Apology
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Apology
by Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Contents
INTRODUCTION
APOLOGY
INTRODUCTION.
In what relation the “Apology” of Plato stands to the real defence of
Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in
tone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the
“Memorabilia” that Socrates might have been acquitted “if in any
moderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;”
and who informs us in another passage, on the testimony of Hermogenes,
the friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the
divine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that
Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that
all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the
speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, “_ut non supplex aut
reus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum_” (Cic. “de Orat.”
i. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the
“accustomed manner” in which Socrates spoke in “the _agora_ and among
the tables of the money-changers.” The allusion in the “Crito” (45 B)
may, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy
of some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the
ideal of Socrates, according to Plato’s conception of him, appearing in
the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of
his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is
greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of
tragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed
up, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident
in the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming
want of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a
perfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates.
Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the
recollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his
disciple. The “Apology” of Plato may be compared generally with those
speeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the
lofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same
time furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of
view of the historian. So in the “Apology” there is an ideal rather
than a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only
Plato’s view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a
chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have
aimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to be supplemented from
the Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon, who belongs to an entirely
different class of writers. The Apology of Plato is not the report of
what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in
fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge in the
fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the
Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in
any case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and
some of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is
significant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence
(Apol.), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in
the “Phædo”. Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp
of authenticity to the one and not to the other?—especially when we
consider that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes
mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his
sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed has the
appearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates
received the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining
the world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been
famous before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (Riddell), and the
story is of a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the
whole we arrive at the conclusion that the “Apology” is true to the
character of Socrates, but we cannot show that any single sentence in
it was actually spoken by him. It breathes the spirit of Socrates, but
has been cast anew in the mould of Plato.
There is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with the
“Apology”. The same recollection of his master may have been present to
the mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the
“Republic”. The “Crito” may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to
the “Apology”, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is
nevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The
idealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the
“Georgias”, in which the thesis is maintained, that “to suffer is
better than to do evil;” and the art of rhetoric is described as only
useful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur
in the so-called “Apology” of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because
the writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The
statements of the “Memorabilia” respecting the trial and death of
Socrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of
Socratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon.
The “Apology” or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three
parts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in
mitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and
exhortation.
The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style; he
is, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and knows of no
rhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character by making a
speech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into two classes;
first, there is the nameless accuser—public opinion. All the world from
their earliest years had heard that he was a corrupter of youth, and
had seen him caricatured in the “Clouds” of Aristophanes. Secondly,
there are the professed accusers, who are but the mouth-piece of the
others. The accusations of both might be summed up in a formula. The
first say, “Socrates is an evil-doer and a curious person, searching
into things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the worse
appear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.” The second,
“Socrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does not
receive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new
divinities.” These last words appear to have been the actual indictment
(compare Xen. Mem.); and the previous formula, which is a summary of
public opinion, assumes the same legal style.
The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of
the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, he had been
identified with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists.
But this was an error. For both of them he professes a respect in the
open court, which contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in
other places. (Compare for Anaxagoras, Phædo, Laws; for the Sophists,
Meno, Republic, Tim., Theaet., Soph., etc.) But at the same time he
shows that he is not one of them. Of natural philosophy he knows
nothing; not that he despises such pursuits, but the fact is that he is
ignorant of them, and never says a word about them. Nor is he paid for
giving instruction—that is another mistaken notion:—he has nothing to
teach. But he commends Evenus for teaching virtue at such a “moderate”
rate as five minæ. Something of the “accustomed irony,” which may
perhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking
here.
He then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil name.
That had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had taken upon
himself. The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in anticipation of the
answer which he received) had gone to Delphi and asked the oracle if
there was any man wiser than Socrates; and the answer was, that there
was no man wiser. What could be the meaning of this—that he who knew
nothing, and knew that he knew nothing, should be declared by the
oracle to be the wisest of men? Reflecting upon the answer, he
determined to refute it by finding “a wiser;” and first he went to the
politicians, and then to the poets, and then to the craftsmen, but
always with the same result—he found that they knew nothing, or hardly
anything more than himself; and that the little advantage which in some
cases they possessed was more than counter-balanced by their conceit of
knowledge. He knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing: they knew
little or nothing, and imagined that they knew all things. Thus he had
passed his life as a sort of missionary in detecting the pretended
wisdom of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him and taken
him away both from public and private affairs. Young men of the richer
sort had made a pastime of the same pursuit, “which was not unamusing.”
And hence bitter enmities had arisen; the professors of knowledge had
revenged themselves by calling him a villainous corrupter of youth, and
by repeating the commonplaces about atheism and materialism and
sophistry, which are the stock-accusations against all philosophers
when there is nothing else to be said of them.
The second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who is present
and can be interrogated. “If he is the corrupter, who is the improver
of the citizens?” (Compare Meno.) “All men everywhere.” But how absurd,
how contrary to analogy is this! How inconceivable too, that he should
make the citizens worse when he has to live with them. This surely
cannot be intentional; and if unintentional, he ought to have been
instructed by Meletus, and not accused in the court.
But there is another part of the indictment which says that he teaches
men not to receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new
gods. “Is that the way in which he is supposed to corrupt the youth?”
“Yes, it is.” “Has he only new gods, or none at all?” “None at all.”
“What, not even the sun and moon?” “No; why, he says that the sun is a
stone, and the moon earth.” That, replies Socrates, is the old
confusion about Anaxagoras; the Athenian people are not so ignorant as
to attribute to the influence of Socrates notions which have found
their way into the drama, and may be learned at the theatre. Socrates
undertakes to show that Meletus (rather unjustifiably) has been
compounding a riddle in this part of the indictment: “There are no
gods, but Socrates believes in the existence of the sons of gods, which
is absurd.”
Leaving Meletus, who has had enough words spent upon him, he returns to
the original accusation. The question may be asked, Why will he persist
in following a profession which leads him to death? Why?—because he
must remain at his post where the god has placed him, as he remained at
Potidaea, and Amphipolis, and Delium, where the generals placed him.
Besides, he is not so overwise as to imagine that he knows whether
death is a good or an evil; and he is certain that desertion of his
duty is an evil. Anytus is quite right in saying that they should never
have indicted him if they meant to let him go. For he will certainly
obey God rather than man; and will continue to preach to all men of all
ages the necessity of virtue and improvement; and if they refuse to
listen to him he will still persevere and reprove them. This is his way
of corrupting the youth, which he will not cease to follow in obedience
to the god, even if a thousand deaths await him.
He is desirous that they should let him live—not for his own sake, but
for theirs; because he is their heaven-sent friend (and they will never
have such another), or, as he may be ludicrously described, he is the