Aristotle
affirmation have no meaning except in relation to some believer, real
or supposed; true disbelief and negation have no meaning except in
relation to some disbeliever, real or supposed. When a man affirms
any proposition as true, he affirms only what he (perhaps with some
other persons also) believes to be true, while others may perhaps
disbelieve it as falsehood. Object and Subject are inseparably
implicated: we may separate them by abstraction, and reason about
each apart from the other; but, as reality, they exist only locked up
one with the other.
[Footnote 35: 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II.
c. xxvi. pp. 325-363: "The Protagorean doctrine--Man is the measure
of all things--is simply the presentation in complete view of a
common fact; uncovering an aspect of it which the received
phraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood have reference to some
believing subject--and the words have no meaning except in that
relation. Protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same
complex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side.
He refuses to admit the object absolute--the pretended _thing in
itself_--Truth without a believer. His doctrine maintains the
indefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every
perception--of the concipient mind in every conception--of the
cognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges
many distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every
object known must be relative to (or in his language, _measured by_)
the knowing Subject: that every _cognitum_ must have its
_cognoscens_, and every _cognoscibile_ its _cognitionis capax_; that
the words have no meaning unless this be supposed; that these two
names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact
of cognition--actual or potential--not two factors, which are in
themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make a
compound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard
his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent, concerned
in every moment of consciousness, &c." Compare also c. xxiv. p. 261.]
That such is and always has been the state of the fact, in regard to
truth and falsehood, belief and disbelief, is matter of notoriety:
Protagoras not only accepts it as a fact, but formulates it as a
theory. Instead of declaring that what he (or the oracle which he
consults and follows) believes to be true, is absolute truth, while
that which others believe, is truth relatively to them,--he lowers
his own pretensions to a level with theirs. He professes to be a
measure of truth only for himself, and for such as may be satisfied
with the reasons that satisfy him. Aristotle complains that this
theory discourages the search for truth as hopeless, not less than
the chase after flying birds.[36] But, however serious such
discouragement may be, we do not escape the real difficulty of the
search by setting up an abstract idol and calling it Absolute Truth,
without either relativity or referee; while, if we enter, as sincere
and _bonâ fide_ enquirers, on the search for reasoned truth or
philosophy, we shall find ourselves not departing from the
Protagorean canon, but involuntarily conforming to it. Aristotle,
after having declared that the Maxim of Contradiction was true beyond
the possibility of deception,[37] but yet that there were several
eminent philosophers who disallowed it, is forced to produce the best
reasons in his power to remove their doubts and bring them round to
his opinion. His reasons must be such as to satisfy not his own mind
only, but the minds of opponents and indifferent auditors as
referees. This is an appeal to other men, as judges each for himself
and in his own case: it is a tacit recognition of the autonomy of
each individual enquirer as a measure of truth to himself. In other
words, it is a recognition of the Protagorean canon.
[Footnote 36: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, b. 38.]
[Footnote 37: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 11: [Greek:
bebaiota/tê d' a)rchê\ pasô=n, peri\ ê(\n diapseusthê=nai
a)du/naton.]]
We know little about the opinions of Protagoras; but there was
nothing in this canon necessarily at variance either with the Maxim
of Contradiction or with that of Excluded Middle. Both Aristotle and
Plato would have us believe that Protagoras was bound by his canon to
declare every opinion to be alike false and true, because every
opinion was believed by some and disbelieved by others.[38] But
herein they misstate his theory. He did not declare any thing to be
_absolutely_ true, or to be _absolutely_ false. Truth and Falsehood
were considered by him as always relative to some referee, and he
recognized no universal or infallible referee. In his theory the
necessity of _some_ referee was distinctly enunciated, instead of
being put out of sight under an ellipsis, as in the received theories
and practice. And this is exactly what Plato and Aristotle omit, when
they refute him. He proclaimed that each man was a measure for
himself alone, and that every opinion was true _to the believer_,
false _to the disbeliever_; while they criticize him as if he had
said--Every opinion is alike true and false; thus leaving out the
very qualification which forms the characteristic feature of his
theory. They commit that fallacy which Plato shows up in the
Euthydêmus, and which Aristotle[39] numbers in his list of _Fallaciæ
Extra Dictionem_, imputing it as a vice to the Sophists: they slide
_à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_. And it is remarkable
that Aristotle, in one portion of his argument against "_Homo
Mensura_," expressly admonishes the Protagoreans that they must take
care to adhere constantly to this qualified mode of enunciation;[40]
that they must not talk of apparent truth generally, but of truth as
it appears _to themselves_ or _to some other persons_, now or at a
different time. Protagoras hardly needed such an admonition to keep
to what is the key-note and characteristic peculiarity of his own
theory; since it is only by suppressing this peculiarity that his
opponents make the theory seem absurd. He would by no means have
disclaimed that consequence of his theory, which Aristotle urges
against it as an irrefragable objection; viz., that it makes every
thing relative, and recognizes nothing as absolute. This is perfectly
true, and constitutes its merit in the eyes of its supporters.
[Footnote 38: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 171-179. Aristot. Met. [Greek: G].
iv. p. 1007, b. 21: [Greek: ei) kata\ panto/s ti ê)\ kataphê=sai ê)\
a)pophê=sai e)nde/chetai, katha/per a)na/gkê toi=s to\n Prôtago/rou
le/gousi lo/gon.] Compare v. p. 1009, a. 6; viii. p. 1012, b. 15.]
