Aristotle
proorô=n e(/kasta tithê=|, o(/ t' e)rôtô=n teu/xetai sullogismou=
titheme/nôn au)tô=| pa/ntôn e)ndoxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos. o(/soi
d' e)x a)doxote/rôn tou= sumpera/smatos e)picheirou=si
sullogi/zesthai, dê=lon ô(s ou) kalô=s sullogi/zontai; dio\ toi=s
e)rôtô=sin ou) thete/on.]]
If you ask a dialectical question in plain and univocal language, the
respondent is bound to answer Yes or No. But if you ask it in terms
obscure or equivocal, he is not obliged to answer thus directly. He
is at liberty to tell you that he does not understand the question;
he ought to have no scruple in telling you so, if such is really the
fact. Suppose the terms of your question to be familiar, but
equivocal; the answer to it may perhaps be either true or false,
alike in all the different senses of the terms. In that case, the
respondent ought to answer Yes or No directly. But, if the answer
would be an affirmation in one sense of the terms and a negation in
another, he must take care to signify that he is aware of the
equivocation, and to distinguish at once the two-fold meaning; for,
if the distinction is not noticed till afterwards, he cannot clearly
show that he was aware of it from the first. If he really was not at
first aware of the equivocation, and gave an affirmative answer
looking only to one among the several distinct meanings, you will try
to convict him of error by pushing him on the other meaning. The best
thing that he can then do will be to confess his oversight, and to
excuse himself by saying that misconception is easy where the same
term or the same proposition may mean several different things.[415]
[Footnote 415: Ibid. vii. p. 160, a. 17-34.]
Suppose you put several particular questions (or several analogous
questions) with the view of arriving ultimately by induction at the
concession of an universal, comprising them all. If they are all both
true and probable, the respondent must concede them all severally;
yet he may still intend to answer No, when the universal is tendered
to him after them. He has no right to answer thus, however, unless he
can produce some contradictory particular instance, real or apparent,
to justify him; and, if he does so without such justification, he is
a perverse dialectician.[416] Perhaps he may try to sustain his
denegation of the universal, after having conceded many particulars,
by a counter-attack founded on some chain of paradoxical reasoning
such as that of Zeno against motion; there being many such paradoxes
contradictory of probabilities, yet hard to refute. But this is no
sufficient justification for refusing to admit the universal, when,
after having admitted many particulars, he can produce no particular
adverse to them. The case will be still worse, if he refuses to admit
the universal, having neither any adverse instance, nor any
counter-ratiocinative attack. It is then the extreme of perverse
Dialectic.[417]
[Footnote 416: Topic. VIII. viii. p. 160, b. 2-5: [Greek: to\ ga\r
a)/neu e)nsta/seôs, ê)\ ou)/sês ê)\ dokou/sês, kôlu/ein to\n lo/gon
duskolai/nein e)sti/n. ei) ou)=n e)pi\ pollô=n phainome/nou mê\
di/dôsi to\ katho/lou mê\ e)/chôn e)/nstasin, phanero\n o(/ti
duskolai/nei.]]
[Footnote 417: Ibid. b. 5, seq. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mêd'
a)ntepicheirei=n e)/chei o(/ti ou)k a)lêthe/s, pollô=| ma=llon a)\n
do/xeie duskolai/nein. kai/toi ou)de\ tou=th' i(kano/n; pollou\s ga\r
lo/gous e)/chomen e)nanti/ous tai=s do/xais, ou(\s chalepo\n lu/ein,
katha/per to\n Zê/nônos o(/ti ou)k e)nde/chetai kinei=sthai ou)de\
to\ sta/dion dielthei=n; _a)ll' ou) dia\ tou=to ta)ntikei/mena
tou/tois ou) thete/on_.]]
