Albert Gallatin
personnel of European courts. In this Adams was more fortunate. Educated
abroad, while his father was minister to the court of St. James, he was
from youth familiar with courts and their ways. To be the son of a
president of the United States was no small matter at that day. The
conjunction of these two men was rare. One of European birth and trained
to American politics, the other of American birth and brought up in the
atmosphere of European diplomacy. In their natural characteristics they
were the opposite of one another. Adams was impetuous, overbearing,
impatient of contradiction or opposition. Gallatin was calm,
self-controlled, persistent; not jealous of his opinions, but ready to
yield or abandon his own methods, if those of others promised better
success; never blinded by passion or prejudice, but holding the end
always in view. That end was peace; "peace at all times desirable," as
Mr. Gallatin said a few days before his departure on his mission, but
much more so, 'because of the incapacity shown in the conduct of the
war, its inefficiency when compared with its expense, and the open
hostility to it of a large number of the American people.' In the face
of the disasters which had befallen the country Mr. Gallatin must have
felt some qualms of conscience for his persistent opposition to the
military and naval establishments. Their reorganization had place in his
desire for peace. He said, May 5, 1813: "Taught by experience, we will
apply a part of our resources to such naval preparations and
organization of the public force as will, within less than five years,
place us in a commanding situation." With the particulars of the dispute
between the two countries he was perfectly familiar. His report prepared
in 1808 for Mr. Campbell, chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, covered the whole ground of the American argument.
At the outset there seemed good ground for hope of an early agreement.
European politics were at a critical point, and England naturally
wished to husband her resources for a sudden emergency. The mediation of
Russia Mr. Gallatin considered a salve to the pride of England. This
reasoning seemed sound enough, but it had not taken account of one
important element: the jealousy of England of any outside interference
between herself and her ancient dependencies. Mr. Gallatin did not hold
English diplomacy in very high regard. Late in life he said that the
history of the relations of England and France was a story of the
triumphs of English arms and of French diplomacy; that England was
always victorious, but France had as often negotiated her out of the
fruits of success. True as this remark was in general, it cannot be said
of the policy of England in American affairs. She pushed to the utmost
her exclusion of France from the American continent when the States were
colonies, and now that they were free and independent she would listen
to no foreign intervention. Neither in peace nor war should any third
government stand between the two nations. This was and ever has been the
true policy of Great Britain, and that it was not lost sight of in the
heat of war is to the credit of her diplomacy. The offer of Russia to
mediate was not welcome, and was set aside by Lord Castlereagh in a note
of discouragement. There was no ground for the commissioners to stand
upon; moreover the emperor and Count Nesselrode were absent from St.
Petersburg, Count Romanzoff being left in charge of the foreign
relations. The offer of mediation had originated with him. His policy
was to curb the maritime power of England, and to secure in the
negotiation a modification at least of the offensive practice of Great
Britain in her assumed police of the sea.
The war was in fact a legacy of the necessarily incomplete diplomacy of
Washington's administration and the Jay treaty. The determining cause
was the enforcement of the right of search and the impressment of seamen
from American vessels; a practice at variance with the rights and the
law of nations. Monroe, Madison's secretary of state, urged the clear
and distinct forbearance of this British practice as the one object to
be obtained. An article in the treaty giving security in that respect
was by Gallatin, as well as by Monroe, considered a _sine qua non_
condition; while Mr. Bayard viewed an informal arrangement as equally
efficient and more practicable than a solemn article. But there was no
doubt of Bayard's determination to reach the result prescribed in their
instructions.
Mr. Gallatin's first act after setting foot on European shores was to
write to Baring Brothers & Co. at London. This he did from Gottenburg,
requesting a passport for the Neptune, which the commission proposed to
retain at St. Petersburg until their return. At the same time he
intimated that he wished the British government to be informed of the
object of the mission. For the expenses of the commission the
ambassadors had authority to draw on the Barings. The reply of Mr.
