Aristotle
case. Though the noëtic process is distinct from sense, yet without
sense it cannot take place in man. Aristotle expressly says: "You
cannot cogitate without a phantasm or without a continuous image."
Now the phantasm has been already explained as a relic of movements
of sense--or as those movements themselves, looked at in another
point of view.[163] "When we cogitate" (he says), "our mental
affection is the same as when we draw a triangle for geometrical
study; for there, though we do not make use of the fact that the
triangle is determinate in its magnitude, we still draw it of a
determinate magnitude. So in cogitation, even when we are not
cogitating a determinate _quantum_, we nevertheless set before our
eyes a determinate _quantum_, but we do not cogitate it _quatenus_
determinate."[164] We cannot even (he goes on to say) remember the
_cogitabilia_ without "a phantasm or sensible image; so that our
memory of them is only by way of concomitance" (indirect and
secondary).[165] Phantasy is thus absolutely indispensable to
cogitation: first to carrying on the process at all; next to
remembering it after it is past. Without either the visible phantasm
of objects seen and touched, or the audible phantasm of words heard
and remembered, the Noûs in human beings would be a nullity.[166]
[Footnote 163: Aristot. De Somniis, i. p. 459, a. 15; De Animâ, III.
vii. p. 431, a. 17; iii. p. 428, b. 12.]
[Footnote 164: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 449, b. 30: [Greek:
e)pei\ de\ peri\ phantasi/as ei)/rêtai pro/teron e)n toi=s peri\
psuchê=s, kai\ noei=n ou)k e)/stin a)/neu phanta/smatos; sumbai/nei
ga\r to\ au)to\ pa/thos e)n tô=| noei=n o(/per kai\ e)n tô=|
diagra/phein; e)kei= te ga\r ou)the\n proschrô/menoi tô=| to\ poso\n
ô(risme/non ei)=nai to\ trigô/nou, o(/môs gra/phomen ô(risme/non
kata\ to\ poso/n; kai\ o( noô=n ô(sau/tôs, ka)\n mê\ poso\n noê=|,
ti/thetai pro\ o)mma/tôn poso/n, noei= d' ou)ch ê(=| poso/n.]
This passage appears to be as clear a statement of the main doctrine
of Nominalism as can be found in Hobbes or Berkeley. In the sixteenth
section of the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge,
Berkeley says:--"And here it must be acknowledged that a man may
consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the
particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.--In
like manner we may consider Peter to far forth as man, or so far
forth as animal, without framing the forementioned idea, either of
man or animal, _inasmuch as all that is perceived is not
considered_." Berkeley has not improved upon the statement of
Aristotle.]
[Footnote 165: Aristot. De Memor. et Remin. i. p. 450, a. 13.]
[Footnote 166: About sense and hearing, as the _fundamenta_ of
intellect, see Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, i. p. 437, a. 1-17.]
We see that, though Aristotle recognizes a general distinction
between phantasy and cogitation, and alludes to many animals as
having the former without attaining to the latter, yet he also
declares that in man, who possesses both, not only is cogitation
dependent upon phantasy, but phantasy passes into cogitation by
gradations almost imperceptible. In regard to the practical
application of Noûs (_i.e._ to animal movements determined either by
appetite or by reason), he finds a great difficulty in keeping the
distinction clearly marked. Substantially, indeed, he lets it drop.
When he speaks of phantasy as being either calculating or perceptive,
we are unable to see in what respect _calculating phantasy_ (which he
states not to belong to other animals) differs from an effort of
cogitation.[167] Indeed, he speaks with some diffidence respecting
any distribution of parts in the same soul, suspecting that such
distribution is not real but logical: you may subdivide as much as
you choose.[168]
[Footnote 167: Aristot. De Animâ, III. x. p. 433, a. 9-b. 30: [Greek:
ei)/ tis tê\n phantasi/an tithei/ê ô(s no/êsi/n tina--phantsi/a de\
pa=sa ê)\ logistikê\ ê)\ ai)sthêtikê/; tau/tês me\n ou)=n kai\ ta\
a)/lla zô=|a mete/chei.] Also vii. p. 431, b. 7.]
[Footnote 168: Ibid. ix. p. 432, a. 23.]
It thus appears clear that Aristotle restricts the Noûs or noëtic
function _in man_ to the matters of sense and experience, physical or
mental, and that he considers the phantasm to be an essential
accompaniment of the cogitative act. Yet this does not at all detract
from his view of the grandeur, importance, and wide range of survey,
belonging to the noëtic function. It is the portion of man's nature
that correlates with the abstract and universal; but it is only a
portion of his nature, and must work in conjunction and harmony with
the rest. The abstract cannot be really separated from the concrete,
nor the universal from one or other of its particulars, nor the
essence from that whereof it is the essence, nor the attribute from
that of which it is the attribute, nor the genus and species from the
individuals comprehended therein; nor, to speak in purely
Aristotelian language, the Form from some Matter, or the Matter from
some Form. In all these cases there is a _notional_ or _logical_
distinction, impressing the mind as the result of various
comparisons, noted by an appropriate term, and remembered afterwards
by means of that term (that is, by means of an audible or visible
phantasm); but real separation there neither is nor can be. This is
the cardinal principle of Aristotle, repeated in almost all his
works--his marked antithesis against Plato. Such logical distinctions
as those here noticed (they might be multiplied without number) it
belongs to Noûs or the noëtic function to cognize. But the real
objects, in reference to which alone the distinctions have a meaning,
are concrete and individual; and the cognizing subject is really the
entire man, employing indeed the noëtic function, but employing it
with the aid of other mental forces, phantasms and remembrances, real
and verbal.
