Aristotle
demonstrative march.[41] Yet what thus lies outside philosophy, is
nevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for
philosophy. We shall find Aristotle insisting upon this in his Topica
and Analytica; and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric
treatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises (the Physica
is one of the most abstruse) as an accompaniment and auxiliary--a
dialectic survey of opinions, puzzles, and controverted points,
before he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of
his own. He does this not only throughout the Physica (in several
other passages besides that which I have just cited),[42] but also in
the Metaphysica, the treatises De Animâ, De Generatione et
Corruptione, &c.
[Footnote 41: We find the epithet [Greek: e)xôteriko\s] used once by
Aristotle, not in conjunction with [Greek: lo/goi], but with [Greek:
pra/xeis], designating those acts which are performed with a view to
some ulterior and extraneous end ([Greek: tô=n a)pobaino/ntôn
cha/rin], as contrasted with [Greek: pra/xeis
au)totelei=s--oi)kei=ai]): Polit. vii. p. 1325, b. 22-29.
[Greek: scholê=| **ga\r a)\n o( theo\s e)/choi kalô=s kai\ pa=s o(
ko/smos, oi(=s ou)k ei)si\n e)xôterikai\ pra/xeis para\ ta\s
oi)kei/as ta\s au)tô=n.] In the Eudemian Ethics the phrase [Greek:
_toi=s a)llotri/ois lo/gois_ sophi/zontai] is used much in the same
sense as [Greek: _toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_ lo/gois]: _i.e._ opposed to
[Greek: toi=s oi)kei/ois]--to that which belongs specially to the
scientific determination of the problem (Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1218,
b. 18).
The phrase [Greek: dia\ tô=n e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn], in Aristot.
Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 31, and the different phrase [Greek: e)k
tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn lo/gôn le/gesthai], in Phys. vi. 2, p. 233, a. 13,
appear to have the same meaning and reference. Compare Prantl not. ad
Arist. Phys. p. 501.]
[Footnote 42: If we turn to the beginning of book iv. of the Physica,
where Aristotle undertakes to examine [Greek: To/pos], _Place_, we
shall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of [Greek:
a)pori/ai], exactly analogous to that which he himself calls [Greek:
e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], when he proceeds to examine [Greek: Chro/nos],
_Time_: see Physica, iv. pp. 208, a. 32-35, 209, a. 30; 210, a. 12,
b. 31. He does the like also about [Greek: Keno/n], _Vacuum_, p. 213,
a. 20, b. 28, and about [Greek: A)/peiron], _Infinitum_, iii. p. 204,
b. 4 (with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 364, b. 20, Br.).
Compare the Scholion of Simplikius ad Physica (i. p. 329, b. 1,
Br.)--[Greek: _i)/sôs_ de\] (Simplikius uses this indecisive word
[Greek: i)/sôs]) [Greek: o(/ti ê( e)ph' e(ka/tera a)pori/a tou=
lo/gou e)xôterikê/ tis ê)=n, ô(s Eu)/dêmo/s phêsi, dialektikê\ ma=llon
ou)=sa], with this last Scholion, on p. 364, b. 20, which describes
the same dialectic handling, though without directly calling it
_exoteric_.]
Having thus learnt to understand, from one distinct passage of
Aristotle himself, what he means by "exoteric discourses," we must
interpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages
in which the phrase occurs. We see clearly that in using the phrase,
he does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his
own--nor even to any other writings at all. He may possibly mean
this; but we cannot be sure of it. He means by the phrase, a
dialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions
and probabilities: whether in his own writings, or in those of
others, or in no writings at all, but simply in those oral debates
which his treatise called Topica presupposes--this is a point which
the phrase itself does not determine. He _may_ mean to allude, in
some cases where he uses the phrase, to his own lost dialogues; but
he may also allude to Platonic and other dialogues, or to colloquies
carried on orally by himself with his pupils, or to oral debates on
intellectual topics between other active-minded men. When Bernays
refers "exoteric discourse" to the lost Aristotelian Dialogues; when
Madvig, Zeller, Torstrick, Forchhammer, and others, refer it to the
contemporary oral dialectic[43]--I think that neither of these
explanations is in itself inadmissible. The context of each
particular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable.
