Aristotle
not.[101] A good and proper solution is, to point out on which
premiss the fallacy of the conclusion depends. First, he must examine
whether it is formally correct, or whether it has only a false
appearance of being so: if the last be the case, he must distinguish
in which of the premisses and in what way such false appearance has
arisen. If on the other hand the syllogism is formally correct, he
must look whether the conclusion is true or false. Should it be true,
he cannot solve the syllogism except by controverting one or both of
the premisses; but should the conclusion be false, two modes of
solution are open to him. One mode is, if he can point out an
equivocation or amphiboly in the terms of the conclusion; another
mode will be, to controvert, or exhibit a fallacy in, one of the
premisses.[102] The respondent, however, must learn to apply this
examination rapidly and unhesitatingly: to do so at once is very
difficult, though it may be easily done if he has leisure to
reflect.[103]
[Footnote 101: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 29: [Greek: ê( me/n
o)rthê\ lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(poi/an
e)rô/têsin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos.]]
[Footnote 102: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 38: [Greek: tou\s me\n
kata\ to\ sumpe/rasma pseudei=s dichô=s e)nde/chetai lu/ein; kai\
ga\r tô=| a)nelei=n ti tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn, kai\ tô=| dei=xai to\
sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch ou(/tôs.]
Mr. Poste translates these last words--"or by a counterproof directed
against the conclusion:" and he remarks in his note (pp. 145-147),
"that this assertion--disproof of the conclusion of the refutative
syllogism is one mode of _solution_--is both manifestly
inadmissible, and flatly contradicted by Aristotle himself
elsewhere." The words of Aristotle doubtless seem to countenance Mr.
Poste's translation; yet the contradiction pointed out by Mr. Poste
(and very imperfectly explained, p. 147) ought to make us look out
for another meaning; which is suggested by the chapter immediately
following (xix. p. 177, a. 9), where Aristotle treats of the
Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly. He tells us that
equivocation may be found either in the conclusion or in the
premisses; and that to show it in the conclusion is one mode of
solving or invalidating the refutation. This is what Aristotle means
by the words cited at the beginning of this note: [Greek: tô=|
dei=xai to\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch o)rthô=s]. In Mr. Poste's
translation these words mean the same as [Greek: a)nelei=n] used just
before, which Aristotle obviously does not intend.]
[Footnote 103: Soph. El. xviii. p. 177, a. 7.]
Aristotle then proceeds to indicate the modes in which the respondent
may provide solutions for each of the thirteen heads of fallacious
refutation above enumerated. For these thirteen classes, he
pronounces that one and the same solution will be found applicable to
all fallacies contained in one and the same class.[104]
[Footnote 104: Scholia, p. 312, a. 4, Br.; Soph. El. 20, p. 177, b.
31: [Greek: tô=n ga\r para\ tau)to\n lo/gôn ê( au)tê\ lu/sis], &c.]
Thus, in the two first of them--Equivocation of Terms and Amphiboly
of Propositions--duplicity of meaning must be either in the
conclusion, or in the premisses, of the refutative syllogism. If it
be in the conclusion, the refutation must at once be rejected, unless
the respondent has previously admitted some proposition containing
the equivocal word as one of its terms, so that the refutation may
appear to contradict it expressly and distinctly. But, if it be in
the premisses, then there is no necessity that the respondent should
have previously admitted such a proposition; for the equivocal word
may form the middle term of the refutative syllogism, and may thus
not appear in the conclusion thereof.[105] The proper way for the
respondent to deal with these questions, involving equivocation or
amphiboly, is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the
double meaning, thus: "In one sense, it is so; in another sense, it
is not." If he does not perceive the double meaning until he has
already answered the first question, he must recover himself, when he
answers the second, by pointing out the equivocation more distinctly,
and by specifying how much he is prepared to concede.[106] Even if he
has been taken unawares, and has not perceived the equivocation until
the refutative syllogism has been constructed simply and absolutely,
he should still contend that he never meant to concede what has been
apparently refuted, and that the refutation tells only against the
name, not against the thing meant;[107] so that there is no genuine
refutation at all.
[Footnote 105: Soph. El. xix. p. 177, a. 18: [Greek: o(/sois d' e)n
toi=s e)rôtê/masin, ou)k a)na/gkê proapophê=sai to\ ditto/n; ou) ga\r
pro\s tou=to a)lla\ dia\ tou=to o( lo/gos.]]
[Footnote 106: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: e)a\n de\ la/thê|, e)pi\ te/lei
prostithe/nta tê=| e)rôtê/sei diorthôte/on;] &c.]
[Footnote 107: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: o(/lôs te machete/on, a)\n kai\
a(plô=s sullogi/zêtai, o(/ti ou)ch o(\ e)/phêsen a)pe/phêse pra=gma,
a)ll' o)/noma; ô(/st' ou)k e)/legchos.]
Instead of [Greek: a)\n kai/], Julius Pacius reads [Greek: ka)/n]:
the meaning is much the same.]
In the next two Fallacies--those of Composition and Division, or
Conjunction and Disjunction--when the questioner draws up his
refutative syllogism as if one of the two had been conceded, the
respondent will retort by saying that his concession was intended
only in the other construction of the words. This fallacy is distinct
from Equivocation; and it is a mistake to try (as some have tried) to
reduce all fallacies to Equivocation or Amphiboly.[108] The
respondent will distinguish, in each particular case, that
construction of the words which he intended in his admission, from
that which the questioner assumes in his pretended refutation.[109]
[Footnote 108: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, a. 33-b. 9. [Greek: ou) pa/ntes
oi( e)/legchoi para\ to\ ditto/n, katha/per tine/s phasin.]
