Aristotle
questioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing; but
this is a disgraceful scene. To keep clear of such abusive discourse,
you must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace, unprepared,
respondents.[466]
[Footnote 466: Ibid. b. 8-15: [Greek: pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs
peirô/menon phai/nesthai diapheu/gein, di/kaion me\n pa/ntôs
peira=sthai sullogi/sasthai, ou)k eu)/schêmon de/.]]
CHAPTER X.
SOPHISTICI ELENCHI.
The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional
occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without
the reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he
possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun
_Sophistic_, with the verb _to practice as a Sophist_ ([Greek:
sophisteu/ein]), expresses such profession and purpose.[1] This
application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various
dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &c.) introduced Sokrates
conversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a
longer dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition
of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the
actual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes
to himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his
general theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming
properly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly
known as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici
Elenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.
[Footnote 1: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r
ê( sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a ou)=sa d' ou)/, kai\ o( sophistê\s
chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as a)ll' ou)k
ou)/sês;--a)na/gkê ou)=n _tou\s boulome/nous sophisteu/ein to\_ tô=n
ei)rême/nôn lo/gôn ge/nos zêtei=n;--o(/ti me\n ou)=n e)/sti ti
toiou=ton lo/gôn ge/nos, kai\ o(/ti toiau/tês e)phi/entai duna/meôs
_ou(\s kalou=men sophista/s_, dê=lon.] Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.]
The Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of
refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept
it as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of
Elenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the
entire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one
variety of Syllogism.[2] The Elenchus is a syllogism with a
conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis
or proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions
of a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid
Elenchus; these last, again, must be understood, before we enter on
the distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical,
invalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and
classification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise
on Logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with
Aristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.
[Footnote 2: Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.]
Aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive
appearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail
not less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a
notorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their
profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of
syllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of
debate:--(1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or
Sophistic.[3] In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not
consistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as
distinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis
is between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as
varieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is
under the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or
Pseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in
which Eristic stands to Dialectic.[4]
[Footnote 3: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ tô=n e)n
tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn te/ttara ge/nê, didaskalikou\ kai\
dialektikoi\ kai\ peirastikoi\ kai\ e)ristikoi/.]]
[Footnote 4: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.]
Didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately,
but only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own
separate, undemonstrable _principia_, from which its conclusions, so
far as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher
acquainted with these _principia_ and deductions, talking with some
one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts
questions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can;
and, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw,
according to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he
himself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must
believe upon the teacher's authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the
didactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that
Dialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and
reason from it, if he thinks it wrong.[5]
[Footnote 5: Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: [Greek: nu=n d' ou)k e)/stin o(
dialektio\s peri\ ge/nos ti ô(risme/non, ou)de\ deiktiko\s ou)deno/s,
ou)de\ toiou=tos oi(=os o( katho/lou. ou)/te ga/r e)stin a(/panta e)n
e(ni/ tini ge/nei, ou)/te ei) ei)/ê, oi(=o/n te u(po\ ta\s au)ta\s
a)rcha\s ei)=nai ta\ o)/nta. ô(/st' ou)demi/a te/chnê tô=n
deiknuousô=n tina\ phu/sin e)rôtêtikê/ e)stin; ou) ga\r e)/xestin
o(poteronou=n tô=n mori/ôn dou=nai; sullogismo\s ga\r ou) gi/netai
e)x a)mphoi=n. ê( de\ dialektikê\ e)rôtêrikê/ e)stin; ei) d'
e)dei/knuen, ei) kai\ mê\ pa/nta, a)lla\ ta/ ge prô=ta kai\ ta\s
oi)kei/as a)rcha/s, ou)k a)\n ê)rô/ta. mê\ dido/ntos ga\r ou)k a)\n
e)/ti ei)=chen e)x ô(=n e)/ti diale/xetai pro\s tê\n e)/nstasin.]
When Aristotle, therefore, reckons [Greek: lo/gous didaskalikou/s] as
one of the four species [Greek: tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn]
(Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand [Greek: to\
diale/gesthai] in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the
derivative noun [Greek: dialektikê/].]
Dialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally
and indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrable _principia_
which the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic
syllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an
interrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares
a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other
puts questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling
him either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some
other point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and
to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the
respondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other
premisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood
all to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary
multitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority.
Accordingly there is often a conflict of arguments _pro_ and _con_,
much diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if
the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the
respondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.
Such is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between
Didactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that
which he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and
distinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate
varieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed,
admits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;[6] and the
like is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.
[Footnote 6: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: [Greek: ê( ga\r
peirastikê/ e)sti dialektikê/ tis], &c.--p. 172, a. 35: [Greek: o(
te/chnê| sullogistikê=| peirastiko/s, dialektiko/s].--viii. p. 169,
b. 25: [Greek: e)/sti d' ê( peirastikê\ me/ros tê=s dialektikê=s.]]
These subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations,
and the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is
conducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:[7] it
may be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two
debaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and
doctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of
the two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing
and confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose
([Greek: koino\n e)/rgon])[8] of the two champions, to improve and
enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a
variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing
more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and
undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain
rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and
respondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to
exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and,
though one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably
conducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the
assailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to
dishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse
and obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that
case the debate is called by Aristotle _eristic_ or _contentious_,
from the undue **predominance of the controversial spirit and
purpose; also _sophistic_, from the fact that there existed (as
he asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who
regularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres, first with
a view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit,
being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to
justify them.[9]
[Footnote 7: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: [Greek: pro\s
gumnasi/an--e)xetastikê\ ga\r ou)=sa], &c. Compare also Topica, VIII.
xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: [Greek: to\ de\
gumna/zesthai duna/meôs cha/rin, kai\ ma/lista peri\ ta\s prota/seis
kai\ e)nsta/seis; e)/sti ga\r ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o(
protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s.]]
[Footnote 8: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.]
[Footnote 9: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n
tê=s ni/kês au)tê=s cha/rin toiou=toi e)ristikoi\ a)/nthrôpoi kai\
phile/rides dokou=sin ei)=nai, oi( de\ do/xês cha/rin tê=s ei)s
chrêmatismo\n sophistikoi/;--kai\ tô=n lo/gôn tô=n au)tô=n me/n
ei)sin oi( phile/rides kai\ sophistai/, a)ll' ou) tô=n au)tô=n
e(/neken. kai\ lo/gos o( au)to\s me\n e)/stai sophistiko\s kai\
e)ristiko/s, a)ll' ou) kata\ tauto/n, a)ll' ê(=| me\n ni/kês
phainome/nês, e)ristiko/s, ê(=| de\ sophi/as, sophistiko/s.] &c.]
We thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked
as two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and
Dialectic; but that _peirastic_ is in fact an epithet applicable
generally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and
appropriate functions; while _eristic_ designates only a peculiar
mode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is
that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations.
Still less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since
it involves no intrinsic or intellectual _differentia_, but connotes
only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who
is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of
pecuniary profit.[10]
[Footnote 10: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: [Greek: o(
ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei, a)ll' e)n tê=|