Alexander Baring must at once have opened Mr. Gallatin's eyes to the
futility of the errand of the commissioners. His words clearly state the
British grounds of objection: "The mediation of Russia was offered, not
sought,--it was fairly and frankly accepted,--I do not see how America
could with any consistency refuse it; but to the eyes of a European
politician it was clear that such an interference could produce no
practical benefit. The only question now seriously at issue between us
is one purely of a domestic nature in each country respectively; no
foreign government can fairly judge of it." Pointing out the difficulty
of establishing any distinction between the great masses of the
seafaring population of Great Britain and America, he finds that no
other country can judge of the various positions of great delicacy and
importance which spring from such a state of things; and says: "This is
not the way for Great Britain and America really to settle their
disputes; intelligent persons of the two countries might devise mutual
securities and concessions which perhaps neither country would offer in
the presence of a third party. It is a sort of family quarrel where
foreign interference can only do harm and irritate at any time, but more
especially in the present state of Europe, when attempts would be made
to make a tool of America." These, he said he had good reason to know,
were the sentiments of the British cabinet on the question of place of
negotiation and foreign mediation. He also informed Mr. Gallatin that
the mediation of Russia had been refused, and that the British
government would express its desire to treat separately and directly
either at London or Gottenburg. He warned Mr. Gallatin that an opinion
prevailed in the British public that the United States were engaged to
France by a secret political connection, which belief, though perhaps
not shared by the government, would lead it to consider the persevering
of the American commission upon bringing the insulated question before
the powers of the Continent as a touchstone of their sincerity. He hoped
that the American commissioners would come at once in contact with the
British ministers, and pointed out the hesitation that every minister
would feel at giving instructions on a matter so delicate as that
"involving the rights and duties of sovereign and subject." He then
declared that there was in England a strong desire for peace and for
ending a contest in which the "two countries could only tease and weaken
each other without any practical result," and at a time when England
desired to carry her resources into the "more important field of
European contest." He then gave Castlereagh's assurance, that the
cartel-ship, the Neptune, should be respected, and expressed his own
personal hope that he should ere long be gratified by seeing it bring,
with the commissioners, the hope of peace to the shores of England.
Meanwhile Mr. Gallatin was engaged in explaining the American case to
Romanzoff by conversation and by a written statement of the facts in
the form of an unofficial note to the emperor. On August 10 word was
received from the Emperor Alexander authorizing the renewal of the offer
of mediation; and shortly after a letter from General Moreau, written to
Mr. Gallatin from the imperial headquarters at Hrushova, assured him of
his sympathy and assistance. His relations with Gallatin were of long
standing and of an intimate nature. Moreau, after a long residence in
America, to which he was warmly attached, had lately crossed the ocean
and tendered his able sword to the coalition against Bonaparte. He
informed Gallatin that one of the British ministers had said to him in
Germany that England would not treat of her maritime rights under any
mediation. He feared that American vanity would hardly consent to treat
directly with Great Britain, and foresaw that the political adversaries
of Madison and Gallatin would blame the precipitation of the United
States government in sending over the envoys before the adhesion of
England to the proposed arbitration was secured. He assured Gallatin of
the interest of the Emperor Alexander in the Americans.
On August 24 Count Romanzoff read to the envoys his dispatch to Count
Lieven, the Russian minister at London, renewing the offer of mediation.
The commissioners considering their authority as limited to treating
under the mediation of Russia, Mr. Gallatin wrote to Monroe, inclosing
a copy of Baring's letter, which he looked upon as an informal
communication of the views of the British government, and asked for
contingent powers and instructions. These they could not expect to
receive before February. Gallatin replied to Mr. Baring that no
information of the refusal of Great Britain to the mediation had been
received, but, even if it had, the commission was not authorized to
negotiate in any other manner. They were, however, competent to treat of
commerce without mediation. He declined to discuss the objection of
Great Britain to the mediation of Russia, confining himself to an
expression of ignorance in America of any such feeling on the part of
the British ministry, and of the confidence placed in the personal
character of the emperor, which was considered a sufficient pledge of
impartiality; while the selection of a sovereign at war with France was
clear evidence that America neither had nor wished to have any political
connection with that power. That he himself believed an arrangement to
be practicable, he said to Mr. Baring, was evident from the fact that he
had given up his political existence, and separated himself from his
family. His opinion was, that while neither nation would be induced to
abandon its rights or pretensions in the matter of impressment, an
arrangement might be made by way of experiment which would reserve to
both their respective abstract rights, real or assumed.
To Moreau he wrote stating his hope that, notwithstanding the first
objections of Great Britain, the mediation of the emperor would be
accepted, and he asked the general for his personal interposition to
this end. France and England he held to be equally at fault in the great
European contest; the one usurping and oppressing the land, the other
dominating and tyrannizing the sea. They alone, said he, have gained, if
not happiness, at least power. Russia, he was firmly persuaded, was the
only power at heart friendly to America. History has shown the sagacity
of this judgment. This letter was never answered. Moreau was at death's
door.
Early in October Mr. Dallas was sent to London to open relations with
the British ministry. His presence there would save two months at least
in each correspondence which involved communication between Washington,
London, and St. Petersburg. Count Romanzoff gave the necessary letter of