Aristotle
even to general reasonings on ethical subjects, the particular
applications of these reasonings are still more open to mistake: the
agent must always determine for himself at the moment, according to
the circumstances of the case, without the possibility of sheltering
himself under technical rules of universal application: just as the
physician or the pilot is obliged to do in the course of his
profession. "Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no
fixed rule, just like the conditions of health. And if this is the
case with the universal theory, still more does the theory that
refers to particular acts present nothing that can be accurately
fixed; for it falls not under any art or any system, but the actors
themselves must always consider what suits the occasion, just as
happens in the physician's and the pilot's art. But though this is
the case with the theory at present, _we must try to give it some
assistance_" ([Greek: peirati/on boêthei=n ]).--Eth. Nic. 2.
The last words cited are remarkable. They seem to indicate, that
Aristotle regarded the successful prosecution of ethical enquiries as
all but desperate. He had previously said (i. 3)--"There is so much
difference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable
and just, of which political science treats, that these properties of
human action seem to exist merely by positive legal appointment, and
not by nature. And there is the same sort of error respecting what
things are good, because many persons have sustained injury from
them, some having already been brought to destruction through their
wealth, others through their courage."
One cannot but remark how entirely this is at variance with the
notion of a moral sense or instinct, or an intuitive knowledge of
what is right and wrong. Aristotle most truly observes that the
details of our daily behaviour are subject to such an infinite
variety of modifications, that no pre-established rules can be
delivered to guide them: we must act with reference to the occasion
and the circumstances. Some few rules may indeed be laid down,
admitting of very few exceptions: but the vast majority of our
proceedings cannot be subjected to any rule whatever, except to the
grand and all-comprehensive rule, if we are indeed so to call it, of
conforming to the ultimate standard of morality.
Supposing the conditions above indicated to be realized--supposing a
certain degree of experience in human affairs, of rational
self-government, and of habitual obedience to good rules of action,
to be already established in the pupil's mind, the theory of ethics
may then be unfolded to him with great advantage (i. 3). It is not
meant to be implied that a man must have previously acquired the
perfection of practical reason and virtue before he acquaints himself
with ethical theory; but he must have proceeded a certain way towards
the acquisition.
Ethics, as Aristotle conceives them, are a science closely analogous
to if not a subordinate branch of Politics. (I do not however think
that he employs the word [Greek: Ê)thikê\] in the same distinct and
substantive meaning as [Greek: politikê\ (e)pistê/mê)], although he
several times mentions [Greek: ta\ ê)thika\] and [Greek: ê)thikoi\
lo/goi].) Ethical science is for the individual what political
science is for the community (i. 2).
In every variety of human action, in each separate art and science,
the agents, individual or collective, propose to themselves the
attainment of some _good_ as the end and object of their proceedings.
Ends are multifarious, and good things are multifarious: but good,
under one shape or another, is always the thing desired by every one,
and the determining cause of human action ([Greek: ou(= pa/nta
e)phi/etai])--i. 1.
Sometimes the action itself, or the exercise of the powers implied in
the action, is the end sought, without anything beyond. Sometimes
there is an ulterior end, or substantive business, to be accomplished
by means of the action and lying beyond it. In this latter class of
cases, the ulterior end is the real good: better than the course of
action used to accomplish it--"the external results are naturally
([Greek: pe/phuke]) better than the course of action" (i. 1). Taking
this as a general position, it is subject to many exceptions: but the
word [Greek: pe/phuke] seems to signify only that such is naturally
and ordinarily the case, not that the reverse never occurs.
Again some ends are comprehensive and supreme; others, partial and
subordinate. The subordinate ends are considered with reference to
the supreme, and pursued as means to their accomplishment. Thus the
end of the bridle-maker is subservient to that of the horseman, and
the various operations of war to the general scheme of the commander.
The supreme, or _architectonic_, ends, are superior in eligibility to
the subordinate, or _ministerial_, which, indeed, are pursued only
for the sake of the former.
One end (or one _good_), as subordinate, is thus included in another
end (or another good) as supreme. The same end may be supreme with
regard to one end different from itself, and subordinate with regard
to another. The end of the general is supreme with reference to that
of the soldier or the maker of arms, subordinate with reference to
that of the statesman. In this scale of comprehensiveness of ends
there is no definite limit; we may suppose ends more and more
comprehensive as we please, and we come from thence to form the idea
of one most comprehensive and sovereign end, which includes under it
every other without exception--with reference to which all other ends
stand in the relation either of parts or of means--and which is
itself never in any case pursued for the sake of any other or
independent end. The end thus conceived is the _Sovereign Good of
man_, or _The Good_--_The Summum Bonum_--[Greek: Ta)gatho\n--To\
a)/riston--Ta)nthrô/pinon a)gatho/n] (i. 2).
