Aristotle
well as on that of the recruit, are not intuitive products or
inspirations of the mind: they are acquirements made by long and
irksome experience, though often forgotten in its details. We are not
to reason upon the learner or the recruit as if they were children
just born.
[Footnote 3: Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 72, a. 27.]
[Footnote 4: Analyt. Poster. I. iii. p. 72, a. 17: [Greek: tou=to
ga\r _ma/list'_ e)pi\ toi=s toiou/tois ei)ô/thamen o)/noma
le/gein]--"we are for the most part accustomed:" Hamilton has not
translated the word [Greek: ma/lista], which it would have been
better for him to do, because he founds upon the passage an argument
to prove that Aristotle limited in a certain way the sense of the
word Axiom.]
The passages out of the Rhetorica and the Metaphysica (cited on p.
772, b., and marked _d_ and _e_) are hardly worth notice. But that
which immediately follows (marked _f_), out of the Nikomachean
Ethica, is the most pertinent of all that are produced. Hamilton
writes:--"Arguing against a paradox of certain Platonists in regard
to the Pleasurable, Aristotle says--'But they who oppose themselves
to Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates were not a good, talk
idly. For what _appears to all_, that we affirm _to be_; and he who
would subvert this belief, will himself assuredly advance nothing
more deserving of credit.'[5] Compare also L. vii. c. 13 (14). In his
paraphrase of the above passage, the Pseudo-Andronicus in one place
uses the expression _common opinion_, and in another all but uses
(what indeed he could hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian,
if indeed in Greek at all) the expression _common sense_, which D.
Heinsius in his Latin version actually employs." Thus far Hamilton;
but the words of Aristotle which immediately follow are even
stronger:--"For, in so far as foolish creatures desire pleasure, the
objection taken would be worth something; but, when intelligent
creatures desire it also, how can the objectors make out their case?
Even in mean and foolish creatures, moreover, there is perhaps a
certain good natural appetite, superior to themselves, which aims at
their own good."[6] Or as Aristotle (according to some critics, the
Aristotelian Eudemus) states it in the Seventh Book of the
Nikomachean Ethica, referred to by Sir W. Hamilton without citing
it:--"Perhaps all creatures (brutes as well as men) pursue, not that
pleasure which they think they are pursuing, nor what they would
declare themselves to be pursuing, but all of them the same pleasure;
for all creatures have by nature something divine."[7]
[Footnote 5: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1172, b. 36: [Greek: o(\
ga\r pa=si dokei=, tou=t' ei)=nai/ phamen; o( d' a)nairô=n tau/tên
tê\n pi/stin, ou) pa/nu pisto/tera e)rei=.]]
[Footnote 6: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. ii. p. 1173, a. 2: [Greek: ê(=|
me\n ga\r ta\ a)no/êta o)re/getai au)tô=n, ê)=n a)/n ti to\ lego/men;
ei) de\ kai\ ta\ phro/nima, pô=s a)\n le/goie/n ti? i)/sôs de\ kai\
e)n toi=s phau/lois e)sti/ ti _phusiko\n_ a)gatho\n _krei=tton ê)\
kath' au(ta/, o(\ e)phi/etai tou= oikei/ou a)gathou=_.] (I adopt here
the text as given by Michelet, [Greek: **ê(=| me\n] in place of
[Greek: ei) me\n], but not in leaving out [Greek: to\] before [Greek:
lego/menon].) I think the sentence would stand better if [Greek:
a)gatho\n] were omitted after [Greek: phusiko/n].]
[Footnote 7: Eth. Nikom. VII. xiv. p. 1153, b. 31: [Greek: i)/sôs de\
kai\ diô/kousin ou)ch ê)\n oi)/ontai (ê(donê/n) ou)d' ê)\n a)\n
phai=en, a)lla\ tê\n au)tê/n; _pa/nta ga\r phu/sei e)/chei ti
thei=on_.] The sentiment is here declared even more strongly
respecting the appetency of all animals--brutes as well as men.]
