Aristotle
tê=| morphê=| tô=n ginome/nôn e)sti/n, ô(/sper mê/têr;--a)lla\ tou=t'
e)/stin ê( u(/lê, ô(/sper a)\n ei) thê=lu a)/r)r(enos kai\ ai)schro\n
kalou= (e)phi/eto).]--De Partibus Animalium, I. i. p. 640, b. 28:
[Greek: ê( ga\r kata\ tê\n morphê\n phu/sis kuriôte/ra tê=s u(likê=s
phu/seôs].
Metaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 5: [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s u(/lês
pro/teron kai\ ma=llon o)/n]--p. 1039, a. 1.
See in Schwegler, pp. 13, 42, 83, Part II. of his Commentary on the
Aristotelian Metaphysica.]
[Footnote 35: Aristot. Metaph. Z. viii. p. 1033, b. 10, seq.]
This difference of rank between Matter and Form--that the first is
inferior and the last the superior--is sometimes so much put in the
foreground, that the two are conceived in a different manner and
under other names, as Potential and Actual. Matter is the potential,
imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the
perfect and complete; a transition from half-reality to entire
reality or act. The Potential is the undefined or
indeterminate[36]--what may be or may not be--what is not yet actual,
and may perhaps never become so, but is prepared to pass into
actuality when the energizing principle comes to aid. In this way of
putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much implicated with
the Actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the Actual: it
is as a half-grown passing into a full-grown; being itself essential
as a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation.[37] The
three logical divisions--Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or
Concrete ([Greek: to\ su/nolon, to\ suneilêmme/non]), are here
compressed into two--the Potential and the Actualization thereof.
Actuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia, e)ntele/cheia]) coincides in meaning
partly with the Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form
being so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost
effaced.[38]
[Footnote 36: Ibid. [Greek: Th]. viii. p. 1050, b. 10. He says, p.
1048, a. 35, that this distinction between Potential and Actual
cannot be defined, but can only be illustrated by particular
examples, several of which he proceeds to enumerate. Trendelenburg
observes (Note **ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 307):--"[Greek: Du/namis]
contraria adhuc in se inclusa tenet, ut in utrumque abire possit:
[Greek: e)ne/rgeia] alterum excludit." Compare also ib. p. 302. This
_May or May not be_ is the widest and most general sense of the terms
[Greek: du/namis] and [Greek: dunato/n], common to all the analogical
or derivative applications that Aristotle points out as belonging to
them. It is more general than that which he gives as the [Greek:
ku/rios o(/ros tê=s prô/tês duna/meôs--a)rchê/ metablêtikê\ e)n
a)/llô| ê)\ ê(=| a)/llo], and ought seemingly to be itself considered
as the [Greek: ku/rios o(/ros]. Cf. Arist. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. xii.
p. 1020, a. 5, with the comment of Bonitz, who remarks upon the loose
language of Aristotle in this chapter but imputes to Aristotle a
greater amount of contradiction than he seems to deserve (Comm. ad
Metaphys. pp. 256, 393).]
[Footnote 37: _Ens potentiâ_ is a variety of _Ens_ (Arist. Metaph.
[Greek: D]. vii. p. 1017, b. 6), but an imperfect variety: it is
[Greek: o)\n a)tele/s], which may become matured into [Greek: o)\n
te/leion, o)\n e)ntelechei/a|] or [Greek: e)nergei/a|] (Metaphys.
[Greek: Th]. i. p. 1045, a. 34).
Matter is either remote or proximate, removed either by one stage or
several stages from the [Greek: su/nolon] in which it culminates.
Strictly speaking, none but proximate matter is said to exist [Greek:
duna/mei]. Alexander Schol. (ad Metaph. [Greek: Th]. p. 1049, a. 19)
p. 781, b. 39: [Greek: ê( po/r)r(ô u(/lê ou) le/getai duna/mei. ti/
dê/ pote? o(/ti ou) parônumia/zomen ta\ pra/gmata e)k tê=s po/r)r(ô
a)ll' e)k tê=s prosechou=s; le/gomen ga\r to\ kibô/tion xu/linon e)k
tê=s prosechou=s, a)ll' ou) gê/i+non e)k tê=s po/r)r(ô.]]
