Aristotle
meaning to correct but vague generalities, he would have proceeded at
once to fill up the acknowledged chasm in his theory: but instead of
this, he enters into an analysis of the intellect, speculative and
practical, and explains the varieties of intellectual, as
contradistinguished from moral, excellence. This part of his work is
highly valuable and instructive: but I cannot find that he ever again
touches upon the [Greek: sko/pos], which had been admitted to be as
yet undetermined. In a certain sense, it is indeed true that he
endeavours "to discriminate what right reason is, and what is its
definition:" for he classifies the intellectual functions into
intellect ([Greek: nou=s]), science ([Greek: e)pistê/mê]), wisdom
([Greek: sophi/a]), art ([Greek: te/chnê]), prudence ([Greek:
phro/nêsis]): he states the general nature of each of these
attributes, and the range of subjects to which it applies. He tells
us that intellect and prudence have reference to human conduct--that
prudence is "concerned with things just and honourable and good for
man" (vii. 12)--"with the things of man, and those things regarding
which we deliberate" (vii. 7)--"prudence must needs be a true habit
according to reason, concerned with the good of man" (vii. 5). In
explaining what prudence is, he tells us that it is _according to
reason_: in explaining what is _right reason_, he tells us that it is
_according to prudence_. He thus seems to make use of each as a part
of the definition of the other. But however this may be, certain it
is that he never fulfils the expectation held out in the beginning of
the Sixth Book, nor ever clears up the [Greek: ou)de\n saphe\s] there
acknowledged.
There is one sentence at the beginning of vi. 5, which looks as if it
conveyed additional information upon the difficulty in question--"Now
it seems to belong to the prudent man to be able to deliberate aright
concerning the things that are good and profitable to himself--not in
part, as concerning the things that have a reference to health or
strength--but concerning the things that refer to the whole of
_living well_" ([Greek: pro\s to\ eu)= zê=|n]). But this in point of
fact explains nothing. For _living well_ is the same as _happiness_:
happiness is _the active exercise of the soul according to virtue_:
therefore _virtue_ must be known, before we can know what _living
well_ is.
I think that this [Greek: sko/pos] or end, which Aristotle alludes to
in the beginning of the Sixth Book as not having been yet made clear,
appears to be more distinctly brought out in a previous passage than
it is in any portion of the Treatise after the beginning of the Sixth
Book. In Book IV. 6, Aristotle treats of the virtues and defects
connected with behaviour in social intercourse: the _obsequious_ at
one extreme, the _peevish_ or _quarrelsome_ at the other: and the
becoming medium, though it had no special name, which lay between
them. Speaking of the person who adopts this becoming medium, he
says--"We have said generally, then, that he will associate with
people as he ought; and having, moreover, a constant reference to
what is honourable and what is expedient, he will aim at not giving
pain or at contributing pleasure."
Again in regard to Temperance--iii. 11--he states the [Greek:
sko/pos] of the temperate man--"What things have a reference to
health or vigour, and are agreeable, these he desires in measure and
as he ought; as well as the other agreeable things that are not
opposed to these, either as being contrary to what is honourable or
as being beyond his fortune. For he that desires things agreeable,
which yet are contrary to what is honourable or beyond his fortune,
loves these pleasures more than they are worth. But not so with the
temperate man who lives according to right reason."
These passages are not very distinct, as an explanation of the proper
[Greek: sko/pos]: but I cannot find any passages after the beginning
of the Sixth Book which are more distinct than they: or perhaps,
equally distinct.
In one passage of the Seventh Book, Aristotle refers, though somewhat
obscurely, to the average degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of
mankind as the standard to be consulted when we pronounce upon excess
or defect (vii. 7).
Aristotle seems in some passages to indicate pleasure and pain as the
end with reference to which actions or dispositions are denominated
_good_ and _evil_. He says--vii. 11--"To theorise respecting pleasure
and pain, is the business of the political philosopher: for he is the
architect of that end with reference to which we call each matter
either absolutely good or absolutely evil. Moreover, it is
indispensable to institute an enquiry respecting them: for we have
explained ethical virtue and vice as referring to pleasures and
pains: and most people affirm happiness to be coupled with pleasure:
for which reason they have named [Greek: to\ maka/rion a)po\ tou=
chai/rein]."