In this passage, Aristotle does really appear as the champion of
authoritative Common Sense. He enunciates the general principle: That
which appears to all, that we affirm to be. And he proceeds to claim
(with the qualification of _perhaps_) for this universal belief a
divine or quasi-divine authority; like Hesiod in the verses cited by
Sir W. Hamilton, p. 770, b., and like Dr. Reid in the motto prefixed
to his 'Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common
Sense.' If Aristotle had often spoken in this way, he would have been
pre-eminently suitable to figure in Sir W. Hamilton's list of
authorities. But the reverse is the fact. In the Analytica and
Topica, Aristotle is so far from accepting the opinion and belief of
all as a certificate of truth and reality, that he expressly ranks
the matters so certified as belonging to the merely probable, and
includes them in his definition thereof. Universal belief counts for
more or less, as a certificate of the truth of what is believed,
according to the matter to which it refers; and there are few matters
on which it is of greater value than pleasure and pain. Yet even upon
this point Aristotle rejects the authority of the many, and calls
upon us to repose implicit confidence in the verdict of the just and
intelligent individual, whom he enthrones as the measure. "Those
alone are pleasures" (says Aristotle) "which appear pleasures to this
man; those alone are pleasant things in which he takes delight. If
things which are revolting to him appear pleasurable to others, we
ought not to wonder, since there are many corruptions and
degenerations of mankind; yet these things are not really
pleasurable, except to these men and to men of like disposition."[8]
This declaration, repeated more than once in the Nikomachean Ethica,
and supported by Analytica and Topica, more than countervails the
opposite opinion expressed by Aristotle, in the passage where he
defends Eudoxus.
[Footnote 8: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. X. v. p. 1176, a. 15: [Greek:
dokei= d' e)n a(/pasi toiou/tois ei)=nai to\ phaino/menon tô=|
spoudai/ô|. ei) de\ tou=to kalô=s le/getai, katha/per dokei=, kai\
e)/stin e(ka/stou me/tron ê( a)retê\ kai\ o( a)gatho\s ê(=|
toiou=tos, kai\ ê(donai\ ei)=en a)\n ai( tou/tô| phaino/menai, kai\
ê(de/a oi(=s ou(=tos chai/rei] &c. Ib. vi. p. 1176, b. 24: [Greek:
_katha/per ou)=n polla/kis ei)/rêtai_, kai\ ti/mia kai\ ê(de/a e)sti\
ta\ tô=| spoudai/ô| toiau=ta o)/nta.]]
The next passage (_g_) produced by Sir W. Hamilton is out of the
Eudemian Ethica. But this passage, when translated more fully and
exactly than we read it in his words, will be found to prove nothing
to the point which he aims at. He gives it as follows, p. 773,
a.:--"But of all these we must endeavour to seek out rational grounds
of belief, by adducing manifest testimonies and authorities. For it
is the strongest evidence of a doctrine, if all men can be adduced as
the manifest confessors of its positions; because every individual
has in him a kind of private organ of the truth. Hence we ought not
always to look to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather
to what appears [and is believed] to be." The original is given
below.[9]
[Footnote 9: Aristot. Eth. Eud. I. vi. p. 1218, b. 26: [Greek:
peirate/on de\ peri\ tou/tôn pa/ntôn zêtei=n tê\n pi/stin dia\ tô=n
lo/gôn, marturi/ois kai\ paradei/gmasi chrô/menon toi=s
phainome/nois. kra/tiston me\n ga\r pa/ntas a)nthrô/pous phai/nesthai
sunomologou=ntas toi=s pa/ntôs, o(/per metabibazo/menoi poiê/sousin;
e)/chei ga\r e(/kastos oi)kei=o/n ti pro\s tê\n a)lê/theian, e)x ô(=n
a)nagkai=on deiknu/nai pôs peri\ au)tô=n. e)k ga\r tô=n a)lêthô=s
me\n legome/nôn, ou) saphô=s de/, proi+ou=sin e)/stai kai\ to\
saphô=s, metalamba/nousin a)ei\ ta\ gnôrimô/tera tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn
le/gesthai sugkechume/nôs.] Then after an interval of fifteen lines:
[Greek: kalô=s d' e)/chei kai\ to\ chôri\s kri/nein to\n tê=s
ai)ti/as lo/gon kai\ to\ deiknu/menon, dia/ te to\ r(êthe\n a)rti/ôs,
o(/ti prose/chein ou) dei= pa/nta toi=s dia\ tô=n lo/gôn, a)lla\
polla/kis ma=llon toi=s phainome/nois (nu=n d' o(/pot' a)\n lu/ein
mê\ e)/chôsin, a)nagka/zontai pisteu/ein toi=s ei)rême/nois), kai\
dio/ti polla/kis to\ me\n u(po\ tou= lo/gou dedei=chthai dokou=n
a)lêthe\s me/n e)stin, ou) me/ntoi dia\ tau/tên tê\n ai)ti/an di'
ê(/n phêsin o( lo/gos. e)/sti ga\r dia\ pseu/dous a)lêthe\s dei=xai;
dê=lon d' e)k tô=n A)nalutikô=n.]]