The noëtic soul is called by Aristotle "the place of Forms," "the
potentiality of Forms," "the correlate of things apart from
Matter."[169] It cogitates these Forms in or along with the
phantasms: the cogitable Forms are contained in the sensible Forms;
for there is nothing really existent beyond or apart from visible or
tangible magnitudes, with their properties and affections, and with
the so-called abstractions considered by the geometer. Hence, without
sensible perception, a man can neither learn nor understand anything;
in all his theoretical contemplations, he requires some phantasm to
contemplate along with them.[170]
[Footnote 169: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iv. p. 429, a. 27, b. 22.]
[Footnote 170: Ibid. vii. p. 431, b. 2: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n ei)/dê
to\ noêtiko\n e)n toi=s phanta/smasi noei=.]--viii. p. 432, a. 3:
[Greek: e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\ ta\ mege/thê,
ô(s dokei=, ta\ ai)sthêta\ kechôrisme/non, e)n toi=s ei)/desi toi=s
ai)sthêtoi=s ta\ noêta/ e)sti, ta/ te e)n a)phaire/sei lego/mena,
kai\ o(/sa tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e(/xeis kai\ pa/thê; kai\ dia\ tou=to
ou)/te mê\ ai)sthano/menos mêthe\n ou)the\n a)\n ma/thoi ou)de\
xunei/ê; o(/tan de\ theôrê=|, a)na/gkê a(/ma pha/ntasma/ ti
theôrei=n.]]
Herein lies one of the main distinctions between the noëtic and the
sentient souls. The sentient deals with particulars, and correlates
with external bodies; the noëtic apprehends universals, which in a
certain sense are within the soul: hence a man can cogitate whenever
or whatever he chooses, but he can see or touch only what is
present.[171] Another distinction is, that the sentient soul is
embodied in special organs, each with determinate capacities, and
correlating with external objects, themselves alike determinate,
acting only under certain conditions of locality. The possibilities
of sensation are thus from the beginning limited; moreover, a certain
relative proportion must be maintained between the percipient and the
perceivable; for extreme or violent sounds, colours, &c., produce no
sensation; on the contrary, they deaden the sentient organ.[172] But
the noëtic soul (what is called the "Noûs of the soul," to use
Aristotle's language)[173] is nothing at all in actuality before its
noëtic function commences, though it is everything in potentiality.
It is not embodied in any corporeal organ of its own, nor mingled as
a new elementary ingredient with the body; it does not correlate with
any external objects; it is not so specially attached to some
particulars as to make it antipathetic to others. Accordingly its
possibilities of cogitation are unlimited; it apprehends with equal
facility what is most cogitable and what is least cogitable. It is
thoroughly indeterminate in its nature, and is in fact at first a
mere unlimited cogitative potentiality;[174] like a tablet, upon
which no letters have as yet been written, but upon which all or any
letters _may be_ written.[175]
[Footnote 171: Ibid. II. v. p. 417, b. 22.]
[Footnote 172: Aristot. De Animâ, III. iv. p. 429, a. 31.]
[Footnote 173: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: o( a)/ra kalou/menos tê=s
psuchê=s nou=s (le/gô de\ nou=n ô(=| dianoei=tai kai\ u(polamba/nei
ê( psuchê/) ou)the/n e)stin e)nergei/a| tô=n o)/ntôn pri\n noei=n.]]
[Footnote 174: Ibid. a. 21: [Greek: ô(/ste mêd' au)tou= ei)=nai
phu/sin mêdemi/an a)ll' ê)\ tau/tên, o(/ti dunato/n.]]
[Footnote 175: Ibid. p. 430, a. 1.]
We have already said that the Noûs of the human soul emanates from a
peculiar influence of the celestial body, which is the special region
of Form in the Kosmos. Through it we acquire an enlarged power of
apprehending the abstract and universal; we can ascend above sensible
forms to the cogitable forms contained therein; we can consider all
forms in themselves, without paying attention to the matter wherein
they are embodied. Instead of considering the concrete solid or
liquid before us, we can mentally analyse them, and thus study
solidity in the abstract, fluidity in the abstract. While our senses
judge of water as hot and cold, our noëtic function enables us to
appreciate water in the abstract--to determine its essence, and to
furnish a definition of it.[176] In all these objects, as
combinations of Form with Matter, the cogitable form exists
potentially; and is abstracted or considered abstractedly, by the
cogitant Noûs.[177] Yet this last (as we have already seen) cannot
operate except along with and by aid of phantasms--of impressions
revived or remaining from sense. It is thus immersed in the materials
of sense, and has no others. But it handles them in a way of its own,
and under new points of view; comparing and analysing; recognizing
the abstract in the concrete, and the universal in the particular;
discriminating mentally and logically the one from the other; and
noting the distinction by appropriate terms. Such distinctions are
the _noümena_, generated in the process of cogitation by Noûs itself.
The Noûs, as it exists in any individual, gradually loses its
original character of naked potentiality, and becomes an actual
working force, by means of its own acquired materials.[178] It is an
aggregate of _noümena_, all of them in nature identical with itself;
and, while cogitating them, the Noûs at the same time cogitates
itself. Considered abstractedly, apart from matter, they exist only
in the mind itself; in theoretical speculation, the _cognoscens_ and
the _cognitum_ are identical. But they are not really separable from
matter, and have no reality apart from it.
[Footnote 176: Ibid. p. 429, b. 10.]
[Footnote 177: Ibid. p. 430, a. 2-9.]
[Footnote 178: Aristot. De Animâ, II. v. p. 417, b. 23. Ibid. III.
iv. p. 429, b. 7: [Greek: o(/tan du/nêtai e)nergei=n di' au(tou=.]]
The distinction, yet at the same time correlation, between Form and