Aristotle
metaphorical. When the thesis tendered to you presents such
difficulty, you may presume that it is affected with the obscurity of
terms here indicated; or, at any rate, that its terms stand in need
of definition.[397] In geometrical construction, as well as in
dialectical debate, it is indispensable that the _principia_ or
primary terms should be defined, and defined properly; without this,
neither the one nor the other can be pursued.[398]
[Footnote 396: Ibid. iii. p. 158, a. 31, seq. [Greek: ê)\
sophismatô/dê phai/netai ta\ e)picheirê/mata.]]
[Footnote 397: Ibid. iii. p. 158, b. 8-23; p. 159, a. 3: [Greek:
ou)/koun dei= lantha/nein, o(/tan dusepichei/rêtos ê)=| ê( the/sis,
o(/ti pe/ponthe/ ti tô=n ei)rême/nôn.]]
[Footnote 398: Ibid. p. 158, b. 24-p. 159, a. 2.]
Sometimes the major and minor premisses of your syllogistic
conclusion are more difficult to establish--more beyond the level of
average intelligence--than the thesis itself. In such a case some may
think that the respondent ought to grant these premisses, because, if
he refuses and requires them to be proved, he will be imposing upon
the questioner a duty more arduous than the thesis itself imposes;
others may say that he ought not to grant them, because, if he did,
he would be acknowledging a conclusion derived from premisses
requiring proof as much or more than itself.[399] A distinction must
here be made. If you are putting questions with a view to teach, the
learner ought not to grant such premisses as those above described,
because he is entitled to require that in every step of the process
he shall be inducted from what is more knowable to what is less
knowable. Accordingly, when you attempt to demonstrate to him
something which he knows little, by requiring him to concede
something which he knows still less, he cannot be advised to grant
what you ask. But, if you are debating with a companion for the
purpose of dialectical exercise, he ought to grant what you ask
whenever the affirmative really appears to him true.[400]
[Footnote 399: Topic. VIII. iii. p. 159, a. 4-11. [Greek: o(/tan d'
ê)=| pro\s to\ a)xi/ôma kai\ tê\n pro/tasin mei=zon e)/rgon
dialegê=nai ê)\ tê\n the/sin, diaporê/seien a)/n tis po/teron
thete/on ta\ toiau=ta ê)\ ou)/;] &c.]
[Footnote 400: Ibid. a. 11-14: [Greek: ê)\ tô=| me\n mantha/nonti ou)
thete/on, a)\n mê\ gnôrimô/teron ê)=|, tô=| de\ gumnazome/nô|
thete/on, a)\n a)lêthe\s mo/non phai/nêtai. ô(/ste phanero\n o(/ti
ou)ch o(moi/ôs e)rôtô=nti/ te ki\ dida/skonti a)xiôte/on tithe/nai.]
This section is obscure and difficult. I am not sure that I
understand it. It seems doubtful whether the verb [Greek: tithe/nai]
is intended to apply to the questioner or to the respondent.]
We have now said enough for the purpose of instructing the questioner
how to frame and marshal his interrogations. We must turn to the
respondent, and point out how _he_ must answer in order to do well
and perform his duty to the common work of dialogue. Speaking
generally, the task of the questioner is to conduct the dialogue so
as to make the respondent enunciate the most improbable and absurd
replies which follow necessarily from the thesis that he has
undertaken to defend; while the task of the respondent is to make it
appear that these absurdities follow from the thesis itself, and not
from his manner of defending it. The respondent may err in one of two
ways, or indeed in both together: either he may set up an
indefensible thesis; or he may fail to defend it in the best manner
that it really admits; or he may do both. The second is a worse error
than the first, in reference to the general purpose of
Dialectic.[401]
[Footnote 401: Ibid. iv. p. 159, a. 15-24: [Greek: tou= d'
a)pokrinome/nou to\ mê\ di' au)to\n phai/nesthai sumbai/nein to\
a)du/naton ê)\ to\ para/doxon, a)lla\ dia\ tê\n the/sin; e(te/ra ga\r
i)/sôs a(marti/a to\ the/sthai prô=ton o(\ mê\ dei= kai\ to\
the/menon mê\ phula/xai kata\ tro/pon.]]
