Aristotle
confers happiness. But is this true of the perfectly virtuous nature
and habits? Does the simple performance of the acts to which they
dispose us, always confer happiness? Is not the existence of a very
high standard of virtuous exigency in a man's mind, a constant source
of self-dissatisfaction, from the difficulty of acting up to his own
ideas of what is becoming and commendable?
That the most virtuous nature is in itself and essentially the most
happy nature, is a point highly questionable--to say the least of it:
and even if we admit the fact, we must at the same time add that it
cannot appear to be so to ordinary persons without. The internal
pleasures of a highly virtuous man cannot be properly appreciated by
any person not of similar character. So that unless a person be
himself disposed to believe it, you could find no means of proving it
to him. To a man not already virtuous, you cannot bring this argument
persuasively home for the purpose of inducing him to become so.
In regard to prudence and temperance, indeed, qualities in the first
instance beneficial to himself, it is clear that the more perfectly
he possesses them, the greater and more assured will be his
happiness. But in regard to virtuous qualities, beneficial in the
first instance to others and not to himself, it can by no means be
asserted that the person who possesses these qualities in the highest
degree is happier than one who possesses them in a more moderate and
ordinary degree.
Aristotle indeed says that _the being just_ necessarily includes the
having pleasure in such behaviour: for we do not call a man just or
liberal unless he has a pleasure in justice or liberality (Eth. Nic.
i. 8). But this does not refute the supposition, that another man,
less just or liberal than he, may enjoy _greater happiness_ arising
out of other tastes and other conduct.
In order to sustain the conclusion of Aristotle respecting the
superior happiness of the virtuous man, it is necessary to assume
that the pleasures of self-esteem and self-admiration are generically
distinguished from other pleasures and entitled to a preference in
the eyes of every right judging person. And Aristotle does seem to
assume something of this nature. He says--x. 3--"Or that pleasures
differ in kind? For the pleasures arising from the honourable are
different from those arising from the base; and it is not the case
that the unjust man experiences the pleasure of the just, or he that
is unmusical that of the musician." The inherent difference between
various pleasures is again touched upon x. 5--"And since the
functions differ in goodness and badness--some of them being objects
of desire, others of them to be eschewed, and others of them
neither--so is it likewise with the pleasures: for each function has
its own pleasures. The pleasure then that is proper to the function
of good is good, and that which is proper to the function of bad is
bad; for the desires of things honourable are praiseworthy, those of
things base are to be blamed. And the pleasures attaching to them are
more proper to the functions than are the appetencies themselves." In
the next chapter, in that remarkable passage where he touches upon the
predilections of men in power for the society of jesters and amusing
companions ("The many have recourse to the amusements of those that
are accounted happy")--"For it is not in kingly power that you find
either virtue or intellect, on which the higher functions of man
depend. Nay, not if princes _who have never tasted the relish of pure
and liberal pleasure_, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, on
which account these must be thought the more desirable. For children
consider those things to be best that are held in honour among
themselves."
Here we have a marked distinction drawn between the different classes
of pleasures--some being characterised as good, some bad, some
indifferent. The best of all are those which the virtuous man enjoys,
and which _he_ considers the best: the pleasures inseparably annexed
to virtuous agency. These pleasures are thus assumed to be of a purer
and more exalted character, and to deserve a decided preference over
every other class of pleasures. And if this be assumed, the superior
happiness of the virtuous man follows as a matter of course.
I should observe that Aristotle considers happiness to consist in the
exercise of the faculties agreeably to virtue ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia
kat' a)retê\n])--the _pleasure_ ([Greek: ê(donê\]) is something
different from the exercise ([Greek: e)ne/rgeia])--inseparably
attending it, indeed, yet not the same--"conjoined with the functions
([Greek: e)nergei/ais]), and the two are so inseparable as to raise a
question whether the function is not identical with the pleasure" (x.
5). And he says, x. 7--"We think that pleasure should be mixed up
([Greek: paramemi/chthai]) with happiness."
It seems to be in the sense of self-esteem, which constitutes the
distinctive mark of virtuous agency, that Aristotle supposes
happiness to consist: the pleasure he supposes to be an inseparable
concomitant, but yet not the same. The self-esteem is doubtless often
felt in cases where a man is performing a painful duty--where the sum
total of feelings accompanying the performance of the act is the very
reverse of pleasurable. But still the self-esteem, or testimony of an
approving conscience, is _per se_ always pleasurable, and is in fact
the essential pleasure inherent in virtuous behaviour. I do not see
the propriety of the distinction here taken by Aristotle. He puts it
somewhat differently, Polit. vii. 1--"Living happily consists either
in joy or in virtue to men, or in both." And Polit. viii. 5--"For
happiness is a compound of both these (honour and pleasure)." So
Polit. viii. 3.