This is another of the evidences showing that there were theorists
prior to Aristotle on logical proof; and that his declaration of
originality (in the concluding chapter of Sophist. Elenchi) must be
taken with reserve.]
[Footnote 109: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, b. 10-26: [Greek: diairete/on
ou)=n tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|;] &c.]
The Fallacies of Accent rarely furnish sophistical refutations,[110]
but those of _Figura Dictionis_ furnish a great many. When two words
have the like form and structure, it may naturally be imagined that
the signification of one belongs to the same Category as that of the
other. But this is often an illusion; and in such cases a sophistical
refutation may be founded thereupon. The respondent will solve it by
denying the inference from similarity of form to similarity of
meaning, and by distinguishing accurately to which among the ten
Categories the meaning of each several word or each proposition
belongs. When two words thus seem, by their form, to belong to the
same Category, the questioner will often take it for granted, without
expressly asking, that they do belong to the same, and will found a
confutation thereupon; but the respondent must not admit the
confutation to be valid, unless this question has been explicitly put
to him and conceded.[111] A question is put which, in its direct and
obvious meaning, bears only on the category of Quantity, of Quality,
of Relation, of Action, or of Passion; but the respondent, not aware
of the equivocation, answers it in such a manner as to comprehend the
Category of Substance, and is so understood by the questioner when he
constructs his refutative syllogism. The respondent will secure
himself from being thus confuted, by keeping constantly in view to
which of the Categories his answer is intended to refer.[112]
[Footnote 110: Ibid. xxi. p. 177, b. 35.]
[Footnote 111: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, a. 4-28. [Greek: to\ ga\r loipo\n
au)to\s prosti/thêsin o( a)kou/ôn ô(s o(moi/ôs lego/menon; to\ de\
le/getai me\n ou)ch o(moi/ôs, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n le/xin.]]
[Footnote 112: Several illustrative examples of this mode of
sophistical refutation, founded on the Fallacy called _Figura
Dictionis_, are indicated in this chapter by Aristotle. The
indication however, is often so brief and elliptical, that there is
great difficulty in restoring the fallacies in full, and still
greater difficulty in translating them into any modern language.
1. Is it possible at the same time to do and to have done the same
thing?--No. To see something is to do something; to have seen
something is to have done something?--Yes. Is it possible at the same
time to see and to have seen the same thing?--Yes.
The respondent has thus contradicted himself. The form of the word
[Greek: o(ra=n] appears to rank it under the Category [Greek:
poiei=n]. However, I think that the mistake really made here was,
that the respondent returned an answer universally negative to the
first question.
2. Does anything coming under the Category _Pati_ come under the
Category _Agere_?--No. But [Greek: te/mnetai, kai/etai,
ai)stha/netai], all show by their form that they belong to the
Category _Pati_?--Yes. Again, [Greek: le/gein, tre/chein, o(ra=n],
show by their form that they belong to the Category _Agere_?--Yes.
You will admit, however, that [Greek: to\ o(ra=n] is [Greek:
ai)stha/nesthai/ ti]?--Certainly. Therefore something that belongs to
the Category _Agere_ belongs also to that of _Pati_.
If we turn back to Aristot. Categ. viii. p. 11, a. 37, we shall find
that he admits the possibility that the same subject may belong to
two distinct Categories.
3. Did any one write that which stands here written?--Yes. It stands
here written that you are standing up--a false statement; but when it
was written the statement was true?--Yes. Therefore the writer has
written a statement both true and false?--Yes.
Here _true_ and _false_ belong to the Category Quality; the statement
or matter written belongs to that of Substance. What the writer wrote
had nothing to do with the former of the two Categories; and no
contradiction has been made out by admitting that the statement _was_
once true and _is_ now false.
4. Does a man tread that which he walks?--Yes. But he walks the whole
day?--Yes. Therefore he treads the whole day.
Here the Category of _Quando_ is confused with that of Substance.
5. But the most interesting illustration of this confusion of one
Category with another, is furnished by Aristotle in respect of the
difference between himself and Plato as to Ideas or Universals.
According to Plato the universal term denoted a separate something
apart from the particulars, yet of which each of these particulars
partook. According to Aristotle it denoted nothing separate from the
particulars, but something belonging (essentially or non-essentially)
to all and each of the particulars. In the Platonic theory it was an
_Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]), or had an existence substantive
and separate: in the Aristotelian it was a _Quale_ or _Quale Quid_
([Greek: poio/n]), having an existence merely adjective or
predicative. Aristotle maintains that Plato or the Platonists placed
it in the wrong Category--in the Category of Substance instead of in
that of Quality.
Now it is by rectifying this confusion of Categories that Aristotle
solves two argumentative puzzles which he ranks as sophistical:--(1)
The argument concluding in what was called the 'Third Man;' (2) The
following question: Koriskus, and the musical Koriskus--are these the
same, or is the second different from the first?
What is called the 'Third Man' was a refutation of the Platonic
theory of Ideas. Because Plato recognized a substantive existence,