Before the respondent undertakes to defend any thesis or definition,
he ought to have previously studied the various modes attacking it,
and to have prepared himself for meeting them.[418] He must also be
cautious of taking up improbable theses, in either of the senses of
improbable. For a thesis is so called when it involves strange and
paradoxical developments, as if a man lays down either that every
thing is in motion or that nothing is in motion; and also, when it
implies a discreditable character and is contrary to that which men
wish to be thought to hold, as, for example, the doctrine that
pleasure is the good, or that it is better to do wrong than to suffer
wrong. If a man defends such theses as these, people hate him because
they presume that he is not merely propounding them as matter for
dialectical argument, but advocating them as convictions of his
own.[419]
[Footnote 418: Ibid. ix. p. 160, b. 14.]
[Footnote 419: Ibid. b. 17-22: [Greek: a)/doxon d' u(po/thesin
eu)labête/on u(pe/chein; ei)/ê d' a)\n a)/doxos dichô=s;] &c.]
The respondent must farther be able, if you bring against him a false
syllogistic reasoning, to distinguish upon which among your premisses
the false conclusion really turns, and to refute that one. Your
reasoning may have more than one false premiss; but he must not
content himself with refuting any one or any other: he must single
out that one which is the chief determining cause of the falsehood.
Thus, if your syllogism be:--Every man in a sitting position is
writing, Sokrates is a man in a sitting position; therefore, Sokrates
is writing,--it will not suffice that the respondent should refute
your minor premiss, though this may be false;[420] because such a
refutation will not apply to the number of other cases in which men
are sitting but not writing; and therefore it will not expose the
full bearing of the falsehood. Your major premiss is that upon which
the full bearing of the falsehood depends; and the respondent must
show that he is aware of this by refuting your major.[421]
[Footnote 420: Topic. VIII. x. p. 160, b. 23-26. [Greek: ou) ga\r o(
o(tiou=n a)nelô\n le/luken, ou)/d' ei) pseu=do/s e)sti to\
a)nairou/menon; e)/choi ga\r a)\n plei/ô pseudê= o( lo/gos.]]
[Footnote 421: Ibid. b. 30-39. [Greek: oi)=de de\ tê\n lu/sin o(
ei)dô\s o(/ti para\ tou=to o( lo/gos--ou) ga\r a)po/chrê to\
e)nstê=nai, ou)/d' a)\n pseu=dos ê)=| to\ a)nairou/menon, a)lla\ kai\
dio/ti pseu=dos a)podeikte/on; _ou(/tô ga\r a)\n ei)/ê phanero\n
po/teron proorô=n ti ê)\ ou)\ poiei=tai tê\n e)/nstasin_.]]
This last-mentioned proceeding--refutation of that premiss upon which
your false conclusion in its full bearing really turns--is the only
regular, valid, and complete objection whereby the respondent can
stop out your syllogistic approaches. There are indeed three other
modes of objection to which he may resort; but these are all either
inconclusive or unfair. He may turn his objection against you
personally; and, without refuting any of your premisses, he may thus
perplex and confuse you, so that you are disqualified from pursuing
the thread of your questions. Or he may turn his objections against
portions of your questions; not refuting any one of your premisses,
but showing that, as they stand, they are insufficient to warrant the
conclusion which you seek to establish; when, if you are master of
your subject, and retain your calmness, you will at once supply the
deficiency by putting additional questions, so that his objection
thus vanishes. Or, lastly, he may multiply irrelevant objections
against time, for the purpose of prolonging the discussion and tiring
you out.[422] Of these four modes of objection open to the respondent
the first is the only one truly valid and conclusive; the three
others are obstructions either surmountable or unfair, and the last
is the most discreditable of all.[423]
[Footnote 422: Ibid. p. 161, a. 1-12: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gon
kôlu=sai sumpera/nasthai tetrachô=s. ê)\ ga\r a)nelo/nta par' o(\
gi/netai to\ pseu=dos. ê)\ pro\s to\n e)rôtô=nta e)/nstasin
ei)po/nta;--tri/ton de\ pro\s ta\ ê)rôtême/na;--teta/rtê de\ kai\
cheiri/stê tô=n e)nsta/seôn ê( pro\s to\n chro/non.]]
