Aristotle
commenting on them:--"The problem is this--What is the beginning or
principle of motion in the soul? Now it is evident, as God is in the
universe, and the universe in God, that [I read [Greek: kinei=n
kai/]--W. H.] the divinity in us is also, in a certain sort, the
universal mover of the mind. For the principle of Reason is not
Reason but something better. Now what can we say is better than even
Science, except God?"[10] So far Hamilton's translation; now follows
his comment:--"The import of this singular passage is very obscure.
It has excited, I see, the attention, and exercised the ingenuity, of
Pomponatius, J. C. Scaliger, De Raei, Leibnitz, Leidenfrost, Jacobi,
&c. But without viewing it as of pantheistic tendency, as Leibnitz is
inclined to do, it may be interpreted as a declaration, that
Intellect, which Aristotle elsewhere allows to be pre-existent and
immortal, is a spark of the Divinity; whilst its data (from which as
principles more certain than their deductions, Reason, Demonstration,
Science, must depart) are to be reverenced as the revelation of
truths which would otherwise lie hid from man: That, in short,
"'The voice of Nature is the voice of God.'
By the bye, it is remarkable that this text was not employed by any
of those Aristotelian philosophers who endeavoured to identify the
Active Intellect with the Deity."
[Footnote 10: Ethic. Eud. VII. xiv. p. 1248, a. 24: [Greek: to\ de\
zêtou/menon tou=t' e)sti/, ti/s ê( tê=s kinê/seôs a)rchê\ e)n tê=|
psuchê=|? dê=lon dê/, ô(/sper e)n tô=| o(/lô| theo/s, kai\ pa=n]
(Fritzsche reads [Greek: e)n) e)kei/nô|. kinei= ga/r pôs pa/nta to\
e)n ê(mi=n thei=on. lo/gou d' a)rchê\ ou) lo/gos a)lla\ ti krei=tton.
ti/ ou)=n a)\n krei=tton kai\ e)pistê/mês ei)/poi plê\n theo/s?]
Instead of [Greek: ei)/poi] (the last word but two) Fritzsche reads
[Greek: ei)/ê kai\ nou=].
This is the passage translated by Sir W. Hamilton. The words of the
original immediately following are these: [Greek: ê( ga\r a)retê\
tou= nou= o)/rganon; kai\ dia\ tou=to oi( pa/lai
e)/legon--"eu)tuchei=s kalou=ntai, oi( a)\n o(rê/sôsi katopthou=sin
a)/logoi o)/ntes, kai\ bouleu/esthai ou) sumphe/rei
au)toi=s"--e)/chousi ga\r a)rchê\n toiou/tên ê( krei/ttôn tou= nou=
kai\ bouleu/seôs. oi( de\ to\n lo/gon; tou=to d' ou)k e)/chousi. kai\
e)nthousismoi/; tou=to d' ou) du/nantai; a)/logoi ga\r o)/ntes
e)pitugcha/nousi] (so Fritzsche reads in place of
[Greek: a)potugcha/nousi]).]
I maintain that this passage noway justifies the interpretation
whereby Sir W. Hamilton ascribes to Aristotle a doctrine so large and
important. The acknowledged obscurity of the passage might have
rendered any interpreter cautious of building much upon it: but this
is not all: Sir W. Hamilton has translated it separately, without any
allusion to the chapter of which it forms part. This is a sure way of
misunderstanding it; for it cannot be fairly construed except as
bearing on the problem enunciated and discussed in that chapter.
Aristotle (or Eudemus) propounds for discussion explicitly in this
chapter a question which had been adverted to briefly in the earlier
part of the Eudemian Ethica (I. i. p. 1214, a. 24)--What is the
relation between good fortune and happiness? Upon what does good
fortune depend? Is it produced by special grace or inspiration from
the Gods? This question is taken up and debated at length in the
chapter from which Sir W. Hamilton has made his extract. It is
averred, as a matter of notoriety, that some men are fortunate.
Though fools, they are constantly successful--more so than wiser men;
and this characteristic is so steady, that men count upon it and
denominate them accordingly. (See this general belief illustrated in
the debate at Athens recorded by Thukydides, vi. 17, the good fortune
of Nikias being admitted even by his opponents.) Upon what does this
good fortune depend? Upon nature? Upon intelligence? Upon fortune
herself as a special agent? Upon the grace and favour of the gods to
the fortunate individual? Aristotle (or Eudemus) discusses the
problem in a long and perplexed chapter, stating each hypothesis,
together with the difficulties and objections attaching to it. As far
as we can make out from an obscure style and a corrupt text, the
following is the result arrived at. There are two varieties of the
fortunate man: one is, he who succeeds through a rightly directed
impulse, under special inspiration of the divine element within him
and within all men; the other is, he who succeeds without any such
impulse, through the agency of Fortune proper. The good fortune of
the first is more constant than that of the second; but both are
alike irrational or extra-rational.[11] Now the divine element in the
soul is the beginning or principle of motion for all the
manifestations in the soul--for reason as well as feeling: that which
calls reason into operation, is something more powerful than reason.
But in the intelligent man this divine mover only calls reason into
operation, leaving reason, when once in operation, to its own force
and guidance, of course liable to err; whereas in the fortunate man
(first variety) the divine element inspires all his feelings and
volitions, without any rational deliberation, so that he executes
exactly the right thing at the right time and place, and accordingly
succeeds.[12]
[Footnote 11: Eth. Eudem. VII. xiv. p. 1248, b. 3: [Greek: phanero\n
de\ o(/ti du/o ei)/dê eu)tuchi/as, ê( me\n thei/a, dio\ kai\ dokei=
o( eu)tuchê\s dia\ theo\n katorthou=n; ou(=tos d' e)sti\n o( kata\
tê\n o(rmê\n diorthôtiko/s, o( d' e(/teros o( para\ tê\n o(rmê\n;
a)/logoi d' a)mpho/teroi. kai\ ê( me\n sunechê\s eu)tuchi/a ma=llon,
au(/tê d' ou) sunechê/s.]
