Aristotle
by frequent doing of acts of this class that a man can acquire the
habit of performing them intentionally and for themselves, in which
consists the just and temperate character. To know what such acts
are, is little or nothing: you must obey the precepts, just as you
follow the prescriptions of a physician. Many men think erroneously
that philosophy will teach them to be virtuous, without any course of
action adopted by themselves (ii. 4).
Aristotle classifies the phenomena of the soul (the non-rational
soul) into three--Passions--Capacities or Faculties--States. The
first are the occasional affections--anger, fear, envy, joy,
aversion--"in short, everything that is accompanied by pleasure or
pain" (ii. 5). The second are, the capacities of being moved by such
affections--the affective faculties, if one may so call them (_ib._
So Eth. Eudem. ii. 2). The third are, those habits according to which
we are said to be well or ill disposed towards this or that
particular affection: to be disposed to violent anger or violent
fear, is a bad habit. Virtues and vices are neither affections, nor
faculties, but habits, either good or bad. This is the genus to which
the virtues belong ([Greek: tô=| ge/nei]--Eth. Nic. ii. 5). Virtue is
that habit from the possession of which a man is called good, and by
which he performs well his appropriate function (ii. 6). It consists
in a certain medium between two extremes, the one of excess, the
other of defect--a medium not positive and absolute, but variable and
having reference to each particular person and each particular
case--neither exceeding nor falling short of what is proper (ii. 6).
All ethical virtue aims at the attainment of this middle point in
respect to our affections and actions--to exhibit each on the proper
occasions, in the proper degree, towards the proper persons, &c. This
middle point is but one, but errors on both sides of it are
numberless: it must be determined by reason and by the judgment of
the prudent man (ii. 6).
Virtue therefore, according to its essence and generic definition
([Greek: kata\ me\n tê\n ousi/an, kai\ to\n lo/gon to\n ti/ ê)n
ei)=nai le/gonta]), is a _certain mediocrity_.
But there are some actions and some affections which do not admit of
mediocrity, and which imply at once in their names evil and
culpability (ii. 6)--such as impudence, envy, theft, &c. Each of
these names implies in its meaning a certain excess and defect, and
does not admit of mediocrity: just as _temperance_ and _courage_
imply in their meaning the idea of mediocrity, and exclude both
excess and defect.
Aristotle then proceeds to apply his general doctrine--that virtue or
excellence consists in a medium between two extremes, both
defects--to various different virtues. He again insists upon the
extreme difficulty of determining where this requisite medium is, in
each individual instance: either excess or defect is the easy and
natural course. In finding and adhering to the middle point consists
the _well_, the _rare_, the _praiseworthy_, the _honourable_ (ii. 9).
The extremes, though both wrong, are not always equally wrong: that
which is the most wrong ought at any rate to be avoided: and we ought
to be specially on our guard against the seductions of pleasure
(_ib._), since our natural inclinations carry us in that direction.
Aristotle so often speaks of the propriety of following _nature_, and
produces _nature_ so constantly as an authority and an arbiter, that
it seems surprising to find him saying--"We must be on our guard with
reference to the things whereto we ourselves are prone. For some of
us are by nature disposed towards some things, others towards
others."--"But we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction"
(ii. 9).
There is a singular passage in the same chapter with respect to our
moral judgments. After having forcibly insisted on the extreme
difficulty of hitting the proper medium point of virtue, he says that
a man who commits only small errors on one side or on the other side
of this point, is not censured, but only he who greatly deviates from
it--he then proceeds--"But it is not easy to define in general
language at what point a man becomes deserving of censure: nor indeed
is it easy to do this with regard to any other matter of perception.
Questions of this sort depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and the judgment upon each _resides in our
perception_" (ii. 9).
The first five chapters, of the third Book of the Ethics, are devoted
to an examination of various notions involved in our ideas of virtue
and vice--_Voluntary_ and _Involuntary_--[Greek: e(kou/sion kai\
a)kou/sion]--_Ignorance_--[Greek: a)/gnoia]--Choice or resolution,
consequent upon previous deliberation--[Greek: proai/resis].
Those actions are _involuntary_, which are done either by compulsion,
or through ignorance. An action is done by compulsion when the
proximate cause of it (or beginning--[Greek: a)rchê\]) is something
foreign to the will of the agent--the agent himself neither
concurring nor contributing. Actions done from the fear of greater
evils are of a mixed character, as where a navigator in a storm
throws his goods overboard to preserve the ship. Such actions as
this, taken as a class, and apart from particular circumstances, are
what no one would do voluntarily: but in the particular circumstances
of the supposed case, the action is done voluntarily. Every action is
_voluntary_, wherein the beginning of organic motion is, the will of
the agent (iii. 1).
