Aristotle
to the agent simply--"This justice then is perfect virtue; yet not
absolutely, but with reference to one's neighbour.--In one sense we
call those things _just_ that are productive and preservative of
happiness and its parts to the political communion" (v. 1).
Justice in this sense, is the very fulness of virtue, because it
denotes the actual exercise of virtuous behaviour towards others:
"there are many who behave virtuously in regard to their own personal
affairs, but who are incapable of doing so in what regards others"
(_ib._). For this reason, justice has been called by some _the good
of another and not our own_--justice alone of all the virtues,
because it necessarily has reference to another: the just man does
what is for the interest of some one else, either the magistrate, or
the community (v. 1).
_Justice_ in the narrower sense, is that mode of behaviour whereby a
man, in his dealings with others, aims at taking to himself his fair
share and no more of the common objects of desire: and willingly
consents to endure his fair share of the common hardships.
_Injustice_ is the opposite--that by which a man tries to appropriate
more than his fair share of the objects of desire, while he tries to
escape his fair share of the objects of aversion. To aim at this
unfair distribution of the benefits of the society, either in one's
own favour or in favour of any one else, is injustice in _the narrow
sense_ (v. 2).
Justice in this narrower sense is divided into two branches--1.
Distributive Justice. 2. Corrective Justice.
Distributive Justice has reference to those occasions on which
positive benefits are to be distributed among the members of the
community, wealth and honours, &c. (v. 2). In this case, the share of
each citizen is to be a share not absolutely of equality, but one
proportional to his personal worth ([Greek: a)xi/an]): and it is in
the estimation of this personal worth that quarrels and dissension
arise.
_Corrective Justice_ has reference to the individual dealings, or
individual behaviour, between man and man: either to the dealings
implying mutual consent and contract, as purchase, sale, loan, hire,
suretyship, deposit, &c.: or such as imply no such mutual
consent,--such as are on the contrary proceedings either by fraud or
by force--as theft, adultery, perjury, poisoning, assassination,
robbery, beating, mutilation, murder, defamation, &c.
In regard to transactions of this nature, the citizens are considered
as being all upon a par--no account is taken of the difference
between them in point of individual worth. Each man is considered as
entitled to an equal share of good and evil: and if in any dealings
between man and man, one man shall attempt to increase his own share
of good or to diminish his own share of evil at the expense of
another man, corrective justice will interpose and re-establish the
equality thus improperly disturbed. He who has been made to lose or
to suffer unduly, must be compensated and replaced in his former
position: he who has gained unduly, must be mulcted or made to
suffer, so as to be thrown back to the point from which he started.
The judge, who represents this _corrective justice_, is a kind of
mediator, and the point which he seeks to attain in directing
redress, is _the middle point between gain and loss_--so that neither
shall the aggressive party be a gainer, nor the suffering party a
loser--"So that justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in
voluntary things,--it is the having the same after as before" (v. 4).
Aristotle admits that the words _gain_ and _loss_ are not strictly
applicable to many of the transactions which come within the scope of
interference from _corrective justice_--that they properly belong to
voluntary contracts, and are strained in order to apply them to acts
of aggression, &c. (_ib._).
The Pythagoreans held the doctrine that justice universally speaking
consisted in simple retaliation--in rendering to another the precise
dealing which that other had first given. This definition will not
suit either for distributive justice or corrective justice: the
treatment so prescribed would be sometimes more, sometimes less, than
justice: not to mention that acts deserve to be treated differently
according as they are intentional or unintentional. But the doctrine
is to a certain extent true in regard to the dealings between man and
man ([Greek: e)n tai=s a)llaktikai=s koinôni/ais])--if it be applied
in the way of general analogy and not with any regard to exact
similarity--it is of importance that the man who has been well
treated, and the man who has been illtreated, should each show his
sense of the proceeding by returning the like usage: "for by
proportionate requital the State is held together" (v. 5). The whole
business of exchange and barter, of division of labour and
occupation,--the co-existence of those distinct and heterogeneous
ingredients which are requisite to constitute the political
communion--the supply of the most essential wants of the citizens--is
all founded upon the continuance and the expectation of this assured
requital for acts done. Money is introduced as an indispensable
instrument for facilitating this constant traffic: it affords a
common measure for estimating the value of every service--"And thus
if there were no possibility of retaliation, there would be no
communion" (v. 5).
Justice is thus a mediocrity--or consists in a just medium--between
two extremes, but not in the same way as the other virtues. The just
man is one who awards both to himself and to every one else the
proper and rightful share both of benefit and burthen. Injustice, on
the contrary, consists in the excess or defect which lie on one side
or the other of this medium point (v. 5).
