Aristotle
same will be _animal bipes_. But this last cannot be the essence and
definition of _non-homo_ also: _non-homo_, as a different name, must
have different definition; _homo_ and _non-homo_ cannot be like
[Greek: lô/pion] and [Greek: i(ma/tion], two terms having the same
signification, essence and definition; for _homo_ signifies one
subject of constant and defined nature, not simply one among many
predicates applicable by accident to this same constant subject; it
signifies [Greek: mi/an phu/sin] and not [Greek: a)/llên tina\
phu/sin] (Scholia, p. 656, b. 21). Since each name indeed is applied
by convention to what it denominates, the name _non-homo_ may be
applied elsewhere to that which we term _homo_; but this is a mere
difference of naming; what bears the name _homo_, and what bears the
name _non-homo_, must always be different, if _homo_ is defined to
signify one determinate nature (b. 22). The one single nature and
essence defined as belonging to _homo_, cannot be the same as that
belonging to _non-homo_. If any thing be _homo_, the same cannot be
_non-homo_: if any thing be _non-homo_, the same cannot be _homo_ (b.
25-34). Whoever says that _homo_ and _non-homo_ have the same
meaning, must say _à fortiori_ that _homo_, _fortis_, _musicus_,
_simus_, _pulcher_, &c., have the same meaning; for not one of these
terms is so directly and emphatically opposite to _homo_, as
_non-homo_ is. He must therefore admit that the meaning, not merely
of all these words but also, of a host besides is the same; in other
words, that not merely Opposites are one, but all other things
besides, under different names ([Greek: o(/ti e(\n pa/nta e)/stai
kai\ ou) mo/non ta\ a)ntikei/mena]--p. 1007, a. 6).
This argument is directed against those who maintain that affirmative
and negative are both true at once, but who still desire to keep up
dialogue (Alex. Schol. p. 658, a. 26, Br.: [Greek: tô=| tê/n te
a)nti/phasin sunalêtheu/ein le/gonti, kai\ sô/zein boulome/nô| to\
diale/gesthai]). No man who maintains this opinion, can keep his
consistency in dialogue, if he will only give direct answers to the
questions put to him, without annexing provisoes and gratuitous
additions to his answers. If you ask him, Whether it is true that
Sokrates is _homo_? he ought to answer plainly Yes, or No. He ought
not to answer: "Yes, but Sokrates is also _non-homo_," meaning that
Sokrates is also the subject of many other accidental
predicates--fair, flat-nosed, brave, accomplished, &c. He ought to
answer simply to the question, whether the one essence or definition
signified by the word man, belongs to Sokrates or not; he ought not
to introduce the mention of these accidental predicates, to which
the question did not refer. These accidental predicates are infinite
in number; he cannot enumerate them all, and therefore he ought not
to introduce the mention of any of them. Sokrates is _homo_, by the
essence and definition of the word; he is _non-homo_, ten thousand
times over, by accidental predicates; that is, he is fair, brave,
musical, flat-nosed, &c., all of which are varieties of the general
word _non-homo_ (p. 1007, a. 7-19).
Those who contend that both members of the Antiphasis are at once
true disallow Essentia altogether, and the distinction between it and
Accidens (p. 1007, a. 21). When we say that the word _homo_ signifies
a certain Essentia, we mean that its Essentia is nothing different
from this, and that the being _homo_ cannot be the same as the being
_non-homo_, or the not being _homo_. Those against whom we are
reasoning discard Essentia as distinguished from Accidens, and
consider all predicates as Accidentia. _Albus_ belongs to _homo_ as
an accident; but the essence of _albus_ does not coincide with that
of _homo_, and cannot be predicated of _homo_ (a. 32). Upon the
theory of these opponents, there would be no Prima Essentia to which
all accidents are attached; but this theory is untenable. Accidents
cannot be attached one to another in an infinite ascending series (b.
1). You cannot proceed more than two steps upward: first one
accident, then a second; the two being joined by belonging to one and
the same subject. No accident can be the accident of another
accident. [Greek: To\ leuko/n] may have the accident [Greek:
mousiko/n], or [Greek: to\ mousiko/n] may have the accident [Greek:
leuko/n]; each of these may be called indifferently the accident of
the other; but the truth is, that [Greek: leuko/s] and [Greek:
mousiko/s] are both of them accidents belonging to the common
Essentia--_homo_. But, when we affirm _homo est musicus_, we
implicate the accident with the Essentia to which it belongs; that
Essentia is signified by the subject _homo_. There must thus be one
word which has signification as Essentia; and, when such is the case,
we have already shown that both members of the Antiphasis cannot be
predicated at once (b. 5-18).
(Alexander, in Scholia, p. 658, b. 40-p. 659, b. 14, Br., remarks on
this argument of Aristotle: Those who held the opinion here
controverted by Aristotle--[Greek: tê\n a)nti/phasin
sunalêtheu/ein]--had in their minds accidental propositions, in regard
to which they were right, except that both members of the Antiphasis
cannot be true at the same time. _Sokrates est musicus_--_Sokrates non
est musicus_: these two propositions are both true, in the sense that
one or other of them is true only potentially, and that both cannot be
actually true at the same time. One of them is true, and the other
false, at the present moment; but that which is now false has been
true in the past, and may become true in the future. Aristotle does
not controvert this theory so far as regards accidental propositions;
but he maintains that it is untenable about essential propositions,
and that the theorists overlooked this distinction.)
