Aristotle
or not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon
the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the
words: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended,
it is addressed to the thought; if not, not.[82] To require that the
questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts
the question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a
teacher--would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.[83]
And this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to
refrain from all those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns
as peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the
attitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can,
not to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The
purpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double
function of question and answer (while entirely absent from
Didactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the
Sophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all
cost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the
procedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not a
_differentia_ giving name and essence to a new species. The unfair
Dialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the
same, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This
distinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very
insufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either
on the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of
concessions which have neither been asked nor granted,--these are
justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.[84] But the
enumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his
anxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself,
distinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much
that belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really
unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the
foreground.
[Footnote 80: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: [Greek: ou)k e)/sti de\
diaphora\ tô=n _ê(\n le/gousi tines_, to\ ei)=nai tou\s me\n pro\s
tou)/noma lo/gous, e(te/rous de\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian.]
From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx.
p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors,
we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of
Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of
prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.]
[Footnote 81: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.]
[Footnote 82: Ibid. b. 28: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)n tô=| lo/gô| e)/sti
to\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian ei)=nai, a)ll' e)n tô=| to\n a)pokrino/menon
e)/chein pôs pro\s ta\ dedome/na.]]
[Footnote 83: Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.]
[Footnote 84: Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.]
Though Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he
nevertheless indicates _Loci_ (or general heads of subjects) to
assist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the
sophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these
precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the
Topica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to
Solecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical
questioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice
in sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical,
and, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.[85] He recommends it as
valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument,
but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific
truths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the
equivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of
escaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without
being aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when
we pursue reflections of our own.[86] It is not enough to see
generally that there _is_ a fallacy; we must farther learn to detect
at once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how
it may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because
fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our
notice under inversion and substitution of words.[87] Unless we
acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall
find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular
case of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally,
we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own
stupidity and incompetence.[88]
[Footnote 85: Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica**, I. ii. p.
101, a. 30, seq.]
[Footnote 86: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: [Greek: deu/teron de\
pro\s ta\s kath' au(to\n zêtê/seis (chrê/simoi); o( ga\r u(ph'
e(te/rou r(a|diôs paralogizo/menos kai\ tou=to mê\ ai)sthano/menos
ka)\n au)to\s u(ph' au(tou= tou=to pa/thoi polla/kis.]]
[Footnote 87: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: ou) tau)to\ d' e)sti\ labo/nta te
to\n lo/gon i)dei=n kai\ lu=sai tê\n mochthêri/an, kai\ e)rôtô/menon
a)panta=n du/nasthai tache/ôs. o(\ ga\r i)/smen, polla/kis
metatithe/menon a)gnoou=men.] Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.]
[Footnote 88: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: [Greek: ô(/ste, a)\n
dê=lon me\n ê(mi=n ê)=|, a)mele/têtoi d' ô)=men, u(sterou=men tô=n
kairô=n polla/kis.]]
Accordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable
length,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or
solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions;
all the thirteen Fallacies, (the six _In Dictione_, and the seven
_Extra Dictionem_) being treated in succession. In conducting his
defensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what
the Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real
or genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must
so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of
simulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really
refuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism
constructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does
Equivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore
yielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent
is really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his
interrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where
they have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly
and briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered.
But, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent
cannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two
meanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards
himself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a
contradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the
question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions
as one.[92]
[Footnote 89: From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.]
[Footnote 90: Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r
pro\s tou\s e)ristikou\s machete/on, ou)k ô(s e)le/gchontas, a)ll'
ô(s phainome/nous; ou) ga/r phamen sullogi/zesthai/ ge au)tou/s,
ô(/ste pro\s to\ mê\ dokei=n diorthôte/on.]]
[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a.
29.
Aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct,
without any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by
dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his
own--[Greek: o(/ t' e)pizêtou=si nu=n me\n ê(=tton pro/teron de\
ma=llon oi( e)ristikoi/, to\ ê)\ nai\ ê)\ ou)\ a)pokri/nesthai to\n
e)rôtô/menon, e)gi/net' a)/n.] I presume that he makes comparison
with the Platonic dialogues--Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias,
pp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.]
[Footnote 92: Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.]
As the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such
but is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an
apparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various
cases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution
of this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is
plausible, the respondent may answer, "Be it so"; but, if it involves
any paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, "So it would
appear": he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to
refutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while
involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is
at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set
up,--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a _Petitio
Principii_, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the
questioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by
Induction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but,
as the general result of the particulars conceded (and such
like),--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may
say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]
[Footnote 93: Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.]
[Footnote 94: Ibid. a. 25.]
[Footnote 95: Ibid. a. 27-35.]
If a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must
be made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the
question is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the
meaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly.
If he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the
result:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real
refutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the
first, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent,
where he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the
first. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape
with a less;[97] _e.g._, he ought to concede the particular rather
than the universal.
[Footnote 96: Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.]
[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 8-13.]
Again, among opinions generally received, there are some which the
public recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty;
others, on which they are firmly assured that every one who
contradicts them speaks falsely. When it is uncertain to which of
these two classes the question put is referable, the respondent will
be safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively, but
simply, "I go with the received opinions."[98] In cases where
opinions are divided, he may find opportunity for changing the terms,
and for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes.
Such change of terms may pass without protest, in consequence of the
doubtful character of the matter; while it will embarrass the
questioner in constructing his refutation.[99] The respondent may
further embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to
be put, and by objecting against them beforehand.[100]
[Footnote 98: Soph. El. **xvii. p. 176, b. 14-20.
Both the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are
differently given by various commentators. The text and construction
of Waitz appears to me the best, and I have followed him. I cannot
agree with Mr. Poste when he declares (notes, p. 143) [Greek:
a)popha/neis] to be the true reading, instead of [Greek:
a)popha/seis], which last is adopted both by Bekker and in the
edition of **Firmin Didot.]
[Footnote 99: Ibid. b. 20-25.]
[Footnote 100: Ibid. b. 26.]
When the questioner has obtained the premisses which he thinks
necessary, and has drawn from them a refutative syllogism, the
respondent must see whether he can properly solve that syllogism or