Apologia pro vita sua being a history of his religious opinions
2. _A play upon words._ St. Alfonso certainly says that a play upon
words is allowable; and, speaking under correction, I should say that he
does so on the ground that lying is _not_ a sin against justice, that
is, against our neighbour, but a sin against God. God has made words the
signs of ideas, and therefore if a word denotes two ideas, we are at
liberty to use it in either of its senses: but I think I must be
incorrect in some respect in supposing that the Saint does not recognize
a lie as an injustice, because the Catechism of the Council, as I have
quoted it at p. 281, says, "Vanitate et mendacio fides ac veritas
tolluntur, arctissima vincula _societatis humanæ_; quibus sublatis,
sequitur summa vitæ _confusio_, ut _homines nihil a dæmonibus differre
videantur_."
3. _Evasion_;--when, for instance, the speaker diverts the attention of
the hearer to another subject; suggests an irrelevant fact or makes a
remark, which confuses him and gives him something to think about;
throws dust into his eyes; states some truth, from which he is quite
sure his hearer will draw an illogical and untrue conclusion, and the
like.
The greatest school of evasion, I speak seriously, is the House of
Commons; and necessarily so, from the nature of the case. And the
hustings is another.
An instance is supplied in the history of St. Athanasius: he was in a
boat on the Nile, flying persecution; and he found himself pursued. On
this he ordered his men to turn his boat round, and ran right to meet
the satellites of Julian. They asked him, "Have you seen Athanasius?"
and he told his followers to answer, "Yes, he is close to you." _They_
went on their course as if they were sure to come up to him, while _he_
ran back into Alexandria, and there lay hid till the end of the
persecution.
I gave another instance above, in reference to a doctrine of religion.
The early Christians did their best to conceal their Creed on account of
the misconceptions of the heathen about it. Were the question asked of
them, "Do you worship a Trinity?" and did they answer, "We worship one
God, and none else;" the inquirer might, or would, infer that they did
not acknowledge the Trinity of Divine Persons.
It is very difficult to draw the line between these evasions and what
are commonly called in English _equivocations_; and of this difficulty,
again, I think, the scenes in the House of Commons supply us with
illustrations.
4. The fourth method is _silence_. For instance, not giving the _whole_
truth in a court of law. If St. Alban, after dressing himself in the
Priest's clothes, and being taken before the persecutor, had been able
to pass off for his friend, and so gone to martyrdom without being
discovered; and had he in the course of examination answered all
questions truly, but not given the whole truth, the most important
truth, that he was the wrong person, he would have come very near to
telling a lie, for a half-truth is often a falsehood. And his defence
must have been the _justa causa_, viz. either that he might in charity
or for religion's sake save a priest, or again that the judge had no
right to interrogate him on the subject.
Now, of these four modes of misleading others by the tongue, when there
is a _justa causa_ (supposing there can be such),--(1) a material lie,
that is, an untruth which is not a lie, (2) an equivocation, (3) an
evasion, and (4) silence,--First, I have no difficulty whatever in
recognizing as allowable the method of _silence_.
Secondly, But, if I allow of _silence_, why not of the method of
_material lying_, since half of a truth _is_ often a lie? And, again, if
all killing be not murder, nor all taking from another stealing, why
must all untruths be lies? Now I will say freely that I think it
difficult to answer this question, whether it be urged by St. Clement or
by Milton; at the same time, I never have acted, and I think, when it
came to the point, I never should act upon such a theory myself, except
in one case, stated below. This I say for the benefit of those who speak
hardly of Catholic theologians, on the ground that they admit text-books
which allow of equivocation. They are asked, how can we trust you, when
such are your views? but such views, as I already have said, need not
have any thing to do with their own practice, merely from the
circumstance that they are contained in their text-books. A theologian
draws out a system; he does it partly as a scientific speculation: but
much more for the sake of others. He is lax for the sake of others, not
of himself. His own standard of action is much higher than that which he
imposes upon men in general. One special reason why religious men, after
drawing out a theory, are unwilling to act upon it themselves, is this:
that they practically acknowledge a broad distinction between their
reason and their conscience; and that they feel the latter to be the
safer guide, though the former may be the clearer, nay even though it be
the truer. They would rather be in error with the sanction of their
conscience, than be right with the mere judgment of their reason. And
again here is this more tangible difficulty in the case of exceptions to
the rule of Veracity, that so very little external help is given us in
drawing the line, as to when untruths are allowable and when not;
whereas that sort of killing which is not murder, is most definitely
marked off by legal enactments, so that it cannot possibly be mistaken
for such killing as _is_ murder. On the other hand the cases of
exemption from the rule of Veracity are left to the private judgment of
the individual, and he may easily be led on from acts which are
allowable to acts which are not. Now this remark does _not_ apply to
such acts as are related in Scripture, as being done by a particular
inspiration, for in such cases there _is_ a command. If I had my own
way, I would oblige society, that is, its great men, its lawyers, its
divines, its literature, publicly to acknowledge as such, those
instances of untruth which are not lies, as for instance untruths in
war; and then there could be no perplexity to the individual Catholic,
for he would not be taking the law into his own hands.