Moreover, if you say that both members of the Antiphasis are alike
true respecting every predicate of a given subject, you must admit
that all things are one (p. 1007, b. 20). The same thing will be at
once a wall, a trireme, a man. Respecting every subject, you may
always either affirm or deny any given predicate; but, according to
this theory, whenever it is true to affirm, it is always equally true
to deny. If you can say truly, _Homo non est triremis_, you may say
with equal truth, according to the theory before us, _Homo est
triremis_. And, of course, _Homo non est triremis_ may be said truly;
since (still according to this theory) the much more special
negative, _Homo non est homo_, may be said truly (b. 32).
Again, if this theory be admitted, the doctrine that every predicate
may be either affirmed or denied of any given subject, will no longer
hold true. For, if it be true to say of Sokrates both _Est homo_ and
_Est non-homo_: it must also be true to say of him both _Non est
homo_ and _Non est non-homo_. If both affirmative and negative may be
alike affirmed, both may be alike denied (p. 1008, a. 2-7). If both
members of the Antiphasis are alike true, both must be alike false
(Alex. Schol. p. 663, a. 14-34).
Again, the theory that both members of the Antiphasis are alike true,
is intended by its authors to apply universally or not universally.
Every thing is both white and not white, Ens and Non-Ens; or this is
true with some propositions, but not with regard to others. If the
theorists take the latter ground and allow some exceptions, so far at
least as those exceptions reach, firm truth is left ([Greek: au(=tai
a)\n ei)=en o(mologou/menai]--p. 1008, a. 11). But, if they take the
former ground and allow no exceptions, they may still perhaps say:
Wherever you can affirm with truth, we can also deny with truth; but,
wherever we can deny with truth, we cannot in every case affirm with
truth (a. 15). Meeting them upon this last ground, we remark that at
any rate some negative propositions are here admitted to be knowable,
and we obtain thus much of settled opinion; besides, wherever the
negative is knowable, the corresponding affirmative must be still
more knowable (a. 18). If they take the former ground and say that,
wherever the negative is true, the affirmative is true also, they
must either mean that each of them is true separately, or that
neither of them is true separately but that both are true when
enunciated together in a couple (a. 19). If they mean the latter,
they do not talk either of these things or of any thing else: there
is neither speech nor speaker, nothing but non-entity; and how can
non-entity either speak or walk (a. 22)? Every thing would be
confounded in one. If they mean the former--that affirmative and
negative are each alike true taken separately, we reply that, since
this must be true as much respecting one subject as respecting
another, so there can be no distinction or difference between one
subject and another; all must be alike and the same; if there be any
difference of any kind, this must constitute a special and
exceptional matter, standing apart from the theory now under
discussion. Upon this view of the theory in question, then, as well
as upon the preceding, we are landed in the same result: all things
would be confounded into one (a. 27). All men would speak truly and
all men alike (including the theorist himself, by his own admission)
would speak falsely. Indeed in discussing with this theorist we have
nothing to talk about; for he says nothing. He does not say, It is
thus; he does not say, It is not thus; he says, It is both thus and
not thus: then, again, he negatives both, saying, It is neither thus
nor not thus; so that there is nothing definite in what he says (a.
32).
Again, let us ask, Does he who believes things to be so, believe
falsely, and he who believes things not to be so and so, believe
falsely also, while he who believes both at once, believes truly? If
this last person believes truly, what is meant by the common saying
that such and such is the constitution of nature? If you even say
that the last person does not indeed believe truly, but believes more
truly than he who believes the affirmative alone, or he who believes
the negative alone, we still have something definite in the
constitution of nature, something which is really true, and not true
and false at the same time. But, if there be no more truly or less
truly--if all persons alike and equally speak truly and speak
falsely--speech is useless to such persons; what they say, they at
the same time unsay. If the state of their minds really corresponds
to this description--if they believe nothing, but at once think so
and so and do not think so and so--how do such persons differ from
plants (b. 3-12; see Alexander's Scholion, p. 665, b. 9-17 Br., about
the explanation of [Greek: ma=llon], and the distinction between
[Greek: le/gein] and [Greek: u(polamba/nein], p. 665, b. 31, seq.)?
It is certain, however, that these theorists are not like plants, and
do not act as such in matters of ordinary life. They look for water,
when thirsty; they keep clear of falling into a well or over a
precipice. In regard to what is desirable or undesirable, at least,
they do not really act upon their own theory--That both members of
the Antiphasis are equally true and equally false. They act upon the
contrary theory--That one of the members is true, and the other
false. But, if these theorists, admitting that they act thus, say
that they do not act thus with any profession of knowing the truth,
but simply on the faith of appearance and greater probability, we
reply that this ought to impose upon them a stronger sense of duty in
regard to getting at the truth. The state of Opinion stands to that
of Knowledge in the same relation as that of sickness to health (p.
1008, b. 12-31).
Finally, to follow up this last argument, even if we grant to these