The variety [Greek: o( para\ tê\n o(rmê\n diorthôtiko/s] is
exemplified in the Physica (II. iv. p. 196, a. 4), where Aristotle
again discusses [Greek: tu/chê]: the case of a man who comes to the
market-place on his ordinary business, and there by accident meets a
friend whom he particularly wished to see, but whom he never dreamt
of seeing there and then.]
[Footnote 12: Eth. Eud. VII. xiv. p. 1248, a. 27-32: [Greek:
eu)tuchei=s kalou=ntai], &c. Compare also ib. p. 1247, b. 18.]
Aristotle (or Eudemus) thus obtains a psychological explanation (good
or bad) of the fact, that there are fools who constantly succeed in
their purposes, and wise men who frequently fail. He tells us that
there is in the soul a divine principle of motion, which calls every
thing--reason as well as appetite or feeling--into operation. But he
says nothing of what Sir W. Hamilton ascribes to him--about Intellect
as a spark of the Divinity, or about data of Intellect to be
reverenced as the revelation of hidden truths. His drift is quite
different and even opposite: to account for the success of
individuals _without intellect_ or reason--to bring forward a divine
element in the soul, which dispenses with intellect, and which
conducts these unintelligent men to success, solely by infusing the
most opportune feelings and impulses. Sir W. Hamilton has
misunderstood this passage, by taking no notice of the context and
general argument to which it belongs.
Besides, when Hamilton represents Aristotle here as declaring: "That
the data of Intellect are to be reverenced as the revelation of
truths which would otherwise lie hid from man"--how are we to
reconcile this with what we read two pages before (p. 771, a.) as the
view of Aristotle about these same data of Intellect, that "they are
themselves pre-eminently certain; and, if denied in words, they are
still always mentally admitted"? Is it reasonable to say that the
Maxim of Contradiction, and the proposition, That if equals be
subtracted from equals, the remainders will be equal--are data "to be
reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid
from man"? At any rate, I protest against the supposition that
Aristotle has ever declared this.
The next two passages cited from Aristotle have really no bearing
upon the authority of Common Sense in its metaphysical meaning: they
are (_i_) from Physic. VIII. iii. and (_k_) from De Gen. Animal. III.
x. Both passages assert the authority of sensible perception against
general reasoning, where the two are conflicting. They assert, in
other words, that general reasoning ought to be tested by experience
and observation, and is not to be accepted when disallowed by these
tests. (The only condition is, that the observation be exact and
complete.) This is just, and is often said, though often disregarded
in fact, by Aristotle. But it has no proper connexion with the
problem about the trustworthiness of Common Sense.
Next Sir W. Hamilton refers us to (without citing) three other places
of Aristotle. Of these, the first (De Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 4-13,
marked _l_) is one which I am much surprised to find in a modern
champion of Common Sense: since it represents Common Sense as giving
full certificate to errors now exploded and forgotten. Aristotle had
begun by laying down and vindicating his doctrine of the First or
Celestial Body, forming the exterior portion of the Kosmos, radically
distinct from the four elements; revolving eternally in uniform,
perfect, circular motion, eternal, unchangeable, &c. Having stated
this, he proceeds to affirm that the results of these reasonings
coincide with the common opinions of mankind, that is, with Common
Sense; and that they are not contradicted by any known observations
of perceptive experience. This illustrates what I have before
observed about Aristotle's position in regard to Common Sense. He
does not extol it as an authority, or tell us that "it is to be
reverenced as a revelation"; but, when he has proved a conclusion on
what he thinks good grounds, he is glad to be able to show that it
tallies with common opinions; especially when these opinions have
some alliance with the received religion.
The next passage (_m_) referred to (De Coelo, III. vii. p. 306, a.
13) has nothing to do with Common Sense, but embodies a very just
protest by Aristotle against those philosophers who followed out
their theories consistently to all possible consequences, without
troubling themselves to enquire whether those consequences were in
harmony with the results of observation.
There follows one other reference (_n_) which was hardly worth Sir W.
Hamilton's notice. In Meteorologic. I. xiii. p. 349, a. 25,
Aristotle, after reciting a theory of some philosophers (respecting
the winds) which he considers very absurd, then proceeds to
say:--"The many, without going into any enquiry at all, talk better
sense than those who after enquiry bring forward such conclusions as
these." It is not saying much for the authority of Common Sense, to
affirm that there have been occasionally philosophical theories so
silly as to be worse than Common Sense.
. . . . . .
B.--_Aristotle's Doctrine._
In regard to Aristotle, there are two points to be examined--
I. What position does he take up in respect to the authority of
Common Sense?
II. What doctrine does he lay down about the first _principia_ or
beginnings of scientific reasoning--the [Greek: a)rchai\
sullogistikai/]?
I.--That Aristotle did not regard Cause, Substance, Time, &c., as
Intuitions, is shown by the subtle and elaborate reasonings that he
employs to explain them, and by the censure that he bestows on the
erroneous explanations and shortcomings of others. Indeed, in regard
to Causality, when we read the great and perplexing diversity of
meaning which Aristotle (and Plato before him in the Phædon)
recognizes as belonging to this term, we cannot but be surprised to
find modern philosophers treating it as enunciating a simple and
intuitive idea. But as to Common Sense--taking the term as above