Happiness (again he says--Polit. vii. 13, p. 440 E. p. 286) consists
in the perfect employment and active exercise of virtue: and that
_absolutely_ (or under the most favourable external conditions)--not
under limitation ([Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs]) or subject to very
trying and difficult circumstances. For a man of virtue may be so
uncomfortably placed that he has no course open to him except a
choice of evils, and can do nothing but make the best of a bad
position. Such a man will conduct himself under the pressure of want
or misfortune as well as his case admits: but happiness is out of his
reach. (Compare Eth. Nic. i. 10.) To be happy, it is necessary that
he should be so placed as to be capable of aspiring to the
accomplishment of positive good and advantage--he must be admitted to
contend for the great prizes, and to undertake actions which lead to
new honours and to benefits previously unenjoyed: he must be relieved
from the necessity of struggling against overwhelming calamities.
Aristotle tells us in the beginning of the Ethics (Eth. Nic. i.
3)--"But there is so much difference of opinion and so much error
respecting what is honourable and just, of which political science
treats, that these properties of human action seem to exist merely by
positive legal appointment, and not by nature. And there is the same
sort of error respecting what things are good." If there be this
widespread error and dissension among mankind with respect to the
determining of what is good and just, what standard has Aristotle
established for the purpose of correcting it? I do not find that he
has established any standard, nor even that he has thought it
necessary to make the attempt. There are indeed a great number of
observations, and many most admirable observations in his Treatise,
on the various branches of Virtue and Vice: many which tend to
conduct the mind of the reader unconsciously to the proper standard:
but no distinct announcement of any general principle, whereby a
dispute between two dissentient moralists may be settled. When he
places virtue in a certain mediocrity between excess on one side and
defect on the other, this middle point is not in any way marked or
discoverable: it is a point not fixed, but variable according to the
position of the individual agent, and is to be determinable in every
case by right reason and according to the judgment of the prudent
man--"in the mean _with reference to ourselves_, as _it has been
determined by reason_, and _as the prudent man_ ([Greek: o(
phro/nimos]) _would determine it_" (Eth. Nic. ii. 6). But though the
decision is thus vested in the prudent man, no mention is made of the
principle which the appointed arbiter would follow in delivering his
judgment, assuming a dispute to arise.
In a previous part of Chapter II., he defines "the mean with
reference to ourselves" to be "that which neither exceeds, nor falls
short of, _the rule of propriety_ ([Greek: tou= de/ontos]). But this
is not one, nor is it the same to all."
To render this definition sufficient and satisfactory, Aristotle
ought to have pointed out to us how we are to find out that _rule of
propriety_ ([Greek: to\ de/on]) which marks and constitutes the
medium point, of actions and affections, _in relation to
ourselves_--this medium point being in his opinion _virtue_. To
explain what is meant by a medium _in relation to ourselves_, by the
words [Greek: to\ de/on], _the rule of propriety_, is only a change
of language, without any additional information.
Thus the capital problem of moral philosophy still remains unsolved.
It is remarkable that Aristotle in some parts of his treatise states
very distinctly what this problem is, and what are the points
essential to its solution: he speaks as if he were fully aware of
that which was wanting to his own treatise, and as if he were
preparing to supply the defect: but still the promise is never
realized. Take for example the beginning of Book VI. Eth. Nic.
"Since it has been already laid down, that we ought to choose the
middle point and not either the excess or the defect--and since the
middle point is that which right reason determines--let us
distinguish what that is. For in all the mental habits which have
been described, as well as in all others also, there is a certain
aim, by a reference to which the rational being is guided either in
relaxing or in restricting: and there is a certain definite boundary
of those medial points, which we affirm to exist between excess and
defect, determinable according to right reason. To speak thus,
however, is indeed correct enough, but it gives no distinct
information ([Greek: ou)the\n de\ saphe/s]): for in all other modes
of proceeding which are governed by scientific principles it is quite
just to say that you ought neither to work nor to rest more than is
sufficient nor less than is sufficient, but to a degree midway
between the two and agreeably to right reason. But a man who has only
this information would be no wiser than he was before it, any more
than he would know what things he ought to apply to his body, by
being simply told that he must apply such things as medical science
and as the medical practitioner directed. Wherefore, with respect
also to the habits of the soul we must not be content with merely
giving a general statement in correct language, but we must farther
discriminate what right reason is, and what is its definition."
This is a very clear and candid statement of the grand and
fundamental defect in Aristotle's theory of Ethics. He says very
truly that "there is a certain end and aim ([Greek: sko/pos]), to
which a rational being has reference when he either restricts or
relaxes any disposition." It was incumbent on Aristotle to explain
what this [Greek: sko/pos] was; but this he never does, though he
seems so clearly to have felt the want of it. We might have supposed
that after he had pointed out what was required to impart specific