Thirdly, as to playing upon words, or equivocation, I suppose it is from
the English habit, but, without meaning any disrespect to a great Saint,
or wishing to set myself up, or taking my conscience for more than it is
worth, I can only say as a fact, that I admit it as little as the rest
of my countrymen: and, without any reference to the right and the wrong
of the matter, of this I am sure, that, if there is one thing more than
another which prejudices Englishmen against the Catholic Church, it is
the doctrine of great authorities on the subject of equivocation. For
myself, I can fancy myself thinking it was allowable in extreme cases
for me to lie, but never to equivocate. Luther said, "Pecca fortiter." I
anathematize his formal sentiment, but there is a truth in it, when
spoken of material acts.
Fourthly, I think _evasion_, as I have described it, to be perfectly
allowable; indeed, I do not know, who does not use it, under
circumstances; but that a good deal of moral danger is attached to its
use; and that, the cleverer a man is, the more likely he is to pass the
line of Christian duty.
* * * * *
But it may be said, that such decisions do not meet the particular
difficulties for which provision is required; let us then take some
instances.
1. I do not think it right to tell lies to children, even on this
account, that they are sharper than we think them, and will soon find
out what we are doing; and our example will be a very bad training for
them. And so of equivocation: it is easy of imitation, and we ourselves
shall be sure to get the worst of it in the end.
2. If an early Father defends the patriarch Jacob in his mode of gaining
his father's blessing, on the ground that the blessing was divinely
pledged to him already, that it was his, and that his father and brother
were acting at once against his own rights and the divine will, it does
not follow from this that such conduct is a pattern to us, who have no
supernatural means of determining _when_ an untruth becomes a
_material_, and not a _formal_ lie. It seems to me very dangerous, be it
ever allowable or not, to lie or equivocate in order to preserve some
great temporal or spiritual benefit; nor does St. Alfonso here say any
thing to the contrary, for he is not discussing the question of danger
or expedience.
3. As to Johnson's case of a murderer asking you which way a man had
gone, I should have anticipated that, had such a difficulty happened to
him, his first act would have been to knock the man down, and to call
out for the police; and next, if he was worsted in the conflict, he
would not have given the ruffian the information he asked, at whatever
risk to himself. I think he would have let himself be killed first. I do
not think that he would have told a lie.
4. A secret is a more difficult case. Supposing something has been
confided to me in the strictest secrecy, which could not be revealed
without great disadvantage to another, what am I to do? If I am a
lawyer, I am protected by my profession. I have a right to treat with
extreme indignation any question which trenches on the inviolability of
my position; but, supposing I was driven up into a corner, I think I
should have a right to say an untruth, or that, under such
circumstances, a lie would be _material_, but it is almost an impossible
case, for the law would defend me. In like manner, as a priest, I should
think it lawful to speak as if I knew nothing of what passed in
confession. And I think in these cases, I do in fact possess that
guarantee, that I am not going by private judgment, which just now I
demanded; for society would bear me out, whether as a lawyer or as a
priest, in holding that I had a duty to my client or penitent, such,
that an untruth in the matter was not a lie. A common type of this
permissible denial, be it _material lie_ or _evasion_, is at the moment
supplied to me:--an artist asked a Prime Minister, who was sitting to
him, "What news, my Lord, from France?" He answered, "_I do not know_; I
have not read the Papers."
5. A more difficult question is, when to accept confidence has not been
a duty. Supposing a man wishes to keep the secret that he is the author
of a book, and he is plainly asked on the subject. Here I should ask the
previous question, whether any one has a right to publish what he dare
not avow. It requires to have traced the bearings and results of such a
principle, before being sure of it; but certainly, for myself, I am no
friend of strictly anonymous writing. Next, supposing another has
confided to you the secret of his authorship:--there are persons who
would have no scruple at all in giving a denial to impertinent questions
asked them on the subject. I have heard a great man in his day at
Oxford, warmly contend, as if he could not enter into any other view of
the matter, that, if he had been trusted by a friend with the secret of
his being author of a certain book, and he were asked by a third person,
if his friend was not (as he really was) the author of it, he ought,
without any scruple and distinctly, to answer that he did not know. He
had an existing duty towards the author; he had none towards his
inquirer. The author had a claim on him; an impertinent questioner had
none at all. But here again I desiderate some leave, recognized by
society, as in the case of the formulas "Not at home," and "Not guilty,"
in order to give me the right of saying what is a _material_ untruth.
And moreover, I should here also ask the previous question, Have I any