Aristotle
Compare ib. I. ii. 38; IV. iv. 6; also Plato, Theætêtus, p. 147, A,
B; Republic I. p. 338, C.]
Without departing from Aristotle's description, therefore, we may
conceive the change operated by Sokrates in philosophical discussion
under a new point of view. In exchanging Physics for Ethics, it
vulgarized both the topics and the talk of philosophy. Physical
philosophy as it stood in the age of Sokrates (before Aristotle had
broached his peculiar definition of Nature) was merely an obscure,
semi-poetical, hypothetical _Philosophia Prima_,[60] or rather
_Philosophia Prima_ and _Philosophia Secunda_ blended in one. This is
true of all its varieties,--of the Ionic philosophers as well as of
Pythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, and even
Demokritus. Such philosophy, dimly enunciated and only half
intelligible,[61] not merely did not tend to explain or clear up
phenomenal experiences, but often added new difficulties of its own.
It presented itself sometimes even as discrediting, overriding, and
contradicting experience; but never as opening any deductive road
from the Universal down to its particulars.[62] Such theories, though
in circulation among a few disciples and opponents, were foreign and
unsuitable to the talk of ordinary men. To pass from these cloudy
mysteries to social topics and terms which were in every one's mouth,
was the important revolution in philosophy introduced in the age of
Sokrates, and mainly by him.
[Footnote 60: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 31.]
[Footnote 61: Ibid. A. x. p. 993, a. 15: [Greek: psellizome/nê| ga\r
e)/oiken ê( prô/tê philosophi/a peri\ pa/ntôn, a(/te ne/a te kat'
a)rcha\s ou)=sa kai\ to\ prô=ton.]]
[Footnote 62: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: a.] i. p. 993, b. 6: [Greek:
to\ o(/lon ti e)/chein kai\ me/ros mê\ du/nasthai dêloi= to\
chalepo\n au)tê=s (tê=s peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as theôri/as).]
Alexander ap. Schol. p. 104, Bonitz: [Greek: ei)s e)/nnoian me\n tou=
o(/lou kai\ e)pi/stasin pa/ntas e)lthei=n, mêde\n de\ me/ros au)tê=s
e)xakribô/sasthai dunêthê=nai, dêloi= to\ chalepo\n au)tê=s.]
Aristotle indicates how much the _Philosophia Prima_ of his earlier
predecessors was uncongenial to and at variance with phenomenal
experience--Metaphys. A. v. p. 986, b. 31.
To shape their theories in such a way--[Greek: ta\ phaino/mena ei)
me/llei tis a)podô/sein] (Metaphys. [Greek: L]. viii. p. 1073, b.
36), was an obligation which philosophers hardly felt incumbent on
them prior to the Aristotelian age. Compare Simplikius (ad. Aristot.
Physic. I.), p. 328, a. 1-26, Schol. Br.; Schol. (ad. Aristot. De
Coelo III. I.) p. 509, a. 26-p. 510, a. 13.]
The drift of the Sokratic procedure was to bring men into the habit
of defining those universal terms which they had hitherto used
undefined, the definitions being verified by induction of particulars
as the ultimate authority. It was a procedure built upon common
speech, but improving on common speech; the talk of every man being
in propositions, each including a subject and predicate, but neither
subject nor predicate being ever defined. It was the mission of
Sokrates to make men painfully sensible of that deficiency, as well
as to enforce upon them the inductive evidence by which alone it
could be rectified. Now the Analytic and Dialectic of Aristotle grew
directly out of this Sokratic procedure, and out of the Platonic
dialogues in so far as they enforced and illustrated it. When
Sokrates had supplied the negative stimulus and indication of what
was amiss, together with the appeal to Induction as final authority,
Aristotle furnished, or did much to furnish, the positive analysis
and complementary precepts, necessary to clear up, justify, and
assure the march of reasoned truth.[63] What Aristotle calls the
syllogistic _principia_, or the principles of syllogistic
demonstration, are nothing else than the steps towards reasoned
truth, and the precautions against those fallacious appearances that
simulate it. The steps are stated in their most general terms, as
involving both Deduction and Induction; though in Aristotle we find
the deductive portion copiously unfolded and classified, while
Induction, though recognized as the only verifying foundation of the
whole, is left without expansion or illustration.
[Footnote 63: Though the theorizing and the analysis of Aristotle
presuppose and recognize the Sokratic procedure, yet, if we read the
Xenophontic Memorabilia, IV. vii., and compare therewith the first
two chapters of Aristotle's Metaphysica, in which he describes and
extols _Philosophia Prima_, we shall see how radically antipathetic
were the two points of view: Sokrates confining himself to practical
results--[Greek: me/chri tou= ô)phelimou=]; Aristotle extolling
_Philosophia Prima_, because it soars above practical results, and
serves as its own reward, elevating the philosopher to a partial
communion with the contemplative self-sufficiency of the Gods. Indeed
the remark of Aristotle, p. 983, a. 1-6, denying altogether the
jealousy ascribed to the Gods, &c., is almost a reply to the opinion
expressed by Sokrates, that a man by such overweening researches
brought upon himself the displeasure of the Gods, as prying into
their secrets (Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 6; I. i. 12).]