Aristotle distinguishes (as has been already stated) three purposes
in the dialogue:--(1) Teaching and Learning; (2) Contention, where
both questioner and respondent strive only for victory; (3)
Investigating and Testing the consequences of some given
doctrine.[402] The first two of these three are dismissed rapidly. In
the first, the teaching questioner has no intention of deceiving, and
the pupil respondent has only to answer by granting all that appears
to him true.[403] In the second, Aristotle tells us only that the
questioner must always appear as if he were making some point of his
own; while the respondent, on his side, must always appear as if no
point were made against him.[404] But in regard to the third
head--dialogues of Search, Testing, Exercise--he is more copious in
suggestions: he considers these as the proper field of Dialectic,
and, as we saw, claims to have been the first who treated them apart
from the didactic dialogues on one side, and the contentious on the
other.[405]
[Footnote 402: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 24-28.]
[Footnote 403: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: tô=| me\n ga\r mantha/nonti
thete/on a)ei\ ta\ dokou=nta; kai\ ga\r ou)/d' e)picheirei= pseu=dos
ou)dei\s dida/skein.]]
[Footnote 404: Topic. VIII. iv. p. 159,. a. 30: [Greek: tô=n d'
a)gnônizome/nôn to\n me\n e)rôtô=nta phai/nesthai/ ti dei= poiei=n
pa/ntôs, to\n d' a)pokrino/menon mêde\n phai/nesthai pa/schein.]]
[Footnote 405: Ibid. a. 32-37; xi. p. 161, a. 23-25: [Greek:
duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gnônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai
ta\s diatriba/s; e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras cha/rin
a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n lo/gôn], &c.]
The thesis which the respondent undertakes to defend (in a dialogue
of Search or Testing) must be either probable, or improbable, or
neither one nor the other. The probability or improbability may be
either simple and absolute, or special and relative--in the
estimation of the respondent himself or of some one or more persons.
Now, if the thesis be improbable, the opposite thereof, which you the
questioner try to prove, must be probable; if the thesis be probable,
the opposite thereof must be improbable; if the thesis be neither,
its opposite will also be neither. Suppose, first, that the thesis is
improbable absolutely. In that case, its opposite, which you the
questioner must fish for premisses to prove, will be probable; the
respondent therefore ought not to grant you any demand which is
either simply improbable or less probable than the conclusion which
you aim at proving; for no such concessions can really serve your
purpose, since you are bound to prove your conclusion from premisses
more probable than itself.[406] Suppose, next, that the thesis is
probable absolutely. In that case, the opposite conclusion, which you
have to make out, will be improbable absolutely. Accordingly,
whenever you ask concessions that are probable, the respondent ought
to grant them; whenever you ask for concessions that are less
improbable than your intended conclusion, he ought to grant these
also; but, if you ask for any thing more improbable than your
intended conclusion, he ought to refuse it.[407] Suppose, thirdly,
that the thesis is neither probable nor improbable. Here, too, the
respondent ought to grant all concessions that appear to him
probable, as well as all that he thinks more probable than the
opposite conclusion which you are seeking to arrive at; but no
others. This is sufficient for the purpose of Dialectic, and for
keeping open the lines of probable argument.[408]
[Footnote 406: Ibid. v. p. 159, b. 9: [Greek: phanero\n ô(s a)do/xou
me\n o)/ntos a(plô=s tou= keime/nou ou) dote/on tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|
ou)/th' o(\ mê\ dokei= a(plô=s, ou)/th' o(\ dokei= me/n ê(=tton de\
tou= sumpera/smatos dokei=. a)do/xou ga\r ou)/sês tê=s the/seôs
e)/ndoxon to\ sumpe/rasma, ô(/ste dei= ta\ lambano/mena e)ndoxa
pa/nt' ei)=nai kai\ ma=llon e)/ndoxa tou= prokeime/nou, ei) me/llei
dia\ tô=n gnôrimôte/rôn to\ ê(=tton gnô/rimon perai/nesthai. ô(/st'
ei)/ ti mê\ toiou=to/n e)sti tô=n e)rôtôme/nôn, ou) thete/on tô=|
a)pokrinome/nô|.]]