[Footnote 39: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 167, a. 3; Rhetoric. II. xxiv. p.
1402, a. 2-15. [Greek: ô(/sper kai\ e)pi\ tô=n e)ristikô=n to\
_kata/ ti_ kai\ _pro/s ti_ kai\ _pê=|_ ou) prostithe/mena poiei= tê\n
sukophanti/an.]]
[Footnote 40: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. vi. p. 1011, a. 21:
[Greek: dio\ kai\ phulakte/on toi=s tê\n bi/an e)n tô=| lo/gô|
zêtou=sin, a(/ma de\ kai\ u(pe/chein lo/gon a)xiou=sin, o(/ti ou) to\
phaino/menon e)/stin, a)lla\ to\ phaino/menonô(=| phai/netai kai\
o(/te phai/netai kai\ ê(=| kai\ ô(/s.]--b. 1: [Greek: a)ll' i)/sôs
dia\ tou=t' a)na/gkê le/gein toi=s mê\ di' a)pori/an a)lla\ lo/gou
cha/rin le/gousin, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)lêthe\s tou=to, a)lla\
tou/tô| a)lêthe/s.]]
Another argument of Aristotle[41] against the Protagorean "_Homo
Mensura_"--That it implies in every affirming Subject an equal
authority and equal title to credence, as compared with every other
affirming Subject--I have already endeavoured to combat in my review
of the Platonic Theætêtus, where the same argument appears fully
developed. The antithesis between Plato and Aristotle on one side,
and Protagoras on the other, is indeed simply that between Absolute
and Relative. The Protagorean doctrine is quite distinct from the
other doctrines with which they jumble it together--from those of
Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, and from the theory that Knowledge is
sensible perception. The real opponents of the Maxim of Contradiction
were Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Plato himself as
represented in some of his dialogues, especially the Parmenides,
Timæus, Republic, Sophistes. Each of these philosophers adopted a
First Philosophy different from the others: but each also adopted one
completely different from that of Aristotle, and not reconcileable
with his logical canons. None of them admitted determinate and
definable attributes belonging to determinate particular subjects,
each with a certain measure of durability.
[Footnote 41: Ibid. v. p. 1010, b. 11.]
Now the common speech of mankind throughout the Hellenic world was
founded on the assumption of such fixed subjects and predicates.
Those who wanted information for practical guidance or security,
asked for it in this form; those who desired to be understood by
others, and to determine the actions of others, adopted the like mode
of speech. Information was given through significant propositions,
which the questioner sought to obtain, and which the answer, if
cognizant, enunciated: _e.g._, Theætêtus **is sitting down[42]--to
repeat the minimum or skeleton of a proposition as given by Plato,
requiring both subject and predicate in proper combination, to convey
the meaning. Now the logical analysis, and the syllogistic precepts
of Aristotle,--as well as his rhetorical and dialectical suggestions
for persuading, for refuting, or for avoiding refutation--are all
based upon the practice of common speech. In conversing (he says) it
is impossible to produce and exhibit the actual objects signified;
the speaker must be content with enunciating, instead thereof, the
name significant of each.[43] The first beginning of rhetorical
diction is, to speak good Greek;[44] the rhetor and the dialectician
must dwell upon words, propositions, and opinions, not peculiar to
such as have received special teaching, but common to the many and
employed in familiar conversation; the auditors, to whom they address
themselves, are assumed to be commonplace men, of fair average
intelligence, but nothing beyond.[45] Thus much of acquirement is
imbibed by almost every one as he grows up, from the ordinary
intercourse of society. The men of special instruction begin with it,
as others do; but they also superadd other cognitions or
accomplishments derived from peculiar teachers. Universally--both in
the interior of the family, amidst the unscientific multitude, and by
the cultivated few--habitual speech was carried on through terms
assuming fixed subjects and predicates. It was this recognized
process in its two varieties of Analytic and Dialectic, which
Aristotle embraced in his logical theory, and to which he also
adapted his First Philosophy.
[Footnote 42: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 262-263.]
[Footnote 43: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 165, a. 5: [Greek: e)pei\ ga\r
ou)k e)/stin au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata diale/gesthai phe/rontas, a)lla\
toi=s o)no/masin a)nti\ tô=n pragma/tôn chrô/metha sumbo/lois.]]
[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhet. III. v. p. 1407, b. 19: [Greek: e)/sti
d' a)rchê\ tê=s le/xeôs to\ E(llêni/zein.]]
[Footnote 45: Aristot. Rhet. I. i. p. 1354, a. 1: [Greek: ê(
r(êtorikê\ a)nti/stropho/s e)sti tê=| dialektikê=|; a)mpho/terai ga\r
peri\ toiou/tôn tinô=n ei)si\n a(\ koina\ tro/pon tina\ a(pa/ntôn
e)sti\ gnôri/zein kai\ ou)demia=s e)pistê/mês a)phôrisme/nês; dio\
kai\ pa/ntes tro/pon tina\ mete/chousin a)mphoi=n.]--p. 1355, a. 25:
[Greek: didaskali/as ga/r e)stin o( kata\ tê\n e)pistê/mên lo/gos,
tou=to de\ a)du/naton, a)ll' a)na/gkê dia\ tô=n koinô=n poiei=sthai
ta\s pi/steis kai\ tou\s lo/gous, ô(/sper kai\ e)n toi=s Topikoi=s