In Book VIII. 9-10, the [Greek: sko/pos] is indeed stated very
clearly, but _not as such_--not as if Aristotle intended to make it
serve as such, or thought that it ought to form the basis upon which
our estimate of what is the proper middle point should be found. In
viii. 9-10, he tells us that all justice and benevolence ([Greek: to\
di/kaion kai\ ê( phili/a]) is a consequence and an incident of
established communion among human beings ([Greek: koinôni/a])--that
the grand communion of all, which comprehends all the rest, is the
_Political Communion_--that the end and object of the _Political
Communion_, as well that for which it was originally created as that
for which it subsists and continues, is _the common and lasting
advantage_ ([Greek: to\ koinê=| su/mpheron])--that all other
communions, of relations, friends, fellow-soldiers, neighbours, &c.,
are portions of the all-comprehensive political communion, and aim at
realizing some partial advantage to the constituent members. These
chapters are very clear and very important, and they announce plainly
enough _the common and lasting interest_ as the foundation and
measure of justice as well as of benevolence. But they do not apply
the same measure, to the qualities which had been enumerated in the
Books prior to the Sixth, as a means of ascertaining where the middle
point is to be found which is alleged to constitute virtue.
Nevertheless, Aristotle tells us that it is in the highest degree
difficult to find the middle point which constitutes virtue (ii. 9).
It might seem at first sight not easy for Aristotle, consistently
with the plan of his treatise, to point out any such standard or
measure. For none can be mentioned, with any tolerable pretensions to
admissibility, except that of _tendency to promote happiness_--the
happiness both of the individual agent and of the society to which he
belongs. But as he had begun by introducing the ideas of reason and
virtue as media for explaining what happiness was, there would have
been at least an apparent incongruity in reverting back to the latter
as a means of clearing up what was obscure in the former. I say--_at
least an apparent incongruity_--because after all the incongruity is
more apparent than real. If we carefully preserve the distinction
between the happiness of the individual agent and the happiness of
the Society to which he belongs, it will appear that Aristotle might
without any inconsistency have specified the latter as being the
object to which reason has regard, in regulating and controlling the
various affections of each individual.
Wherein consists the happiness of an individual man? In a course of
active exertion of the soul conformably to virtue: _virtue_ being
understood to consist in a certain mediocrity of our various
affections as determined by _right reason_.
When we next enquire, to what standard does _right reason_ look in
making this determination? it may without inconsistency be
answered--_Right reason_ determines the proper point of mediocrity by
a reference to _happiness generally_--that is, to the happiness of
society at large, including that of the individual agent in
question--in other words, to _the common and lasting advantage_,
which Aristotle describes as the grand object of the statesman. There
is no inconsistency in reverting to happiness, thus explained, as the
standard by which right reason judges in controlling our different
affections.
In all moral enquiries, it is of the greatest importance to keep in
view the happiness of the individual, and the happiness of the
society at large, as two distinct and separate objects--which
coincide indeed [Greek: ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/], in the majority of
instances and with regard to the majority of individuals--but which
do not coincide necessarily and universally, nor with regard to every
individual. A particular man may be placed in such a position, or
animated with such feelings, that his happiness may be promoted by
doing what is contrary to the happiness of the society. He will under
these circumstances do what is _good_ for himself but _bad_ for
others: he will do what is morally wrong, and will incur the blame of
society. In speaking of _good_ and _evil_ it is always necessary to
keep in mind, that what is _good_ for an individual may be _bad_ for
the society: I mean, understanding the words _good for an individual_
in the most comprehensive sense, as including all that he has to
suffer from the unfavourable sentiments of society. Much confusion
has arisen from moralists speaking of good and evil absolutely,
without specifying whether they meant _good_ for the individual or
for the society: more particularly in the writings of the ancient
philosophers.
From the manner in which Aristotle arrives at his definition of what
constitutes happiness, we might almost suppose that he would have
been led to the indication of the happiness of society at large as
the standard for right reason to appeal to. For in examining what is
the proper business of man in general, he has recourse to the analogy
of the various particular arts and professions--the piper, the
statuary, the carpenter, the carrier, &c. Each has his particular
business and walk of action, and in the performance of that business
consists _the good and the well_ in his case (i. 7). So in like
manner there is a special business for man in general, in the
performance of which we are to seek human good.
Now this analogy of particular artists and professional men might
have conducted Aristotle to the idea of the general happiness of
society as a standard. For the business of every artist or artisan
consists in conducing to the comfort, the protection, or the
gratification of the public, each in his particular walk:
professional excellence for them consists in accomplishing this
object perfectly. For every special profession therefore the
happiness of society at large, under one form or another, is
introduced as the standard by which good and excellence are to be
measured.
Apply this analogy to man in general, taken apart from any particular
craft or profession. If each man, considered simply as such, has his
appropriate business, in the good performance of which happiness for
him consists, the standard of excellence in respect to such
**performance is to be found in its conduciveness to the
happiness of society at large. It can be found nowhere else, if we
are to judge according to the analogy of special arts and
professions.
Until this want of a standard or measure is supplied, it is clear
that the treatise of Aristotle is defective in a most essential
point--a defect which is here admitted by himself in the first
chapter of the Sixth Book. Nor is there any other way of supplying
what is wanting except by reference to the general happiness of