Aristotle
proaire/sei;--sophistê\s me\n kata\ tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s d'
ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin a)lla\ kata\ tê\n du/namin.] To the same
purpose he speaks in Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 25,
distinguishing the Sophist by his [Greek: proai/resis] from the
Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of [Greek: du/namis] both
are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El.,
notes, p. 99):--"[Greek: du/namis], capacity, is in the intellect;
[Greek: proai/resis], purpose, in the will. The antithesis between
these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the
relation between Sophistic and Dialectic. . . The power _plus_ the
will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will,
Dialectic (p. 100)."]
While, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the
two heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle
has of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the
latter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers
enunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic
syllogism is derived from the _principia_ belonging specially to one
particular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to
conclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from
probable premisses (_i.e._, accredited by the ordinary public or by a
few wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are
probable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle
recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic
syllogism there corresponds the _pseudographic_ syllogism or the
_paralogism_: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism
does) from the special matters of some given science,[11] yet which
nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality;
either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the
matter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To
the dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds the
_eristic_ or _sophistic_ syllogism: which is a good syllogism in
appearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in
form, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to
be probable without being really probable.[12]
[Footnote 11: Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. [Greek: oi( e)k tô=n
peri/ tinas e)pistê/mas oi)kei/ôn gino/menoi paralogismoi/, katha/per
e)pi\ tê=s geômetri/as kai\ tô=n tau/tê| suggenô=n sumbe/bêken
e)/chein;--e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn me\n tê=| e)pistê/mê| lêmma/tôn, ou)k
a)lêthô=n de/, to\n sullogismo\n poiei=tai.]]
[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164,
a. 20-b. 21.]
One would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and
the didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the
pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic
deserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would
deserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal
conditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does
not admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist
(he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to
deceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though
sometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps
within the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be
false, since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science
geometry,[13] but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it
transgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it
solves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two
epithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the
quadrature of the circle--one by Hippokrates, on geometrical
principles, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical.
Both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of
Hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the
sphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled
out of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally
sophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had
succeeded in solving the problem.[14] If indeed the pseudo-graphic
syllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic,
even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if
it be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however
untrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or
eristic.[15]
[Footnote 13: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.]
[Footnote 14: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: [Greek: ta\ ga\r
pseudographê/mata ou)k e)ristika/ (kata\ ga\r ta\ u(po\ tê\n te/chnên
oi( paralogismoi/), ou)de/ g' ei)/ ti/ e)sti pseudogra/phêma peri\
a)lêthe/s, oi(=on to\ I(ppokra/tous ê)\ o( tetragônismo\s o( dia\
tô=n mêni/skôn. a)ll' ô(s Bru/sôn e)tetragô/nize to\n ku/klon, _ei)
kai\ tetragôni/zetai o( ku/klos, a)ll' o(/ti ou) kata\ to\ pra=gma,
dia\ tou=to sophistiko/s_.] Also p. 172, a. 1-8.]
[Footnote 15: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p.
161, a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s
kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein, katha/per to\n geôme/trên
geômetrikô=s, a)/n te pseu=dos a)/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=| to\
sumperaino/menon.] Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.]
Such is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication
of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process.
Now this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no
appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals with _Omne
Scibile_, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts
the analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the
Sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the
task which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he
shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given
science,--in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may
be. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and
dishonest manoeuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of
the regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all
price, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a
species, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being
analysed and defined;[16] and his treatise on Sophistical Refutations
is intended to describe and illustrate the _Loci_ belonging to it,
and contributing to its purpose.[17]
[Footnote 16: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: [Greek: ô(/sper ga\r ê(
e)n a)gô=ni a)diki/a ei)=do/s ti e)/chei kai\ e)/stin a)dikomachi/a
tis, ou(/tôs e)n a)ntilogi/a| a)dikomachi/a ê( e)ristikê/ e)stin;
e)kei= te ga\r oi( pa/ntôs nika=n proairou/menoi pa/ntôn a(/ptontai,
kai\ e)ntau=tha oi( e)ristikoi/.]]
[Footnote 17: Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti
ou) pa/ntôn tô=n e)/legchôn a)lla\ tô=n para\ tê\n dialektikê\n
lêpte/on tou\s to/pous.]]
Fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to
dishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and
being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see
by what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses
from fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for
its appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either
by the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not
everything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is
really probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is
the case, the _probabilia_ are apparent only and not real; they have
the character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately
manifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It
is such apparent _probabilia_ as these, which make up the premisses
of eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or
fallacious refutations turn.[18]
[Footnote 18: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d'
e)/sti sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn mê\ o)/ntôn de/,
kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou)
ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon, kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon.
ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei
pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n
lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\
to\ polu/ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n
au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\ phu/sis.] Compare Soph. El. ii. p.
165, b. 7.]
Aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the
one hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the
whole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this
latter department. The distinction that he draws between them is
two-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part
of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose
of victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely
apparent--such as any one may see not to be real
probabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms.
Now, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of
profit as having no essential connection with the question. It is
quite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the
Sophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the
eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even
in well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and
benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the
distinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and
the Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory, still more
unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate
between what is really probable (_i.e._, accredited either by the
multitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance
and not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation
given by Aristotle himself[19]--when he describes the apparently
probable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most
ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the
more gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest.
Nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to
fallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint
to impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed
to come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would
undoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the
Preface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most
dishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact,
Aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning
of the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic
syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible
enough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection;
like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver,
and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger
than they really are.[20] Here we have the eristic or sophistic
syllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken
for truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be
applied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as
bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even
by the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that
definition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of
dialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthydêmus) puts into
the mouth of the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. And, since