[Footnote 38: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. i. p. 1042, a. 25, seq.
He scarcely makes any distinction here between [Greek: u(/lê] and
[Greek: du/namis], or between [Greek: morphê\] and [Greek:
e)ne/rgeia] (cf. [Greek: Th]. viii. p. 1050, a. 15).
Alexander in his Commentary on this book ([Greek: Th]. iii. p. 1047,
a. 30) p. 542, Bonitz's edit., remarks that [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] is
used by Aristotle in a double sense; sometimes meaning [Greek:
ki/nêsis pro\s to\ te/los], sometimes meaning the [Greek: te/los]
itself. Comp. [Greek: Ê]. iii. p. 1043, a. 32; also the commentary of
Bonitz, p. 393.]
Two things are to be remembered respecting Matter, in its
Aristotelian (logical or ontological) sense: (1) It may be Body, but
it is not necessarily Body;[39] (2) It is only intelligible as the
correlate of Form: it can neither exist by itself, nor can it be
known by itself (_i.e._, when taken out of that relativity). This
deserves notice, because to forget the relativity of a relative word,
and to reason upon it as if it were an absolute, is an oversight not
unfrequent. Furthermore, each variety of Matter has its appropriate
Form, and each variety of Form its appropriate Matter, with which it
correlates. There are various stages or gradations of Matter; from
_Materia Prima_, which has no Form at all, passing upwards through
successive partial developments to _Materia Ultima_; which last is
hardly[40] distinguishable from Form or from _Materia Formata_.
[Footnote 39: Aristot. Metaph. Z. xi. p. 1036, a. 8: [Greek: ê( d'
u(/lê a)/gnôstos kath' au(tê/n. u(/lê d' ê( me\n ai)sthêtê/, ê( de\
noêtê/; ai)sthêtê\ me\n oi(=on chalko\s kai\ xu/lon kai\ o(/sê
kinêtê\ u(/lê, noêtê\ de\ ê( e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s u(pa/rchousa mê\
ê(=| ai)sthêta/, oi(=on ta\ mathêmatika/.]--p. 1035, a. 7.
Physica, III. vi. p. 207, a. 26; De Generat. et Corrupt. I. v. p.
320, b. 14-25.]
[Footnote 40: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ii. p. 414, a. 25: [Greek:
e(ka/stou ga\r ê( e)ntele/cheia e)n tô=| duna/mei u(pa/rchonti kai\
tê=| oi)kei/a| u(/lê pe/phuken e)ggi/nesthai.]--Physica, II. ii. p.
194, b. 8: [Greek: e)/ti tô=n pro/s ti ê( u(/lê; a)/llô| ga\r ei)/dei
a)/llê u(/lê.]--Metaph. [Greek: Ê]. vi. p. 1045, b. 17: [Greek:
e)/sti d', ô(/sper ei)/rêtai, kai\ ê( e)scha/tê u(/lê kai\ ê( morphê\
tau)to/ kai\ duna/mei, to\ de\ e)nergei/a|.] See upon this doctrine
Schwegler's Commentary, pp. 100, 154, 173, 240, Pt. 2nd. Compare also
Arist. De Gener. Animal. II. i. p. 735, a. 9; also De Coelo, IV. iii.
p. 310, b. 14.]
The distinction above specified is employed by Aristotle in his
exposition of the Soul. The soul belongs to the Category of Substance
or Essence (not to that of Quantity, Quality, &c.); but of the two
points of view under which Essence may be presented, the soul ranks
with Form, not with Matter--with the Actual, not with the Potential.