To comprehend, to define, and to prescribe means for realizing the
Sovereign Good, is the object of _Political Science_, the paramount
and most architectonic Science of all, with regard to which all other
Sciences are simply ministerial. It is the business of the political
ruler to regulate the application of all other Sciences with
reference to the production of this his End--to determine how far
each shall be learnt and in what manner each shall be brought into
practice--to enforce or forbid any system of human action according
as it tends to promote the accomplishment of his supreme purpose--the
Sovereign Good of the Community. Strategical, rhetorical, economical,
science, are all to be applied so far as they conduce to this purpose
and no farther: they are all simply ministerial; political science is
supreme and self-determining (i. 2).
What _Political Science_ is for the community, _Ethical Science_ is
for the individual citizen. By this it is not meant that the
individual is to be abstracted from society or considered as living
apart from society: but simply that human action and human feeling is
to be looked at from the point of view of the individual, mainly and
primarily--and from the point of view of the society, only in a
secondary manner: while in political science, the reverse is the
case--our point of view is, first as regards the society;--next, and
subordinate to that, as regards the individual citizen (_See_ Eth.
Nic. vii. 8).
The object of the Ethical Science is, the Supreme Good of the
individual citizen--the End of all Ends, with reference to his
desires, his actions, and his feelings--the end which he seeks for
itself and without any ulterior aim--the end which comprehends all
his other ends as merely partial or instrumental and determines their
comparative value in his estimation (i. 2, i. 4).
It is evident that this conception of an End of all Ends is what Kant
would call an _Idea_--nothing precisely conformable to it, in its
full extent, can ever exist in reality. No individual has ever been
found, or ever will be found, with a mind so trained as to make every
separate and particular desire subservient to some general
preconceived End however comprehensive. But it is equally certain
that this subordination of Ends one to another is a process performed
to a greater or less degree in every one's mind, even in that of the
rudest savage. No man can blindly and undistinguishingly follow every
immediate impulse: the impulse, whatever it be, when it arises, must
be considered more or less as it bears upon other pursuits and other
objects of desire. This is an indispensable condition even of the
most imperfect form of social existence. In civilized society, we
find the process carried very far indeed in the minds of the greater
number of individuals. Every man has in his view certain leading
Ends, such as the maintenance of his proper position in society, the
acquisition of professional success, the making of his fortune, the
prosecution of his studies, &c., each of which is essentially
paramount and architectonic, and with reference to which a thousand
other ends are simply subordinate and ministerial. Suppose this
process to be pushed farther, and you arrive at the idea of an End
still more comprehensive, embracing every other end which the
individual can aspire to, and forming the central point of an
all-comprehensive scheme of life. Such a maximum, never actually
attainable, but constantly approachable, in reality, forms the Object
of Ethical Science. _Quorsum victuri gignimur_!
What is the Supreme Good--the End of all Ends? How are we to
determine wherein it consists, or by what means it is to be
attained--at least, as nearly attained as the limitations of human
condition permit? Ethical Science professes to point out what the end
ought to be--Ethical precepts are suggestions for making the closest
approaches to it which are practicable. Even to understand what the
end is, is a considerable acquisition: since we thus know the precise
point to aim at, even if we cannot hit it (i. 2).
The approaches which different men make towards forming this idea, of
an End of Ends or of a Supreme Good, differ most essentially:
although there seems a verbal agreement between them. Every man
speaks of _Happiness_ as his End of Ends ([Greek: o)no/mati
o(mologei=tai], i. 4): he wishes to live well or to do well, which he
considers to be the same as being happy. But men disagree exceedingly
in their opinions as to that which constitutes happiness: nay the
same man sometimes places it in one thing, sometimes in another--in
health or in riches, according as he happens to be sick or poor.
There are however three grand divisions, in one or other of which the
opinions of the great majority of mankind may be distributed. Some
think that happiness consists in a life of bodily pleasure ([Greek:
bi/os a)polaustiko/s]): others, in a life of successful political
action or ambition ([Greek: bi/os politiko/s]): others again, in a
life of speculative study and the acquisition of knowledge ([Greek:
bi/os theôrêtiko/s]). He will not consent to number the life of the
([Greek: chrêmatistê\s]) money-maker among them because he attains
his end at the expense of other people and by a force upon their
inclinations (this at least seems the sense of the words--[Greek: o(
ga\r chrêmatistê\s bi/aio/s ti/s e)sti]), and because wealth can
never be the good, seeing that it is merely useful for the sake of
ulterior objects.
(The reason which Aristotle gives for discarding from his catalogue
the life of the _money-seeker_, while he admits that of the
_pleasure-seeker_ and the _honour-seeker_, appears a very
inconclusive one. He believed them to be all equally mistaken in
reference to real happiness: the two last just as much as the first: