Albert Gallatin
rights, of her territory, and indeed of her independence. The American
commissioners made no secret of their belief that their mission was
closed. Two of the secretaries started from Ghent on a continental tour,
and notice was given to the landlord of the house where the
commissioners resided of their intention to quit it on October 1. On
August 2, while matters were still at this deadlock, Lord Castlereagh
passed through Ghent on his way to the Congress at Vienna. Goulburn was
ordered to change his tone and Lord Liverpool was advised to moderate
his demands; to use Castlereagh's words, to "a letting down of the
question." Lord Liverpool replied on September 2, that he had already
given Goulburn to understand that the commission had taken a very
erroneous view of British policy. In this communication he betrays the
hope, which the cabinet had entertained, of the outcome of American
dissensions, by his expression of the opinion that if the negotiation
had broken off on the notes already presented by the British commission,
or the answer that the Americans were disposed to make, the war would
have become popular in America.
Lord Bathurst reopened the negotiations, but his modification was of
tone rather than of matter. The surrender of the control of the Lakes to
Great Britain, and of the Northwest Territory to the Indians, was still
adhered to. The reply of the American commissioners was drawn chiefly by
Mr. Gallatin. It absolutely rejected the proposals respecting the
boundary and the military flag on the Lakes, and refused even to refer
them to the American government, but offered to pursue the negotiation
on the other points. To Monroe Mr. Gallatin explained his reason for
assenting to discuss the Indian article, and therein his colleagues
concurred with him, to be: that they had little hope of peace, but
thought it desirable, if there were to be a breach, that it should be on
other grounds than that of Indian pacification. The reply of the
commission on this point, also drafted by Mr. Gallatin, was sent in on
September 26. It merely guaranteed the Indians in all their old rights,
privileges, and possessions.
The destruction of the public buildings at Washington by the British
troops, known in London on October 1, caused a great sensation in
England. As Gallatin said in a letter to Madame de Stael, it was "an act
of vandalism to which no parallel could be found in the twenty years of
European war from the frontiers of Russia to Paris, and from those of
Denmark to Naples." "Was it (he asked), because, with the exception of a
few cathedrals, England had no public buildings comparable to them, or
was it to console the London mob for their disappointment that Paris was
neither pillaged nor burned?" It can hardly be doubted that the flames
which consumed the American capital lighted the way to peace. The
atrocity of war was again brought vividly to the view of nations whose
sole yearning was for peace. Far from discouraging the American
commissioners, it fortified their resolution. They knew that it would
unite the people of the States as one man. It in no way disturbed
Gallatin's confidence either in the present or future of his adopted
country. To those who asked his opinion of the securities of the United
States, he said: "If I have not wholly misunderstood America, its
resources and its political morality, I am not wrong in the belief that
its public funds are more secure than those of all European powers."
In spite of the protests of Mr. Goulburn, who felt the ground on which
he stood daily less stable, and in his letters to his chief was
unsparing in his denunciations, Lord Liverpool accepted the proposed
settlement of the Indian question. Nothing remained but to incorporate
in a treaty form the points agreed upon. Lord Bathurst, who seems
throughout the negotiation to have forgotten the old adage, that "fine
words butter no parsnips," and with true British blindness never to have
appreciated how thoroughly he was overmatched by Mr. Gallatin, submitted
a preliminary notification that the British terms would be based on the
principle of _uti possidetis_, which involved a rectification of the
boundaries on the Canadian frontier. To this the Americans returned a
peremptory refusal. They would not go one step farther except on the
basis of the _status quo ante bellum_. Lord Liverpool considered this as
conclusive. A vigorous prosecution of the war was resolved upon by the
cabinet. Only for reasons of expediency was a show of negotiation still
kept up.
But when the cabinet took a survey of the general field they felt little
complacency in the prospect of a struggle which sooner or later must
interest the maritime powers. France, compelled by the peace of Vienna
to withdraw from what even Lafayette considered as her natural frontier,
was restive, and there was a large party in Russia who would gladly see
the emperor take up the American cause. Moreover the chancellor of the
exchequer saw before him an inevitable addition of ten millions of
pounds sterling to his budget, the only avowable reason for which was
the rectification of the Canadian frontier. In their distress the
cabinet proposed to Wellington to go to the United States with the
olive-branch and the sword, to negotiate or conquer a peace. The desire
of the cabinet to bring the war to an honorable conclusion was avowed.
But Wellington, before accepting this proposal, gave Lord Liverpool a
very frank opinion of the mistake made in exacting territorial
concessions, since the British held no territory of the United States in
other than temporary possession, and had no right to make any such
demand. Lord Liverpool was not tenacious. He was never, he wrote Lord
Bathurst, much inclined to give way to the Americans, but the cabinet
felt itself compelled to withdraw from its extreme ground. He accepted
his defeat and acknowledged it.
