Apologia pro vita sua being a history of his religious opinions
sake of the heathen among whom they lived, to observe a great reserve
and caution in communicating to them the knowledge of "the whole counsel
of God." This cautious dispensation of the truth, after the manner of a
discreet and vigilant steward, is denoted by the word "economy." It is a
mode of acting which comes under the head of Prudence, one of the four
Cardinal Virtues.
The principle of the Economy is this; that out of various courses, in
religious conduct or statement, all and each _allowable antecedently and
in themselves_, that ought to be taken which is most expedient and most
suitable at the time for the object in hand.
Instances of its application and exercise in Scripture are such as the
following:--1. Divine Providence did but gradually impart to the world
in general, and to the Jews in particular, the knowledge of His
will:--He is said to have "winked at the times of ignorance among the
heathen;" and He suffered in the Jews divorce "because of the hardness
of their hearts." 2. He has allowed Himself to be represented as having
eyes, ears, and hands, as having wrath, jealousy, grief, and repentance.
3. In like manner, our Lord spoke harshly to the Syro-Ph[oe]nician
woman, whose daughter He was about to heal, and made as if He would go
further, when the two disciples had come to their journey's end. 4. Thus
too Joseph "made himself strange to his brethren," and Elisha kept
silence on request of Naaman to bow in the house of Rimmon. 5. Thus St.
Paul circumcised Timothy, while he cried out "Circumcision availeth
not."
It may be said that this principle, true in itself, yet is dangerous,
because it admits of an easy abuse, and carries men away into what
becomes insincerity and cunning. This is undeniable; to do evil that
good may come, to consider that the means, whatever they are, justify
the end, to sacrifice truth to expedience, unscrupulousness,
recklessness, are grave offences. These are abuses of the Economy. But
to call them _economical_ is to give a fine name to what occurs every
day, independent of any knowledge of the _doctrine_ of the Economy. It
is the abuse of a rule which nature suggests to every one. Every one
looks out for the "mollia tempora fandi," and for "mollia verba" too.
Having thus explained what is meant by the Economy as a rule of social
intercourse between men of different religious, or, again, political, or
social views, next I will go on to state what I said in the Arians.
I say in that Volume first, that our Lord has given us the _principle_
in His own words,--"Cast not your pearls before swine;" and that He
exemplified it in His teaching by parables; that St. Paul expressly
distinguishes between the milk which is necessary to one set of men, and
the strong meat which is allowed to others, and that, in two Epistles. I
say, that the Apostles in the Acts observe the same rule in their
speeches, for it is a fact, that they do not preach the high doctrines
of Christianity, but only "Jesus and the Resurrection" or "repentance
and faith." I also say, that this is the very reason that the Fathers
assign for the silence of various writers in the first centuries on the
subject of our Lord's divinity. I also speak of the catechetical system
practised in the early Church, and the _disciplina arcani_ as regards
the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, to which Bingham bears witness; also
of the defence of this rule by Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom,
and Theodoret.
But next the question may be asked, whether I have said any thing in my
Volume _to guard_ the doctrine, thus laid down, from the abuse to which
it is obviously exposed: and my answer is easy. Of course, had I had any
idea that I should have been exposed to such hostile misrepresentations,
as it has been my lot to undergo on the subject, I should have made more
direct avowals than I have done of my sense of the gravity and the
danger of that abuse. Since I could not foresee when I wrote, that I
should have been wantonly slandered, I only wonder that I have
anticipated the charge as fully as will be seen in the following
extracts.
For instance, speaking of the Disciplina Arcani, I say:--(1) "The
elementary information given to the heathen or catechumen was _in no
sense undone_ by the subsequent secret teaching, which was in fact but
the _filling up of a bare but correct outline_," p. 58, and I contrast
this with the conduct of the Manichæans "who represented the initiatory
discipline as founded on a _fiction_ or hypothesis, which was to be
forgotten by the learner as he made progress in the _real_ doctrine of
the Gospel." (2) As to allegorizing, I say that the Alexandrians erred,
whenever and as far as they proceeded "to _obscure_ the primary meaning
of Scripture, and to _weaken the force of historical facts_ and express
declarations," p. 69. (3) And that they were "more open to _censure_,"
when, on being "_urged by objections_ to various passages in the history
of the Old Testament, as derogatory to the divine perfections or to the
Jewish Saints, they had _recourse to an allegorical explanation by way
of answer_," p. 71. (4) I add, "_It is impossible to defend such a
procedure_, which seems to imply a _want of faith_ in those who had
recourse to it;" for "God has given us _rules of right and wrong_",
_ibid._ (5) Again, I say,--"The _abuse of the Economy_ in _the hands of
unscrupulous reasoners_, is obvious. _Even the honest_ controversialist
or teacher will find it very difficult to represent, _without
misrepresenting_, what it is yet his duty to present to his hearers with
caution or reserve. Here the obvious rule to guide our practice is, to
be careful ever to maintain _substantial truth_ in our use of the
economical method," pp. 79, 80. (6) And so far from concurring at all
hazards with Justin, Gregory, or Athanasius, I say, "It _is plain_
[they] _were justified or not_ in their Economy, _according_ as they did
or did not _practically mislead their opponents_," p. 80. (7) I proceed,
"It is so difficult to hit the mark in these perplexing cases, that it
is not wonderful, should these or other Fathers have failed at times,
and said more or less than was proper," _ibid._
The Principle of the Economy is familiarly acted on among us every day.
