Apologia pro vita sua being a history of his religious opinions
defence of law, the good of others. Moreover, their moral rights, e.g.
defence against the inquisitive, &c.
St. Alfonso, I consider, would take the same view of the "justa causa"
as the Anglican divines; he speaks of it as "quicunque finis _honestus_,
ad servanda bona spiritui vel corpori utilia;" which is very much the
view which they take of it, judging by the instances which they give.
In all cases, however, and as contemplated by all authors, Clement of
Alexandria, or Milton, or St. Alfonso, such a causa is, in fact,
extreme, rare, great, or at least special. Thus the writer in the
Mélanges Théologiques (Liège, 1852-3, p. 453) quotes Lessius: "Si absque
justa causa fiat, est abusio orationis contra virtutem veritatis, et
civilem consuetudinem, etsi proprie non sit mendacium." That is, the
virtue of truth, and the civil custom, are the _measure_ of the just
cause. And so Voit, "If a man has used a reservation (restrictione non
purè mentali) without a _grave_ cause, he has sinned gravely." And so
the author himself, from whom I quote, and who defends the Patristic and
Anglican doctrine that there _are_ untruths which are not lies, says,
"Under the name of mental reservation theologians authorize many lies,
_when there is for them a grave reason_ and proportionate," i.e. to
their character.--p. 459. And so St. Alfonso, in another Treatise,
quotes St. Thomas to the effect, that if from one cause two immediate
effects follow, and, if the good effect of that cause is _equal in
value_ to the bad effect (bonus _æquivalet_ malo), then nothing hinders
the speaker's intending the good and only permitting the evil. From
which it will follow that, since the evil to society from lying is very
great, the just cause which is to make it allowable, must be very great
also. And so Kenrick: "It is confessed by all Catholics that, in the
common intercourse of life, all ambiguity of language is to be avoided;
but it is debated whether such ambiguity is _ever_ lawful. Most
theologians answer in the affirmative, supposing a _grave cause_ urges,
and the [true] mind of the speaker can be collected from the adjuncts,
though in fact it be not collected."
However, there are cases, I have already said, of another kind, in which
Anglican authors would think a lie allowable; such as when a question is
_impertinent_. Of such a case Walter Scott, if I mistake not, supplied a
very distinct example, in his denying so long the authorship of his
novels.
What I have been saying shows what different schools of opinion there
are in the Church in the treatment of this difficult doctrine; and, by
consequence, that a given individual, such as I am, _cannot_ agree with
all of them, and has a full right to follow which of them he will. The
freedom of the Schools, indeed, is one of those rights of reason, which
the Church is too wise really to interfere with. And this applies not to
moral questions only, but to dogmatic also.
* * * * *
It is supposed by Protestants that, because St. Alfonso's writings have
had such high commendation bestowed upon them by authority, therefore
they have been invested with a quasi-infallibility. This has arisen in
good measure from Protestants not knowing the force of theological
terms. The words to which they refer are the authoritative decision that
"nothing in his works has been found _worthy of censure_," "censurâ
dignum;" but this does not lead to the conclusions which have been drawn
from it. Those words occur in a legal document, and cannot be
interpreted except in a legal sense. In the first place, the sentence is
negative; nothing in St. Alfonso's writings is positively approved; and,
secondly, it is not said that there are no faults in what he has
written, but nothing which comes under the ecclesiastical _censura_,
which is something very definite. To take and interpret them, in the way
commonly adopted in England, is the same mistake, as if one were to take
the word "Apologia" in the English sense of apology, or "Infant" in law
to mean a little child.
1. Now first as to the meaning of the above form of words viewed as a
proposition. When a question on the subject was asked of the fitting
authorities at Rome by the Archbishop of Besançon, the answer returned
to him contained this condition, viz. that those words were to be
interpreted, "with due regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the
approbation of writings of the servants of God, ad effectum
Canonizationis." This is intended to prevent any Catholic taking the
words about St. Alfonso's works in too large a sense. Before a Saint is
canonized, his works are examined, and a judgment pronounced upon them.
Pope Benedict XIV. says, "The _end_ or _scope_ of this judgment is, that
it may appear, whether the doctrine of the servant of God, which he has
brought out in his writings, is free from any soever _theological
censure_." And he remarks in addition, "It never can be said that the
doctrine of a servant of God is _approved_ by the Holy See, but at most
it can [only] be said that it is not disapproved (non reprobatam) in
case that the Revisers had reported that there is nothing found by them
in his works, which is adverse to the decrees of Urban VIII., and that
the judgment of the Revisers has been approved by the sacred
Congregation, and confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff." The Decree of Urban
VIII. here referred to is, "Let works be examined, whether they contain
errors against faith or good morals (bonos mores), or any new doctrine,
or a doctrine foreign and alien to the common sense and custom of the
Church." The author from whom I quote this (M. Vandenbroeck, of the
diocese of Malines) observes, "It is therefore clear, that the
approbation of the works of the Holy Bishop touches not the truth of
every proposition, adds nothing to them, nor even gives them by
consequence a degree of intrinsic probability." He adds that it gives
St. Alfonso's theology an extrinsic probability, from the fact that, in
the judgment of the Holy See, no proposition deserves to receive a
censure; but that "that probability will cease nevertheless in a
particular case, for any one who should be convinced, whether by evident
arguments, or by a decree of the Holy See, or otherwise, that the
doctrine of the Saint deviates from the truth." He adds, "From the fact
that the approbation of the works of St. Alfonso does not decide the
truth of each proposition, it follows, as Benedict XIV. has remarked,
that we may combat the doctrine which they contain; only, since a
canonized saint is in question, who is honoured by a solemn _culte_ in
the Church, we ought not to speak except with respect, nor to attack his
opinions except with temper and modesty."
