Aristotle
The remaining books are known as [Greek: a], [Greek: D], I, K, M, N.
The short Book [Greek: a] is entirely unconnected with any of the
others, and most probably is not the work of Aristotle. Book [Greek:
D] ([Greek: peri\ tô=n posachô=s legome/nôn])--a vocabulary of
philosophical terms--is Aristotelian beyond question, being referred
to occasionally in the chief books; but it lies quite apart from the
exposition proper. Book I--dealing with Unity and Opposites--though
it also has no place in the actual line of treatment, is truly
ontological in character, and probably was intended to fall within
some larger scheme of metaphysical doctrine; the like, as far as can
be judged, being true of Books M and N, containing together a
criticism of Pythagorean and Platonic theories. Finally, Book K,
consisting in part of an epitomized excerpt from the Physica--hardly
from the hand of Aristotle, gives otherwise only a sketch in outline
of the argument of Books B, [Greek: G], E, and thus, although
Aristotelian, is to be discounted.
The author nowhere states the principle upon which he selected the
six books for a preliminary Abstract; but the actual selection,
joined to various indications in the Abstract and marginal notes in
his copies of the Metaphysica, leaves no doubt that he accepted the
view of Brandis, more especially as set forth by Bonitz. On the whole
question of the Canon of the Metaphysica, Bonitz's Introduction to
his Commentary may with advantage be consulted.]
Book [Greek: G].
In this First Philosophy, Aristotle analyses and illustrates the
meaning of the _generalissima_ of language--the most general and
abstract words which language includes. All these are words in common
and frequent use; in the process of framing or putting together
language, they have become permanently stamped and circulated as the
result of many previous comparisons, gone through but afterwards
forgotten, or perhaps gone through at first without any distinct
consciousness. Men employ these words familiarly in ordinary speech,
and are understood by others when they do so. For the most part, they
employ the words correctly and consistently, in the affirmation of
particular propositions relating to topics of daily life and
experience. But this is not always or uniformly the case. Sometimes,
more or less often, men fall into error and inconsistency in the
employment of these familiar general terms. The First Philosophy
takes up the generalities and established phrases in this condition;
following back analytically the synthetical process which the framers
of language have pursued without knowing or at least without
recording it, and bringing under conscious attention the different
meanings, more or fewer, in which these general words are used.
Philosophia Prima devotes itself, specially and in the first
instance, to Ens _quatenus_ Ens in all its bearings; being thus
distinguished from mathematics and other particular sciences, each of
which devotes itself to a separate branch of Ens (p. 1003, a. 25). It
searches into the First Causes or Elements of Ens _per se_, not _per
accidens_ (a. 31). But Ens is a commune, not generically, but
analogically; constituted by common relationship to one and the same
terminus, as everything healthy is related to health. The Principle
([Greek: a)rchê/]) of all Entia is Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); but
some Entia are so called as being affections of Essence; others, as
being a transition to Essence, or as destruction, privation, quality,
efficient or generative cause, of Essence or its _analoga_; others,
again, as being negations ([Greek: a)popha/seis]) thereof, whence,
for example, we say that Non-Ens _is_ Non-Ens (b. 6-10). There is one
science of all these primary, secondary, tertiary, &c., Entia; just
as there is one science of all things healthy, of the primary, the
secondary, the tertiary, &c., _quatenus_ healthy. But, in all such
matters, that science bears in the first instance and specially
([Greek: kuri/ôs]) on the Primum Aliquid, from which all the
secondary and other derivatives take their departure, and upon which
they depend (b. 16). Accordingly, in the present case, since Essence
is the Primum Aliquid, the province of First Philosophy is to
investigate the causes and principles of Essences in all their
varieties (b. 18-22). Now whatever varieties there are of Ens, the
like varieties there are of Unum; for the two are always implicated
together, though the words are not absolutely the same in meaning (b.
24-35). Accordingly both Ens and Unum with all the varieties of each
belong to Philosophia Prima; likewise Idem, Simile, &c., and the
opposites thereof. All opposites may be traced in the last analysis
to this foundation--the antithesis of Unum and Multa (p. 1004, a. 1).
We must set forth and discriminate the different varieties--primary,
secondary, tertiary, &c.--of Idem and Simile, and also of their
opposites, Diversum and Dissimile; and we must show how they are
derived from or related to Primum Idem, &c., just as we must do in
the case of Ens and Unum. All this task belongs to First Philosophy
(a. 20-30). Aristotle speaks of [Greek: o( philo/sophos], as meaning
the master of Philosophia Prima (b. 1; B. p. 997, a. 14).
If these investigations do not belong to the First Philosopher, to
which among the other investigators can they belong? Who is to
enquire whether Sokrates, and Sokrates sitting, is the same person?
Whether Unum is opposite to Unum? In how many senses Opposite can be
said? (p. 1004, b. 3). All these are affections _per se_ of Unum
_quatenus_ Unum, and of Ens _quatenus_ Ens, not _quatenus_ numbers,
or lines, or fire; that is, they are propria (_sensu logico_) of Ens
and Unum (not included in the notion or definition, but deducible
therefrom--"notæ consecutione notionis"), just as odd and even,
proportionality, equality, excess and defect, are propria of numbers;
and there are other propria of solids, whether moved or unmoved,
heavy or light. It is these propria of Ens and Unum that Philosophia
Prima undertakes to explain (b. 7-16), and which others fail to
explain, because they take no account of [Greek: ou)si/a] (b. 10), or
of the fundamental Ens or Essentia to which these belong as propria.