Men are praised if under such painful circumstances they make a right
choice--if they voluntarily undergo what is painful or dishonourable
for the purpose of accomplishing some great and glorious result
(_ib._): they are censured, if they shrink from this course, or if
they submit to the evil without some sufficient end. If a man is
induced to do what is unbecoming by the threat of evils surpassing
human endurance, he is spoken of with forbearance: though there are
some crimes of such magnitude as cannot be excused even by the
greatest possible apprehension of evil, such as death and torture. In
such trying circumstances, it is difficult to make a right choice,
and still more difficult to adhere to the choice when it is made.
What is done _through ignorance_, can never be said to be done
_voluntarily_: if the agent shall be afterwards grieved and repentant
for what he has done, it is _involuntary_. If he be not repentant,
though he cannot be said to have done the deed _voluntarily_, yet
neither ought it to be called involuntary.
A distinction however is to be taken in regard to ignorance,
considered as a ground for calling the action _involuntary_, and for
excusing the agent. A man drunk or in a violent passion, misbehaves,
_ignorantly_ but not _through ignorance_: that is, ignorance is not
the cause of his misbehaviour, but drunkenness or rage. In like
manner, every depraved person may be ignorant of his true interest,
or the rule which he ought to follow, but this sort of ignorance does
not render his behaviour _involuntary_, nor entitle him to any
indulgence. It must be ignorance with regard to some particular
circumstance connected with the special action which he is
committing--ignorance of the person with whom, or the instrument with
which, or the subject matter in regard to which he is dealing.
Ignorance of this special kind, if it be accompanied with subsequent
sorrow and repentance, constitutes an action involuntary, and forms a
reasonable ground for indulgence (**iii. 1).
A _voluntary action_, then, is that of which the beginning is in the
agent--he knowing the particular circumstances under which he is
acting. Some persons have treated actions, performed through passion
or through desire, as _involuntary_; but this is an error. If this
were true, neither children nor animals would be capable of voluntary
action. Besides, it is proper, on some occasions, to follow the
dictates both of anger and of desire: and we cannot be said to act
involuntarily in these cases when we do exactly what we ought to do.
Moreover sins from passions and sins from bad reasoning are alike
voluntary or alike involuntary: both of them ought to be avoided: and
the nonrational affections are just as much a part of human nature as
reason is (**iii. 1).
Having explained the proper meaning of voluntary and involuntary as
applied to actions, Aristotle proceeds to define [Greek:
_proai/resis_] (deliberate choice); which is most intimately
connected with excellence, and which indeed affords a better test of
disposition than actions themselves can do (**iii. 2).
All premeditated choice is voluntary, but all voluntary action is not
preconcerted. Children and animals are capable of voluntary action,
but not of preconcerted action: sudden deeds, too, are voluntary, but
not preconcerted. Premeditated choice is different from desire--from
passion--from wishing--and from opinion. Desire and passion are
common to animals, who are nevertheless incapable of _deliberate
preference_. The incontinent man acts from desire, but not from
deliberate preference: the continent man acts from deliberate
preference, but not from desire. Nor is premeditated choice the same
as wishing: for we often wish for what is notoriously impracticable
or unattainable, but we do not deliberately prefer any such thing:
moreover we _wish_ for the end, but we _deliberately choose_ the
means conducting to the end. We wish to be happy: but it cannot with
propriety be said that we deliberately choose to be happy. Deliberate
choice has reference to what it is or seems in our own power to
achieve.
Again, deliberate choice is not to be regarded as a simple
modification of opinion. Opinions extend to everything: deliberate
choice belongs exclusively to matters within our grasp. Opinion is
either true or false: deliberate choice is either good or evil. We
are good or bad, according to the turn which our deliberate choice
takes: not according to our opinions. We deliberately choose to seek
something or to avoid something, and our choice is praised when it
falls upon what is proper: the points upon which we form an opinion
are, what such or such a thing is, whom it will benefit, and how: and
our opinion is praised when it happens to be true. It often occurs,
too, that men who form the truest opinions are not the best in their
deliberate preferences. Opinion may precede or accompany every
deliberate choice, but still the latter is something distinct in
itself. It is in fact a determination of the will, preceded by
deliberate counsel, and thus including or presupposing the employment
of reason (**iii. 2). It is an appetency, determined by previous
counsel, of some matter within our means, either really or seemingly,
to accomplish--[Greek: bouleutikê\ o(/rexis tô=n e)ph' ê(mi=n]
(**iii. 3).
It seems from the language of Aristotle that the various explanations
of [Greek: Proai/resis] which he has canvassed and shown to be
inadmissible, had all been advanced by various contemporary
philosophers.
[Greek: Proai/resis], or _deliberate preference_, includes the idea
of _deliberation_. A reasonable man does not deliberate upon all
matters--he does not deliberate respecting mathematical or physical
truths, or respecting natural events altogether out of his reach, or
respecting matters of pure accident, or even respecting matters of
human design carried on by distant foreign nations. He only
deliberates respecting matters which are more or less within his own
agency and control: respecting matters which are not certain, but of
doubtful issue. He does not deliberate about the end, but about the
means towards the end: the end itself is commonly assumed, just as
the physician assumes the necessity of establishing good health and