The Matter to which (as correlate) soul stands related, is a natural
body (_i.e._, a body having within it an inherent principle of motion
and rest) organized in a certain way, or fitted out with certain
capacities and preparations to which soul is the active and
indispensable complement. These capacities would never come into
actuality without the soul; but, on the other hand, the range of
actualities or functions in the soul depends upon, and is limited by,
the range of capacities ready prepared for it in the body. The
implication of the two constitutes the living subject, with all its
functions, active and passive. If the eye were an animated or living
subject, seeing would be its soul; if the carpenter's axe were
living, cutting would be its soul;[41] the matter would be the lens
or the iron in which this soul is embodied. It is not indispensable,
however, that all the functions of the living subject should be at
all times in complete exercise: the subject is still living, even
while asleep; the eye is still a good eye, though at the moment
closed. It is enough if the functional aptitude exist as a dormant
property, ready to rise into activity, when the proper occasions
present themselves. This minimum of Form suffices to give living
efficacy to the potentialities of body; it is enough that a man,
though now in a dark night and seeing nothing, will see as soon as
the sun rises; or that he knows geometry, though he is not now
thinking of a geometrical problem. This dormant possession is what
Aristotle calls the First Entelechy or Energy, _i.e._, the lowest
stage of Actuality, or the minimum of influence required to transform
Potentiality into Actuality. The Aristotelian definition of Soul is
thus: The first entelechy of a natural organized body, having life in
potentiality.[42] This is all that is essential to the soul; the
second or higher entelechy (actual exercise of the faculties) is not
a constant or universal property.[43]
[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, b. 18: [Greek: ei)
ga\r ê)=n o( o)phthalmo\s zô|o/n, psuchê\ a)\n ê)=n au)tou= ê(
o)/psis; au(/tê ga\r ou)si/a o)phthalmou= ê( kata\ to\n lo/gon. o( d'
o)phthalmo\s u(/lê o)/pseôs, ê(=s a)poleipou/sês ou)ke/t'
o)phthalmo/s, plê\n o(mônu/môs, katha/per o( li/thinos kai\ o(
gegramme/nos.]]
[Footnote 42: Aristot. De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, a. 27: [Greek: dio\
psuchê/ e)stin e)ntele/cheia ê( prô/tê sô/matos phusikou= duna/mei
zôê\n e)/chontos; toiou=to de\ o(\ a)\n ê)=| o)rganiko/n.] Compare
Metaphysica, Z. x. p. 1035, b. 14-27.]
[Footnote 43: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ii. p. 414, a. 8-18. The
distinction here taken between the first or lower stage of Entelechy,
and the second or higher stage, coincides substantially with the
distinction in the Nikomachean Ethica and elsewhere between [Greek:
e(/xis] and [Greek: e)ne/rgeia]. See Topica, IV. v. p. 125, b. 15;
Ethic. Nikom. II. i.-v. p. 1103 seq.]
In this definition of Soul, Aristotle employs his own _Philosophia
Prima_ to escape the errors committed by prior philosophers. He does
not admit that the soul is a separate entity in itself; or that it is
composed (as Empedokles and Demokritus had said) of corporeal
elements, or (as Plato had said) of elements partly corporeal, partly
logical and notional. He rejects the imaginary virtues of number,
invoked by the Pythagoreans and Xenokrates; lastly, he keeps before
him not merely man, but all the varieties of animated objects, to
which his definition must be adapted. His first capital point is to
put aside the alleged identity, or similarity, or sameness of
elements, between soul and body; and to put aside equally any
separate existence or substantiality of soul. He effects both these
purposes by defining them as essentially _relatum_ and correlate; the
soul, as the _relatum_, is unintelligible and unmeaning without its
correlate, upon which accordingly its definition is declared to be
founded.
The real animated subject may be looked at either from the point of
view of the _relatum_ or from that of the correlate; but, though the
two are thus logically separable, in fact and reality they are
inseparably implicated; and, if either of them be withdrawn, the
animated subject disappears. "The soul (says Aristotle) is not any
variety of body, but it cannot be without a body; it is not a body,
but it is something belonging to or related to a body; and for this
reason it is in a body, and in a body of such or such
potentialities."[44] Soul is to body (we thus read), not as a
compound of like elements, nor as a type is to its copy, or _vice
versâ_, but as a _relatum_ to its correlate; dependent upon the body
for all its acts and manifestations, and bringing to consummation
what in the body exists as potentiality only. Soul, however, is
better than body; and the animated being is better than the inanimate
by reason of its soul.[45]
[Footnote 44: Aristot. De Animâ, II. ii. p. 414, a. 19: [Greek: kai\
dia\ tou=to kalô=s u(polamba/nousin oi(=s dokei= mêt' a)/neu sô/matos