We cannot go farther, in explaining the seven doubtful passages where
Aristotle alludes to the "exoteric discourses," than to understand
the general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus
designates. Extra-philosophical, double-sided, dialectic, is in
general (he holds) insufficient by itself, and valuable only as a
preparation and auxiliary to the didactic process. But there are some
particular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient
and satisfactory, which can be safely accepted as the basis of future
deduction. These points he indicates in the passages above cited;
without informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was
written or spoken, and whether by himself or by others.[44]
[Footnote 43: Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol.
i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of [Greek:
e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], as conceived by Aristotle. See also the
dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of
Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp.
107-152--which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a
collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it.
It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the
supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that by _exoteric books_ are
always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much
reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad
Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p.
123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant
any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of
cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other
hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has
defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer,
Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is
thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these
two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively
right. "Exoteric discourse," as I understand it, might be found both
in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men
out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic
works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which
Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric
discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by
cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in the
_salons_ or coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at
Athens--this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the
Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled
dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and
that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens.
To discuss these matters in the way which he calls [Greek: pro\s
do/xan], was more frequent than to discuss them [Greek: pro\s
a)lê/theian].
Zell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage
in Aristotle's Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in a
previous note), "quo loco, à Buhlio neglecto, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\
lo/goi] idem significant quod alibi [Greek: koinai\ do/xai,
ei)ôtho/tes lo/goi], vel [Greek: ta\ lego/mena]: quæ semper,
priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet
Aristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1." I find also in Weisse
(Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a
fair explanation of what Aristotle really means by _exoteric_; an
explanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment
erroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).]
[Footnote 44: Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i.
13, p. 1102, a. 26. [Greek: le/getai de\ peri\ au)tô=n kai\ e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois a)rkou/ntôs e)/nia, kai\ chrêste/on au)toi=s],
is explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring
to oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors;
and this _may_ possibly be a correct explanation.]
From the time of Cicero downward, a distinction has been drawn
between some books of Aristotle which were exoteric, and others that
were not so; these last being occasionally designated as
_akroamatic_. Some modern critics have farther tried to point out
which, among the preserved works of Aristotle, belonged to each of
these heads. Now there existed, doubtless, in the days of Cicero,
Strabo, Plutarch, and Gellius, books of Aristotle properly called
_exoteric_, _i.e._ consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse
and debate; though whether Aristotle himself would have spoken of an
exoteric _book_, I have some doubt. Of such a character were his
Dialogues. But all the works designated as akroamatic (or
non-exoteric) must probably have contained a certain admixture of
"exoteric discourse"; as the Physica ([Greek: Phusikê\ A)kro/asis])
and the Metaphysica are seen to contain now. The distinction
indicated by Cicero would thus be really between one class of works,
wherein "exoteric discourse" was exclusive or paramount,--and
another, in which it was partially introduced, subordinate to some
specified didactic purpose.[45] To this last class belong all the
works of Aristotle that we possess at present. Cicero would have
found none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book.
[Footnote 45: To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by
Weisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: "Dass
dieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten
Bücherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleich
_exoterisch_ und _esoterisch_ sein konnte; und zweitens, dass
_exoterisch_ überhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den
positiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen
unmittelbar als Glied eintritt." But Weisse goes on afterwards to
give a different opinion (about the meaning of _exoteric_ books),
conformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda;
and in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in
which Aristotle handled the Abstracta, _Place_ and _Infinite_, is
just the same as that which he declares to be _exoteric_ in the case
of _Time_. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not
accurate: "[Greek: E)xôterika\] dicebantur, quæ ad rhetoricas
meditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam
conducebant. [Greek: A)kroatika\] autem vocabantur, in quibus
philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; quæque ad naturæ
contemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant." It
appears to me that _disceptationes dialecticæ_ ought to be
transferred to the department [Greek: e)xôterika/], and that
_civilium rerum notitia_ belongs as much to [Greek: a)kroatika\] as
to [Greek: e)xôterika/]. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question
very ably and instructively, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote,
pp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have
cited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings
go really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks,
justly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of
Search) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute
Forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot.
Exot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when