[Footnote 407: Ibid. b. 16.]
[Footnote 408: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, b. 19-23: [Greek: i(kanô=s
ga\r a)\n do/xeie dieile/chthai--ou(/tô ga\r e)ndoxote/rous
sumbê/setai tou\s lo/gous gi/nesthai.]]
When the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered
simply and absolutely, the respondent ought to measure his
concessions by the standard of opinion received usually.[409] When
the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered as
referable to the respondent himself, he has only to consult his own
judgment and estimation in granting or refusing what is asked. When
he undertakes to defend a thesis avowedly as the doctrine of some
known philosopher, such as Herakleitus, he must, in giving his
answers, measure probability and improbability according to what
Herakleitus would determine.[410]
[Footnote 409: Ibid. b. 24: [Greek: pro\s ta\ dokou=nta a(plô=s tê\n
**su/gkrisin poiête/on].]
[Footnote 410: Ibid. b. 25-35. [Greek: pro\s tê\n e)kei/nou dia/noian
a)poble/ponta thete/on e(/kasta kai\ a)rnête/on].]
Since all the questions that you ask must be either probable,
improbable, or neuter, and either relevant[411] or not relevant to
your purpose of refuting the thesis, let us first suppose that you
ask for a concession which is in itself probable, but not relevant.
The respondent ought to grant it, adding that he thinks it probable.
If what you ask is neither probable nor relevant, he ought even then
to grant it; but annexing a notification that he is aware of its
improbability, in order to save his own credit for intelligence.[412]
If it be both probable and relevant, he ought to say that he is aware
of its probability, but that it is too closely connected with the
thesis, and that, if he grants it, the thesis will stand refuted. If
it be relevant, yet at the same time very improbable, he must reply
that, if he grants it, the thesis will be refuted, but that it is too
silly to be propounded. If, being neutral, it is also not relevant,
he ought to grant it without comment; but if, being neutral, it is
relevant, he ought to notify that he is aware that by granting it his
thesis will be refuted.[413]
[Footnote 411: Ibid. vi. p. 159, b. 39: [Greek: ê)\ pro\s to\n
lo/gon, ê)\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon]. By this phrase Aristotle seems to
mean, not simply relevant, but closely, directly, conspicuously
relevant--equivalent to [Greek: li/an suneggu\s tou= e)n a)rchê=|]
(p. 160, a. 5).]
[Footnote 412: Ibid. b. 36-p. 160, a. 2. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mê\
dokou=n kai\ mê\ pro\s to\n lo/gon, dote/on me/n, e)pisêmante/on de\
to\ mê\ dokou=n pro\s eu)la/beian eu)êthei/as.]
How is this to be reconciled with what Aristotle says in the
preceding chapter, p. 159, b. 11-18, that the respondent ought not to
grant such improbabilities at all?]
[Footnote 413: Ibid. p. 160, a. 6-11.]
In this way of proceeding, the march of the dialogue on both sides
will be creditable. The respondent, signifying plainly that he
understands the full consequences of his own concessions, will not
appear to be worsted through any short-comings of his own, but only
through what is inherent in his thesis; while you the questioner,
having asked for such premisses as are really more probable than the
conclusion to be established, and having had them granted, will have
made out your point. It must be understood that you ought not to try
to prove your conclusion from premisses less probable than itself;
and that, if you put questions of this sort, you transgress the rules
of dialectical procedure.[414]
[Footnote 414: Topic. VIII. vi. p. 160, a. 11-16. [Greek: ou(/tô ga\r
o(/ t' a)pokrino/menos ou)de\n do/xei di' au(to\n pa/schein, e)a\n