If we go through the Sokratic conversations as reported in the
Memorabilia of Xenophon, we shall find illustration of what has been
just stated: we shall see Sokrates recognizing and following the
common speech of men, in propositions combining subject and
predicate; but trying to fix the meaning of both these terms, and to
test the consistency of the universal predications by appeal to
particulars. The syllogizing and the inductive processes are
exhibited both of them in actual work on particular points of
discussion. Now on these processes Aristotle brings his analysis to
bear, eliciting and enunciating in general terms their _principia_
and their conditions. We have seen that he expressly declares the
analysis of these _principia_ to belong to First Philosophy.[64] And
thus it is that First Philosophy as conceived by Aristotle,
acknowledges among its _fundamenta_ the habits of common Hellenic
speech; subject only to correction and control by the Sokratic
cross-examining and testing discipline. He stands distinguished among
the philosophers for the respectful attention with which he collects
and builds upon the beliefs actually prevalent among mankind.[65]
Herein as well as in other respects his First Philosophy not only
differed from that of all the pre-Sokratic philosophers (such as
Herakleitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, &c.) by explaining the
_principia_ of Analytic and Dialectic as well as those of Physics and
Physiology, but it also differed from that of the post-Sokratic and
semi-Sokratic Plato, by keeping up a closer communion both with
Sokrates and with common speech. Though Plato in his Dialogues of
Search appears to apply the inductive discipline of Sokrates, and to
handle the Universal as referable to and dependent upon its
particulars; yet the Platonic _Philosophia Prima_ proceeds upon a
view totally different. It is a fusion of Parmenides with
Herakleitus;[66] divorcing the Universal altogether from its
particulars; treating the Universal as an independent reality and as
the only permanent reality; negating the particulars as so many
unreal, evanescent, ever-changing copies or shadows thereof.
Aristotle expressly intimates his dissent from the divorce or
separation thus introduced by Plato. He proclaims his adherence to
the practice of Sokrates, which kept the two elements together, and
which cognized particulars as the ultimate reality and test for the
Universal.[67] Upon this doctrine his First Philosophy is built:
being distinguished hereby from all the other varieties broached by
either his predecessors or contemporaries.
[Footnote 64: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b.
11.]
[Footnote 65: See Aristot. De Divinat. per Somnum, i. p. 462, b. 15;
De Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 3, 20; Metaphys. A. ii. p. 982, a. 4-14.
Alexander ap. Scholia, p. 525, b. 36, Br.: [Greek: e)n pa=sin e)/thos
a)ei\ tai=s koinai=s kai\ phusikai=s tô=n a)nthrô/pôn prolê/psesin
a)rchai=s ei)s ta\ deiknu/mena pro\s au)tou= chrê=sthai.]]
[Footnote 66: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, a. 32; M. iv. p. 1078,
b. 12. That Plato's _Philosophia Prima_ involved a partial
coincidence with that of Herakleitus is here distinctly announced by
Aristotle: that it also included an intimate conjunction or fusion of
Parmenides with Herakleitus is made out in the ingenious Dissertation
of Herbart, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, Göttingen (1805),
which winds up with the following epigrammatic sentence as result (p.
50):--"Divide Heracliti [Greek: ge/nesin ou)si/a|] Parmenidis, et
habebis Ideas Platonicas." Compare Plato, Republic VII. p. 515, seq.]
[Footnote 67: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 17, seq.; ix. p.
1086, a. 37: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s kath'
e(/kasta r(ei=n e)no/mizon] (Platonici) [Greek: kai\ me/nein ou)the\n
au)tô=n, to\ de\ katho/lou para\ tau=ta ei)=nai/ te kai\ e(/tero/n
ti ei)=nai. tou=to d', ô(/sper e)n toi=s e)/mprosthen e)le/gomen,
e)ki/nêse me\n Sôkra/tês dia\ tou\s o(rismou/s, ou) mê\n e)chô/rise/
ge tô=n kath' e(/kaston. kai\ tou=to o)rthô=s e)no/êsen ou)
chôri/sas.]]
The Maxim of Contradiction, which Aristotle proclaims as the first
and firmest _principium_ of syllogizing, may be found perpetually
applied to particular cases throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon
and the Sokratic dialogues of Plato. Indeed the Elenchus for which
Sokrates was so distinguished, is nothing more than an ever-renewed
and ingenious application of it; illustrating the painful and
humiliating effect produced even upon common minds by the shock of a
plain contradiction, when a respondent, having at first confidently
laid down some universal affirmative, finds himself unexpectedly
compelled to admit, in some particular case, the contradictory
negative. As against a Herakleitean, who saw no difficulty in
believing both sides of the contradiction to be true at once, the
Sokratic Elenchus would have been powerless. What Aristotle did was,
to abstract and elicit the general rules of the process; to classify
propositions according to their logical value, in such manner that he
could formulate clearly the structure of the two propositions between
which an exact contradictory antitheses subsisted. The important
logical distinctions between propositions _contradictory_ and
propositions _contrary_, was first clearly enunciated by Aristotle;
and, until this had been done, the Maxim of Contradiction could not
have been laid down in a defensible manner. Indeed we may remark
that, while this Maxim is first promulgated as a formula of First
Philosophy in Book [Greek: G]. of the Metaphysica, it had already
been tacitly assumed and applied by Aristotle throughout the De
Interpretatione, Analytica, and Topica, as if it were obvious and
uncontested. The First Philosophy of Aristotle was adapted to the
conditions of ordinary colloquy as amended and tested by Sokrates,
furnishing the theoretical basis of his practical Logic.
But, as Aristotle tells us, there were several philosophers and
dialecticians who did not recognize the Maxim; maintaining that the
same proposition might be at once true and false--that it was
possible for the same thing both to be and not to be. How is he to
deal with these opponents? He admits that he cannot demonstrate the
Maxim against them, and that any attempt to do this would involve
_Petitio Principii_. But he contends for the possibility of
demonstrating it in a peculiar way--_refutatively_ or _indirectly_;
that is, provided that the opponents can be induced to grant (not