the course of these arrangements he was brought
into contact with Mr. Pierre Choteau of St. Louis, who controlled the
Indian trade of a vast territory. The foundation of an intimate
acquaintance was then laid. The influence of this remarkable man over
the Western Indians and the extent of his trading operations with them
was great, and has never since been equaled. About this period Mr. John
Jacob Astor informed the government that he had an opportunity, of which
he intended to take advantage, to purchase one half of the interest of
the Canadian Fur Company, which, notwithstanding the treaty of 1794,
engrossed the trade by way of Michilimackinac with our own Indians.
Before that period this lucrative traffic had been exclusively in
British hands, and the hostility of the Indian tribes rendered any
interference in it by Americans dangerous to life and property, and
their participation since had been merely nominal. Jefferson's cabinet
received the proposal with satisfaction, but, in their strict
interpretation of the Constitution, could find no way of giving any aid
to the scheme beyond the _official_ promise of protection, which it fell
to Mr. Gallatin to draft. Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Astor a letter to
the same effect. Mr. Astor, however, was not deterred from his
enterprise, but, under the charter of the American Fur Company granted
by the State of New York, extended his project to the Indians west of
the Rocky Mountains, and made of it an immense business, employing
several vessels at the mouth of the Columbia River and a large land
party beyond the Rocky Mountains. He finally founded the establishment
of Astoria. This settlement fell into the hands of the British during
the war of 1812. Mr. Astor sought to persuade the American government to
permit him to renew the establishment at its close, only asking a flag
and a lieutenant's command, but Mr. Madison would not commit himself to
the plan.
Among Mr. Jefferson's pet schemes was that of a substitution of gunboats
for fortifications, and for supporting the authority of the laws within
harbors. The mind of Mr. Jefferson had no doubt been favorably disposed
to this mode of offensive defense by the experience of Lafayette at
Annapolis, in his southern expedition in the spring of 1781, when his
entire flotilla, ammunition of war, and even the city of Annapolis,
were saved from destruction by two improvised gunboats, which, armed
with mortars and hot shot, drove the British blockading vessels out of
the harbor. Jefferson first suggested the scheme in his annual message
of 1804, and Gallatin did not interfere; but when, in 1807, the
President insisted, in a special message, on the building of two hundred
vessels of this class, Mr. Gallatin objected, because of the expense in
construction and maintenance, and secondly, of their infallible decay.
Mr. Jefferson persisted, and Mr. Gallatin's judgment was vindicated by
the result. Two years later, of one hundred and seventy-six gunboats
constructed, only twenty-four were in actual service. In his letter of
criticism, Mr. Gallatin gave as his opinion, that "it would be an
economical measure for every naval nation to burn their navy at the end
of a war and to build a new one when again at war, if it was not that
time was necessary to build ships of war." The principle was the same as
to gunboats, and the objection of time necessary for building did not
exist.
This year he also laid before the President a memorandum of preparatory
measures for defense against Great Britain, from whom an attack was
expected by land and sea, and a second plan for offensive operations on
the northern frontier, which is complete in its geographical and
topographical information, and its estimate of resources in men,
material, and money. At the same time he urged upon Mr. Jefferson to
moderate the tone of his message, so as not to widen the breach by
hurting the pride of Great Britain.
In connection with the land system, Mr. Jefferson favored, and Mr.
Gallatin devised, an extensive plan of internal improvements. The route
of the Cumberland road from the Potomac to the Ohio was reported to
Congress in 1807; a coast survey was ordered in the same year. The first
superintendent was Hassler, a Swiss, whom Mr. Gallatin brought to the
notice of Mr. Jefferson. In 1808 a general plan of improvement was
submitted to the Senate. This included canals parallel with the
seacoast, making a continuous line of inland navigation from the Hudson
to Cape Fear; a great turnpike from Maine to Georgia; the improvement of
the Susquehanna, Potomac, James, and Santee rivers to serve the slope
from the Alleghanies to the Atlantic; of the Alleghany, Monongahela, and
Kanawha, to serve the country westward to the Mississippi, the head
waters of these rivers to be connected by four roads across the
Appalachian range; a canal at the falls of the Ohio; a connection of the
Hudson with Lake Champlain, and of the same river with Lake Ontario at
Oswego; and a canal around Niagara Falls. The entire expense he
estimated at $20,000,000, to be met by an appropriation of $2,000,000 a
year for ten years; the stock created for turnpikes and canals to be a
permanent fund for repairs and improvements.