_Distributive justice_ is said by Aristotle to deal with individuals
according to geometrical ratio; _corrective justice_, according to
arithmetical proportion. _Justice_, strictly and properly so called,
is _political justice_: that reciprocity of right and obligation
which prevails between free and equal citizens in a community, or
between citizens who, if not positively equal, yet stand in an
assured and definite ratio one to the other (v. 6). This relation is
defined and maintained by law, and by judges and magistrates to
administer the law. Political justice implies a state of law--a
community of persons qualified by nature to obey and sustain the
law--and a definite arrangement between the citizens in respect to
the alternation of command and obedience--"For this is, as we have
said ([Greek: ê)=n]), according to law, and among those who can
naturally have law; those, namely, as we have said ([Greek: ê)=san]),
who have an equality of ruling and being ruled." As the law arises
out of the necessity of preventing injustice, or of hindering any
individual from appropriating more than his fair share of good things,
so it is felt that any person invested with sovereign authority may
and will commit this injustice. Reason therefore is understood to hold
the sovereign authority, and the archon acts only as the guardian of
the reciprocal rights and obligations--of the constitutional
equality--between the various citizens: undertaking a troublesome duty
and paid for his trouble by honour and respect (v. 6).
The relation which subsists between master and slave, or father and
son, is not properly speaking that of justice, though it is somewhat
analogous. Both the slave, and the non-adult son, are as it were
parts of the master and father: there can therefore be no injustice
on his part towards them, since no one deliberately intends to hurt a
part of himself. Between husband and wife there subsists a sort of
justice--_household justice_ ([Greek: to\ oi)konomiko\n
di/kaion])--but this too is different from political justice (v. 6).
Political justice is in part _natural_--in part _conventional_. That
which is _natural_ is everywhere the same: that which is conventional
is different in different countries, and takes its origin altogether
from positive and special institution. Some persons think that _all_
political justice is thus conventional, and none natural: because
they see that rights and obligations ([Greek: ta\ di/kaia]) are
everywhere changeable, and nowhere exhibit that permanence and
invariability which mark the properties of natural objects. "This is
true to a certain extent, but not wholly true: probably among the
Gods it is not true at all: but with us that which is natural is in
part variable, though not in every case: yet there is a real
distinction between what is natural and what is not natural. Both
natural justice and conventional justice, are thus alike contingent
and variable: but there is a clear mode of distinguishing between the
two, applicable not only to the case of justice but to other cases in
which the like distinction is to be taken. For by nature the right
hand is the stronger: but nevertheless it may happen that there are
ambidextrous men.--And in like manner those rules of justice which
are not natural, but of human establishment, are not the same
everywhere: nor indeed does the same mode of government prevail
everywhere, though there is but one mode of government which is
everywhere agreeable to nature--the best of all" (v. 7).
(The commentary of Andronicus upon this passage is clearer and more
instructive than the passage of Aristotle itself: and it is
remarkable as a distinct announcement of the principle of utility.
"Since both natural justice, and conventional justice, are
changeable, in the way just stated, how are we to distinguish the one
of these fluctuating institutions from the other? The distinction is
plain. Each special precept of justice is to be examined on its own
ground to ascertain whether it be for the advantage of all that it
should be maintained unaltered, or whether the subversion of it would
occasion mischief. If this be found to be the fact, the precept in
question belongs to natural justice: if it be otherwise, to
conventional justice" (Andronic. Rh. v. c. 10).
The just, and the unjust, being thus defined, a man who does,
willingly and knowingly, either the one or the other, acts justly or
unjustly: if he does it unwillingly or unknowingly, he neither acts
justly nor unjustly, except by accident--that is, he does what is not
essentially and in its own nature unjust, but is only so by accident
(v. 8). Injustice will thus have been done, but no unjust act will
have been committed, if the act be done involuntarily. The man who
restores a deposit unwillingly and from fear of danger to himself,
does not act justly, though he does what by accident is just: the man
who, anxious to restore the deposit, is prevented by positive
superior force from doing so, does not act unjustly, although he does
what by accident is unjust. When a man does mischief, it is either
done contrary to all reasonable expectation, in such manner that
neither he nor any one else could have anticipated from his act the
mischief which has actually ensued from it ([Greek: paralo/gôs]), and
in this case it is a pure misfortune ([Greek: a)tu/chêma]): or he
does it without intention or foreknowledge, yet under circumstances
in which mischief might have been foreseen, and ought to have been
foreseen; in this case it is a fault ([Greek: a(ma/rtêma]): or he
does it intentionally and with foreknowledge, yet without any
previous deliberation, through anger, or some violent momentary
impulse; in this case it is an unjust act ([Greek: a)di/kêma]), but
the agent is not necessarily an _unjust or wicked_ man for having
done it: or he does it with intention and deliberate choice, and in
this case he is an unjust and wicked man.
The man who does a just thing, or an unjust thing, is not necessarily