When we would persuade others, we do not begin by treading on their
toes. Men would be thought rude who introduced their own religious
notions into mixed society, and were devotional in a drawing-room. Have
we never thought lawyers tiresome who did _not_ observe this polite
rule, who came down for the assizes and talked law all through dinner?
Does the same argument tell in the House of Commons, on the hustings,
and at Exeter Hall? Is an educated gentleman never worsted at an
election by the tone and arguments of some clever fellow, who, whatever
his shortcomings in other respects, understands the common people?
* * * * *
As to the Catholic Religion in England at the present day, this only
will I observe,--that the truest expedience is to answer right out, when
you are asked; that the wisest economy is to have no management; that
the best prudence is not to be a coward; that the most damaging folly is
to be found out shuffling; and that the first of virtues is to "tell
truth, and shame the devil."
NOTE G. ON PAGE 279.
LYING AND EQUIVOCATION.
Almost all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit, that _when a just
cause is present_, there is some kind or other of verbal misleading,
which is not sin. Even silence is in certain cases virtually such a
misleading, according to the Proverb, "Silence gives consent." Again,
silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under
certain circumstances, e.g. to keep silence, when it is a duty to make a
profession of faith.
Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually
saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle that
such words are not a lie, when there is a "justa causa," as killing is
not murder in the case of an executioner.
Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a
lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of justice,
and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth to another,
it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing that is not, to
children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent questions, to those whom
we hope to benefit by misleading.
Another ground, taken in defending certain untruths, _ex justâ causâ_,
as if not lies, is, that veracity is for the sake of society, and that,
if in no case whatever we might lawfully mislead others, we should
actually be doing society great harm.
Another mode of verbal misleading is equivocation or a play upon words;
and it is defended on the theory that to lie is to use words in a sense
which they will not bear. But an equivocator uses them in a received
sense, though there is another received sense, and therefore, according
to this definition, he does not lie.
Others say that all equivocations are, after all, a kind of
lying,--faint lies or awkward lies, but still lies; and some of these
disputants infer, that therefore we must not equivocate, and others that
equivocation is but a half-measure, and that it is better to say at once
that in certain cases untruths are not lies.
Others will try to distinguish between evasions and equivocations; but
though there are evasions which are clearly not equivocations, yet it is
very difficult scientifically to draw the line between the one and the
other.
To these must be added the unscientific way of dealing with lies:--viz.
that on a great or cruel occasion a man cannot help telling a lie, and
he would not be a man, did he not tell it, but still it is very wrong,
and he ought not to do it, and he must trust that the sin will be
forgiven him, though he goes about to commit it ever so deliberately,
and is sure to commit it again under similar circumstances. It is a
necessary frailty, and had better not be thought about before it is
incurred, and not thought of again, after it is well over. This view
cannot for a moment be defended, but, I suppose, it is very common.
* * * * *
I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this:
the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a _justa causa_, an
untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with
great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the
doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that
there can be _no_ just cause of untruth. In these later times, this
doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely
taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain
equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.
Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other
schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says
that equivocations, &c. after all _are_ lies, and another which says
that there are untruths which are not lies.
* * * * *
And now as to the "just cause," which is the condition, _sine quâ non_.
The Greek Fathers make it such as these, self-defence, charity, zeal for
God's honour, and the like.
St. Augustine seems to deal with the same "just causes" as the Greek
Fathers, even though he does not allow of their availableness as
depriving untruths, spoken on such occasions, of their sinfulness. He
mentions defence of life and of honour, and the safe custody of a
secret. Also the great Anglican writers, who have followed the Greek
Fathers, in defending untruths when there is the "just cause," consider
that "just cause" to be such as the preservation of life and property,