Albert Gallatin
introduction to Count Lieven. Gallatin's instructions to the young
secretary were explicit as to the caution he should exercise in a
country where he could consider himself as only on sufferance. Hardly
were these preliminaries concluded, and Dallas had not started on his
journey, when Mr. Gallatin received word from America that the Senate
had refused to confirm him in his position as commissioner. Mr. Gallatin
had not resigned his position of secretary of the treasury. The Senate
refused to sanction the cumulative appointment.
Stripped of his official character, he now felt himself at liberty to
follow his own inclination. His first impulse was to go to London, where
he was sure that Baring's friendship would open to him a means of
usefulness in the matter on which he was engaged. The death of Moreau
cut off the medium of approach to the emperor. This event was of no
consequence, however, in the negotiation, as the emperor had been
positively informed in July that England would not countenance even the
appearance of foreign intervention in her dispute with America. But as
yet no official information of his rejection had been received by Mr.
Gallatin, nor did any reach him until March. Without it he could not
well leave St. Petersburg. Meanwhile a diplomatic imbroglio, caused by
the failure of the emperor to inform Romanzoff of Castlereagh's second
refusal to accept the offer of mediation, embarrassed the commission all
winter. Nor yet were they aware that the British minister, driven to the
wall by the second offer of the emperor, had made proposals to Monroe to
treat directly with the United States government. The British note with
this offer was written on November 4. Mr. Gallatin was apprised of it by
Mr. Dallas in January, 1814. Mr. Baring urged him, if he should return
to America during the winter, to take his way through England, as good
effects might result from even a passing visit. Gallatin was then, as he
expressed it, "chained for the winter to St. Petersburg," nor had he
any way of reaching home, except by a cartel from a British port.
No word coming from the emperor, the envoys concluded to withdraw from
St. Petersburg. Before leaving, Mr. Gallatin addressed a letter of
thanks to Count Romanzoff, and requested him to communicate any
information he might receive from the emperor. It was supposed that the
offer of England to treat directly with America might be inclosed in
Castlereagh's letter of refusal to accept Russian mediation. On January
25, 1814, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard left St. Petersburg and traveled
by land to Amsterdam, which they reached after a tedious journey on
March 4. The captain of the Neptune was ordered to bring his vessel to a
port of Holland. At Amsterdam, where the envoys remained four weeks,
they learned that Mr. Madison had at once accepted Castlereagh's offer
and appointed a new commission, consisting of Messrs. Adams, Bayard,
Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell. Mr. Gallatin was not included, as he
was supposed to be on his way home to resume his post in the Treasury
Department, the duties of which had been performed in his absence by Mr.
Jones, the secretary of the navy. When correct information did reach Mr.
Madison, on February 8, he immediately added Mr. Gallatin to the
commission, and appointed Mr. G. W. Campbell to be secretary of the
treasury. Thus it happened that Mr. Gallatin, whom Mr. Madison intended
for the head of the commission, was the last named of those who
conducted the negotiations.
On April 1, 1814, Mr. Gallatin concluded to pass through England on his
return, and leaving orders for the Neptune on its arrival to proceed to
Falmouth, he took the packet to Harwich, whither he requested Mr. Baring
to send him the requisite passports to enable him to reach London with
his suite without delay.
In company with Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gallatin reached the English capital on
April 9, 1814. There they heard some days later of the arrival of
Messrs. Clay and Russell at Gottenburg. The situation of Great Britain
had greatly changed. Intoxicated with the success of their arms and the
abdication of Napoleon, the English people were quite ready to undertake
the punishment of the United States, while the release of a large body
of trained troops in France, Italy, Holland, and Portugal enabled the
ministry immediately to throw a large force into Canada for the summer
campaign. In the British cabinet a belief was said to be entertained
that a continuance of the war would bring about a separation of the
American Union, and perhaps a return of New England to the mother
country. In this emergency Gallatin availed himself of the opportunity
which presented itself of addressing Lafayette in sending to that
officer the patents for the Louisiana land granted to him by the
American government, and urged the use of his influence to promote an
accommodation between England and the United States.
To Clay he wrote on April 22, proposing that the place of negotiation be
changed from "that corner" Gottenburg, either to London, or some neutral
place more accessible to the friendly interference of those among the
European powers upon which they must greatly rely. The Emperor Alexander
was expected in London, and Castlereagh, who had recently returned from
France where he had been in direct intercourse with him, was understood
to be of all the cabinet the best disposed to the United States. From
Clay Gallatin heard in reply that the British _charge d'affaires_ at
Stockholm had already asked the sanction of the Swedish government to
the negotiation at Gottenburg. While Clay was unwilling to go to London
he gave his consent to carry on the negotiations in Holland, if the
arrangement could be made in such a manner as to avoid any ill feeling
at the Swedish court by the change from Gottenburg. In May Gallatin and
Bayard asked of Monroe, who was then secretary of state, authority for
the commissioners to remove the negotiation to any place which their
judgment should prefer. In May, also, the British government was
officially notified by the American commissioners of their appointment.