The following is a literal translation, restoring what Sir W.
Hamilton omits:--"But, respecting all these matters, we must
endeavour to seek belief through general reasoning, employing the
appearances before us (_i.e._ the current _dicta_ and _facta_ of
society) as testimonies and examples. For it is best that all mankind
should be manifestly in agreement with what we are about to say; but,
if that cannot be, that at all events they should be in some sort of
agreement with us; which they will come to be when brought round (by
being addressed in the proper style). For every man has in him some
tendencies favourable to the truth, and it is out of these that we
must somehow or other prove our conclusions. By taking our departure
from what is said around us truly but not clearly, we shall by
gradual advance introduce clearness, taking along with us such
portion of the confused common talk as is most congruous to Science.
. . . It is well also to consider apart the causal reasoning
(syllogistic, deductive premisses), and the conclusion shown: first,
upon the ground just stated, that we must not pay exclusive attention
to the results of deductive reasoning, but often rather to apparent
facts, whereas it often happens now that, when men cannot refute the
reasoning, they feel constrained to believe in the conclusion; next,
because the conclusion, shown by the reasoning, may often be true in
itself, but not from the cause assigned in the reasoning. For a true
conclusion may be shown by false premisses; as we have seen in the
Analytica."
Whoever reads the original words of Aristotle (or Eudemus) will see
how much Sir W. Hamilton's translation strains their true meaning.
[Greek: Kra/tiston] does not correspond to the phrase--"it is the
strongest evidence of a doctrine." [Greek: Kra/tiston] is the
equivalent of [Greek: a)/riston], as we find in chap. iii. of this
Book of the Eudemian Ethica (p. 1215, a. 3): [Greek: e)pei\ d'
ei)si\n a)pori/ai peri\ e(ka/stên pragmatei/an oi)kei=ai, dê=lon
o(/ti kai\ peri\ _bi/ou tou= krati/stou_ kai\ zôê=s tê=s a)ri/stês
ei)si/n.] Nor ought the words [Greek: oi)kei=o/n ti pro\s tê\n
a)lê/theian] to be translated--"a kind of private organ of the
truth:" they mean simply--"something in him favourable or tending
towards the truth," as we read in chap. ii. of this same
Book--[Greek: oi)kei=on pro\s eu)exi/an] (p. 1214, b. 22). Moreover,
Hamilton has omitted to translate both the words preceding and the
words following; accordingly he has missed the real sense of the
passage. Aristotle inculcates upon the philosopher never to neglect
the common and prevalent opinions, but to acquaint himself with them
carefully; because, though these opinions are generally full of
confusion and error ([Greek: ei)kê=| ga\r le/gousi schedo\n peri\
a(pa/ntôn (oi( polloi/)]--Ethic. Eudem. I. iii. p. 1215, a. 1), he
will find in them partial correspondences with the truth, of which he
may avail himself to bring the common minds round to better views;
but, unless he knows pretty well what the opinions of these common
minds are, he will not be able to address them persuasively. This is
the same reasonable view which Aristotle expresses at the beginning
of the Topica (in a passage already cited, above), respecting the
manner of dealing proper for a philosopher towards current opinion.
But it does not at all coincide with the representation given by
Hamilton.
The next piece of evidence (_h_) which we find tendered is another
passage out of the Eudemian Ethica. It will be seen that this passage
is strained with even greater violence than the preceding. Hamilton
writes as follows, first translating the words of Aristotle, then