2. Then, as to the meaning of the word _censura_: Benedict XIV.
enumerates a number of "Notes" which come under that name; he says, "Out
of propositions which are to be noted with theological censure, some are
heretical, some erroneous, some close upon error, some savouring of
heresy," and so on; and each of these terms has its own definite
meaning. Thus by "erroneous" is meant, according to Viva, a proposition
which is not _immediately_ opposed to a revealed proposition, but only
to a theological _conclusion_ drawn from premisses which are _de fide_;
"savouring of heresy is" a proposition, which is opposed to a
theological conclusion not evidently drawn from premisses which are _de
fide_, but most probably and according to the common mode of
theologizing;--and so with the rest. Therefore when it was said by the
Revisers of St. Alfonso's works that they were not "worthy of
_censure_," it was only meant that they did not fall under these
particular Notes.
But the answer from Rome to the Archbishop of Besançon went further than
this; it actually took pains to declare that any one who pleased might
follow other theologians instead of St. Alfonso. After saying that no
Priest was to be interfered with who followed St. Alfonso in the
Confessional, it added, "This is said, however, without on that account
judging that they are reprehended who follow opinions handed down by
other approved authors."
And this too I will observe,--that St. Alfonso made many changes of
opinion himself in the course of his writings; and it could not for an
instant be supposed that we were bound to every one of his opinions,
when he did not feel himself bound to them in his own person. And, what
is more to the purpose still, there are opinions, or some opinion, of
his which actually have been proscribed by the Church since, and cannot
now be put forward or used. I do not pretend to be a well-read
theologian myself, but I say this on the authority of a theological
professor of Breda, quoted in the Mélanges Théol. for 1850-1. He says:
"It may happen, that, in the course of time, errors may be found in the
works of St. Alfonso and be proscribed by the Church, _a thing which in
fact has already occurred_."
* * * * *
In not ranging myself then with those who consider that it is
justifiable to use words in a double sense, that is, to equivocate, I
put myself under the protection of such authors as Cardinal Gerdil,
Natalis Alexander, Contenson, Concina, and others. Under the protection
of these authorities, I say as follows:--
Casuistry is a noble science, but it is one to which I am led, neither
by my abilities nor my turn of mind. Independently, then, of the
difficulties of the subject, and the necessity, before forming an
opinion, of knowing more of the arguments of theologians upon it than I
do, I am very unwilling to say a word here on the subject of Lying and
Equivocation. But I consider myself bound to speak; and therefore, in
this strait, I can do nothing better, even for my own relief, than
submit myself, and what I shall say, to the judgment of the Church, and
to the consent, so far as in this matter there be a consent, of the
Schola Theologorum.
Now in the case of one of those special and rare exigencies or
emergencies, which constitute the _justa causa_ of dissembling or
misleading, whether it be extreme as the defence of life, or a duty as
the custody of a secret, or of a personal nature as to repel an
impertinent inquirer, or a matter too trivial to provoke question, as in
dealing with children or madmen, there seem to be four courses:--
1. _To say the thing that is not._ Here I draw the reader's attention to
the words _material_ and _formal_. "Thou shalt not kill;" _murder_ is
the _formal_ transgression of this commandment, but _accidental
homicide_ is the _material_ transgression. The _matter_ of the act is
the same in both cases; but in the _homicide_, there is nothing more
than the act, whereas in _murder_ there must be the intention, &c.,
which constitutes the formal sin. So, again, an executioner commits the
material act, but not that formal killing which is a breach of the
commandment. So a man, who, simply to save himself from starving, takes
a loaf which is not his own, commits only the material, not the formal
act of stealing, that is, he does not commit a sin. And so a baptized
Christian, external to the Church, who is in invincible ignorance, is a
material heretic, and not a formal. And in like manner, if to say the
thing which is not be in special cases lawful, it may be called a
_material lie_.
The first mode then which has been suggested of meeting those special
cases, in which to mislead by words has a sufficient occasion, or has a
_just cause_, is by a material lie.
The second mode is by an _æquivocatio_, which is not equivalent to the
English word "equivocation," but means sometimes a _play on words_,
sometimes an _evasion_: we must take these two modes of misleading
separately.