The Americans meanwhile arranged a draft of a treaty. The articles on
impressment and other maritime rights, absolutely rejected by the
British, were set aside. There only remained the question of the
boundaries, the fisheries, and the navigation of the Mississippi. Here
Mr. Gallatin had as much difficulty in maintaining harmony between Adams
and Clay as in obtaining a peace from Liverpool and Bathurst. Adams was
determined to save the fisheries; Clay would not hear of opening the
Mississippi to British vessels. A compromise was effected by which it
was agreed that no allusion should be made to either subject. Mr.
Gallatin terminated the dispute by adding a declaration that the
commissioners were willing to sign a treaty applying the principle of
the _status quo ante bellum_ to _all_ the subjects of difference. This
was in strict conformity with the instructions from the home government.
On November 10 the American draft was sent in. On the 25th the British
replied with a counter-draft which made no allusion to the fisheries,
but stipulated for the free navigation of the Mississippi. The Americans
replied that they would give up the navigation of the river for a
surrender of the fisheries. This proposal was at once refused by the
British. The matter was settled by an offer of the Americans to
negotiate under a distinct reservation of all American rights. All
stipulations on either subject were in the end omitted, the British
government on December 22 withdrawing the article referring to these
points. In the course of the negotiation Mr. Gallatin proposed that in
case of a future war both nations should engage never to employ the
savages as auxiliaries, but this article does not appear. To the credit
of civilization, however, the last article contained a mutual engagement
to put an end to the trade in slaves. An agreement entered into in
perfect faith, but which the jealousy of the exercise of search in any
form rendered nugatory for half a century. On Christmas day the treaty
was signed. Mr. Henry Adams[19] justly says, "Far more than
contemporaries ever supposed, or than is now imagined, the Treaty of
Ghent was the special work and the peculiar triumph of Mr. Gallatin."
His own correspondence shows how admirably he was constituted for the
nice work of diplomatic negotiation. In the self-poise which he
maintained in the most critical situations, the unerring sagacity with
which he penetrated the purposes of his adversaries, the address with
which he soothed the passions and guided the judgments of his
colleagues, it is impossible to find a single fault. If he had a fault,
says his biographer, it was that of using the razor when he would have
done better with the axe. But the axe is not a diplomatic weapon. The
simulation of temper may serve an occasional purpose, but temper itself
is a mistake; and to Mr. Gallatin's credit be it said, it was a mistake
never committed by him in the course of this long and sometimes painful
negotiation. Looking back upon its shifting scenes, it is clear that
even the pertinacity of Adams and the irascibility of Clay served to
advance the purpose of the mission. From the first to the last Mr.
Gallatin had his own way, not because it was his own way, but because it
was the best way and was so recognized by the majority of the commission
at every turn of difference. Fortunately for the interests of peace the
battle of New Orleans had not yet been fought. There seems a justice in
this final act of the war. The British attack upon the Chesapeake[20]
was committed before war had been declared. The battle of New Orleans
was fought a fortnight after the Treaty of Ghent was signed. The burning
of Washington was avenged by the most complete defeat which the British
had ever encountered in their long career of military prowess.
By his political life Mr. Gallatin acquired an American reputation; by
his management of the finances of the United States he placed himself
among the first political economists of the day; but his masterly
conduct of the Treaty of Ghent showed him the equal of the best of
European statesmen on their own peculiar ground of diplomacy. No one of
American birth has ever rivaled him in this field. Europeans recognized
his pre-eminent genius. Sismondi praised him in a public discourse.
Humboldt addressed him as his illustrious friend. Madame de Stael
expressed to him her admiration for his mind and character. Alexander
Baring gave him more than admiration, his friendship.
* * * * *
Upon the separation of the commissioners, Mr. Gallatin paid a flying
visit to Geneva. His fame, or "glory," to use the words of Humboldt,
preceded him. Of his old intimates, Serre was under the sod in a West
Indian island; Badollet was leading a quiet life at Vincennes in the
Indiana Territory, where Gallatin had obtained for him an appointment in
the land office; Dumont was in England. Of Gallatin's family few
remained. But he received the honors due to him as a Genevan who had
shed a lustre on his native city. On his way to England, where he had
made an appointment with his colleagues to attempt a commercial treaty
with Great Britain, he stopped at Paris. Here he saw Napoleon, returned
from Elba, his star in full blaze before its final extinction. Here he
heard in April (1815) of his appointment by Madison as minister to
France. His colleagues also had been honored by similar advancements.
Adams was transferred from Russia to England. Bayard was named minister
to Russia, but illness prevented his taking possession of his post.
In April, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Clay opened negotiations with Lord
Castlereagh in London, where they were quickly joined by Adams. Lord
Castlereagh bore no malice against Mr. Gallatin for the treaty. On the
contrary, he wrote of it to Lord Liverpool as "a most auspicious and