A national university for education in the higher sciences was also
recommended by Jefferson in his message of 1806, but Mr. Gallatin had
little faith in the popularity of this scheme. After the convulsion of
1794 in Geneva, Gallatin's old college mate, D'Yvernois, conceived the
plan of transporting the entire University of Geneva to the United
States, and wrote on the subject to Jefferson and Adams; but his idea
was based on the supposition that fifteen thousand dollars' income could
be had from the United States in support of the institution, which was,
of course, at the time impracticable. Jefferson believed that these
plans of national improvement could be carried into effect only by an
amendment to the Constitution; but Mr. Gallatin, as in the bank
question, was disturbed by no such scruples, and he recommended Mr.
Jefferson to strike from his message the words "general welfare," as
questionable in their nature, and because the proposition seemed to
acknowledge that the words are susceptible of a very dangerous meaning.
To a permanent embargo act Mr. Gallatin was from the beginning opposed.
He recognized the mischief of government prohibitions, and thought that
statesmen might well hesitate before they took the hazard of regulating
the concerns of individuals. The sequel proved the correctness of this
judgment. But Mr. Jefferson could not bring his mind to any more
decisive measure, indeed, it may justly be said, to any measure
whatever. Taking advantage of Mr. Madison's election to the presidency,
he simply withdrew from the triumvirate, and, passing over the subject
in silence in his last message, he ignominiously left to Mr. Madison and
Mr. Gallatin the entire responsibility which the threatening state of
the foreign relations of the country imposed on the Republican party.
The question was now between the enforcement of the Embargo Act and war.
To take off the embargo seemed a declaration of weakness. To add to it a
non-importation clause was the only alternative. In November, 1808, Mr.
Gallatin prepared for George W. Campbell, chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the House, the declaration known as Campbell's
report, which recited, in clear, compact form, the injuries done to the
United States by Great Britain, and closed with resolutions to the
effect that the United States could not submit to the edicts of Great
Britain and France, and with a recommendation of non-intercourse and for
placing of the country in a state of defense. After long debate the
resolutions were adopted by large majorities, and the policy of
resistance was finally determined upon--resistance, not war. Thus the
United States resorted, as the colonies had resorted in 1774, to a
policy of non-importation. But the condition of the States was not that
of the colonies. Then all the colonies were commercial, and the entire
population was on the seaboard; the prohibition fell with equal weight
upon all. Now there were large interior communities whom restrictions
upon commerce would rather benefit than injure. Yet neither the Sons of
Liberty nor the non-importation associations had been able to enforce
their voluntary agreements either before or after the Congress of 1774.
If this were to be the mode of resistance, stringent measures must be
adopted to make it effective. Mr. Gallatin accordingly called upon
Congress for the necessary powers. They at once responded with the
Enforcement Act, which Mr. Gallatin proceeded to apply with
characteristic administrative vigor, and summoned Jefferson to authorize
the collectors of revenue to call the military force of the United
States to support them in the exercise of their restrictive authority.
There was to be no evasion under the systems which Hamilton devised and
Gallatin knew so well how to administer.
His annual report made to Congress on December 10 had clearly set forth
the situation, and, without recommending war, had pointed out how it
might be carried on. Macon wrote of him on December 4 to their mutual
friend, Joseph H. Nicholson, "Gallatin is decidedly for war." After his
report was sent in the situation became still more perplexing. Rumors
came of an intention to call a convention of the five New England
States, with New York, if possible, to take ground against the embargo.
As these indications of dissatisfaction became manifest, and the
contingency of the employment of force at home presented itself,