Lord Bathurst answered with an assurance that commissioners would be
forthwith appointed for Great Britain, and with a proposal of Ghent as
the place for negotiation. This was at once acceded to.
Meanwhile Mr. Crawford, the United States minister at Paris, was
endeavoring, at the instance of Mr. Gallatin, to secure the friendly
interposition of the Emperor Alexander, not as a mediator, but as a
common friend and in the interest of peace to the civilized world.
Crawford was unable to obtain an audience of the emperor, or even an
interview with Count Nesselrode, but Lafayette took up the cause with
his hearty zeal for everything that concerned the United States, and, in
a long interview with the emperor at the house of Madame de Stael,
submitted to him the view taken by the United States of the controversy,
and obtained from him his promise to exert his personal influence with
the British government on his arrival at London. Baron von Humboldt, the
Prussian minister at Paris, who had been influenced by British
misrepresentation, was also won over by Lafayette, and now tendered his
services to Mr. Gallatin in any way in which he might be made useful.
Lafayette's letter was brought by Humboldt in person. Gallatin and
Humboldt had met in 1804, when the great traveler passed through
Washington on his return from Peru and Mexico.
The Treaty of Paris having been signed, Lord Castlereagh reached London
early in June, and the emperor arrived a few days later. Mr. Gallatin
had an audience of the emperor on June 17, and on the 19th submitted an
official statement of the American case and an appeal for the
interposition of his imperial majesty, "the liberator and pacifier of
Europe." From the interview Mr. Gallatin learned that the emperor had
made three attempts in the interest of peace, but that he had no hope
that his representations had been of any service. England would not
admit a third party to interfere, and he thought that, with respect to
the conditions of peace, the difficulty would be with England and not
with America.
On June 13 Gallatin warned Monroe of the preparations England was making
which would enable her to land fifteen to twenty thousand men on the
Atlantic coast; that the capture of Washington and New York would most
gratify the British people, and that no help need be expected from the
countries of Europe, all which were profoundly desirous of peace.
The ministry informing Mr. Gallatin that the British commissioners would
start for Ghent on July 1, he improved the interval by a visit to Paris.
He left London, where he had passed nearly three months in the uncertain
preliminaries of negotiation, and after a few days in the French capital
reached Ghent on July 6. The British commissioners only appeared on
August 6. They were Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams, all
second-rate men, but for this reason suited to the part they had to
play. After the overturn of Napoleon the British cabinet had no desire
for peace, or at least not until they had secured by war some material
advantages in the United States, which a treaty would confirm. The
business of their representatives at Ghent was to make exorbitant
demands of the Americans and delay negotiations pending the military
operations in progress.
In June Gallatin was satisfied of the general hostile spirit of Great
Britain and of its wish to inflict serious injury on the United States.
He notified Monroe of his opinion and warned him that the most favorable
terms to be expected were the _status ante bellum_, and not certainly
that, unless the American people were united and the country able to
stand the shock of the campaign. Mr. Madison's administration had
already humbled itself to an abandonment, or at least to an adjournment,
of the principle to establish which they had resorted to arms. But in
the first stages of the negotiation it was clear that the British
cabinet had more serious and dangerous objects in view, and looked
beyond aggression and temporary injury to permanent objects. At the
first meeting on August 8, the British commissioners demanded, as a
preliminary to any negotiation, that the United States should set apart
to the Indian tribes the entire territory of the Northwest to be held by
them forever in sovereignty under the guaranty of Great Britain. The
absurdity of such a demand is sufficient evidence that it was never
seriously entertained. There could have been no idea that the military
power of Great Britain was able to enforce, or that the United States
would abjectly submit to, such a mutilation of its territory and such a
limitation of its expansion. Behind this cover Mr. Gallatin
instinctively detected the real design of the cabinet to be the conquest
of New Orleans and the mouths of the Mississippi. If to the territory
thus acquired that of Florida should be added by cession from Spain,
which could hardly refuse any compensation asked of her by Great Britain
in return for the liberation of the Peninsula, a second British dominion
would be set up on the American continent. These views Gallatin
communicated to Monroe in a private dispatch of August 20, 1814, by the
hands of Mr. Dallas. To the _sine qua non_ of the British commissioners
no answer was made by the Americans. The negotiation was abruptly
suspended, and only by informal conversation was Mr. Goulburn given to
understand that reference had been had to America for instructions. Mr.
Gallatin was of opinion that the negotiations were at an end, and in his
despair of peace took consolation in the belief that the insolence of
the demand would unite America from Maine to Georgia in defense of her