[Footnote 423: Ibid. a. 13-15: [Greek: ai( me\n ou)=n e)nsta/seis,
katha/per ei)/pamen, tetrachô=s gi/nontai; lu/sis d' e)sti\ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn ê( prô/tê mo/non, ai( de\ loipai\ kôlu/seis tine\s kai\
e)mpodismoi\ tô=n sumperasma/tôn.]]
To blame the argumentative procedure and to blame the questioner are
two distinct things. Perhaps your manner of conducting the
interrogation, preparatory to your final syllogism, may be open to
censure; yet nevertheless you the questioner may deserve no censure;
for it may be the respondent's fault, not yours. He may refuse to
grant the very premisses which are essential to the good conduct of
your case; he may resort to perverse evasions and contradictions for
the mere purpose of thwarting you; so that you are forced to adapt
yourself to his unworthy manoeuvres rather than to aim at the thesis
itself. Dialectic cannot be well conducted unless both the partners
do their duty to the common purpose; the bad conduct of your
respondent puts you out, and the dialectic presently degenerates on
both sides into angry contention.[424] Apart from this, too, it must
be remembered that the express purpose of Dialectic is not to teach,
but to search and test consequences and to exercise the intellect of
both parties. Accordingly you are not always restricted to true
syllogistic premisses and conclusions. You are allowed to resort
occasionally to false premisses and false conclusions; for, if what
the respondent advances be true, you have no means of refuting it
except by falsehood; and, if what he advances be false, the best way
of refuting it may be through some other falsehood.[425] You render
service to him by doing so; for, since his beliefs are contrary to
truth, if the dialogue is confined to his beliefs, the result may
perhaps contribute to persuade him, but it will not instruct or
profit him.[426] It is your business to bring him round and
emancipate him from these erroneous beliefs; but you must accomplish
this in a manner truly dialectical, and not contentious; whether you
proceed by true or by false conclusions.[427] If you on your side,
indeed, put questions in a contentious spirit, it is you that are to
blame. But often the respondent is most to blame, when he refuses to
grant what he thinks probable, and when he does not apprehend what
you really intend to ask.[428] He is sometimes also to blame for
granting what he ought to refuse; such as _Petitio Principii_ or
Affirmation of Contraries. It is often difficult to distinguish what
questions involve _Petitio Principii_ or Affirmation of Contraries:
they are asked and granted without either party being aware, and the
like mistake is committed by men in private talk, not merely in
formal dialogue. When this happens, the argument will inevitably be a
bad one; but the fault is with the respondent who, having before
refused what he ought to have granted, now grants what he ought to
refuse.[429]
[Footnote 424: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 16-24. [Greek:
duskolai/nontes ou)=n a)gônistika\s kai\ ou) dialektika\s poiou=ntai
ta\s diatriba/s.] a. 37: [Greek: phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn
to\ koino\n e)/rgon.]]
[Footnote 425: Ibid. a. 24-31: [Greek: e)/ti d' e)pei\ gumnasi/as
kai\ pei/ras cha/rin a)ll' ou) didaskali/as oi( toiou=toi tô=n
lo/gôn, dê=lon ô(s ou) mo/non ta)lêthê= sullogiste/on a)lla\ kai\
pseu=dos, ou)de\ di' a)lêthô=n a)ei\ a)ll' e)ni/ote kai\ pseudô=n.
polla/kis ga\r a)lêthou=s tethe/ntos a)nairei=n a)na/gkê to\n
dialego/menon, ô(/ste protate/on ta\ pseudê=. e)ni/ote de\ kai\
pseu/dous tethe/ntos a)nairete/on dia\ pseudô=n.]]
[Footnote 426: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r kôlu/ei tini\
dokei=n ta\ mê\ o)/nta ma=llon tô=n a)lêthô=n, ô(/st' e)k tô=n
e)kei/nô| dokou/ntôn tou= lo/gou genome/nou ma=llon e)/stai
pepeisme/nos ê)\ ô)phelême/nos.]]
[Footnote 427: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s
metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein.]