These Propria of Ens are the [Greek: oi)kei=a]--the special and
peculiar matter or principles--of Philosophia Prima. That all of them
belong in this special way to the First Philosopher, we may farther
see by the fact that all of them are handled by the Dialectician and
the Sophist, who assume an attitude counterfeiting the Philosopher.
All three travel over the same ground, and deal with Ens, as a matter
common to all (p. 1004, b. 20). But the Sophist differs from the
Philosopher in his purpose, inasmuch as he aims only at giving the
false appearance of wisdom without the reality, while the
Dialectician differs from the Philosopher in his manner of handling
([Greek: tô=| tro/pô| tê=s duna/meôs]--b. 24). The Dialectician
discusses the subject in a tentative way, from many different points
of view, suggested by current opinions; the Philosopher marches by a
straight and assured road from the appropriate principles of his
science to certain conclusions and cognitions.
The same view of the scope and extent of Philosophia Prima may be
made out in another way. Almost all philosophers affirm that Entia
are composed of contraries, and may be traced back to opposite
principles--odd and even, hot and cold, limit and the unlimited,
friendship and enmity, &c. Now these and all other contraries may be
traced back to Unum and Multa: this we may assume (p. 1005, a. 1;
according to Alexander Aph., it had been shown in the treatise De
Bono--Schol. p. 648, a. 38, Br.).
Though it be true, therefore, that neither Ens nor Unum is a true
genus, nor separable, but both of them aggregates of analogical
derivatives, yet since all these derivatives have their root in one
and the same fundamentum, the study of all of them belongs to one and
the same science (p. 1005, a. 6-11). It is not the province of the
geometer to examine what is The Opposite, The Perfect, Ens, Unum,
Idem, Diversum, except in their application to his own problems. The
general enquiry devolves upon the First Philosopher; who will
investigate Ens _quatenus_ Ens, together with the belongings or
appendages ([Greek: ta\ u(pa/rchonta]) of Ens _quatenus_ Ens,
including Prius, Posterius, Genus, Species, Totum, Pars, and such
like (a. 11-18).
It falls to the First Philosopher also to investigate and explain
what mathematicians call their Axioms: the mathematician ought not to
do this himself, but to leave it to the First Philosopher. These
Axioms are, in their highest generality, affirmations respecting Ens
_quatenus_ Ens, all of which belong to the First Philosopher; from
whom the mathematician accepts them, and applies them as far as his
own department requires (p. 1005, a. 20, seq.).
In First Philosophy, the firmest, best known, and most unquestionable
of all principles is this: It is impossible for the same predicate at
the same time and in the same sense to belong and not to belong to
the same subject (p. 1005, b. 20). No one can at the same time
believe that the same thing both is and is not; though Herakleitus
professed to believe this, we must not suppose that he really did
believe it (b. 25). No man can hold two contrary opinions at the same
time (b. 31). This is by nature the first principle of all other
axioms; to which principle all demonstrations are in the last resort
brought back (b. 33: [Greek: phu/sei ga\r a)rchê\ kai\ tô=n a)/llôn
a)xiôma/tôn au(/tê pa/ntôn]).
Aristotle then proceeds to explain and vindicate at length this
[Greek: a)rchê/]--the Principle of Contradiction, which many at that
time denied. This principle is at once the most knowable, and noway
assumed as hypothesis ([Greek: gnôrimôta/tên kai\ a)nupo/theton]--p.
1005, b. 13). You cannot indeed demonstrate it to be true; the very
attempt to demonstrate it would be unphilosophical: demonstration of
every thing, is an impossibility. You cannot march upwards in an
infinite progression of demonstrations; you must arrive ultimately at
some first truth which is not demonstrable; and, if any such first
truth is to be recognized, no one can point out any truth better
entitled to such privilege than the Principle of Contradiction (p.
1006, a. 11). But you can convict an opponent of self-contradiction
([Greek: a)podei=xai e)legktikô=s], a. 12, 15), if he will only
consent to affirm any proposition in significant terms--that is, in
terms which he admits to be significant to himself and which he
intends as such to others; in other words, if he will enter into
dialogue with you, for without significant speech there can be no
dialogue with him at all (a. 21).
When the opponent has shown his willingness to comply with the
conditions of dialogue, by advancing a proposition in terms each
having one definite signification, it is plain, by his own admission,
that the proposition does not both signify and not signify the same.
First, the copula of the proposition (_est_) does not signify what
would be signified if the copula were _non est_; so that here is one
case wherein the affirmative and the negative cannot be both of them
true (p. 1006, a. 30; see Alex. Schol. and Bonitz's note). Next, let
the subject of the proposition be _homo_; a term having only one
single definite signification, or perhaps having two or three (or any
definite number of) distinct significations, each definite. If the
number of distinct significations be indefinite, the term is unfit
for the purpose of dialogue (a. 30-b. 10). The term _homo_ will
signify one thing only; it will have one determinate essence and
definition--say _animal bipes_: that is, if any thing be a man, the