Aristotle
theorists that both members of the Antiphasis are true, still there
are degrees of truth: the More and the Less pervades the constitution
of nature (p. 1008, b. 32). We shall not surely affirm that two and
three are equally even; nor shall we say, when any one affirms four
to be five, that he commits an equal error with one who affirms four
to be a thousand. Clearly one of these persons is more near to the
truth, the other is less near to the truth. But, if there be such a
thing as _being nearer to the truth_, there must surely be some truth
to which you have come nearer; and, even if this be denied, yet at
least what we have already obtained (the [Greek: e)ggu/teron tê=s
a)lêthei/as]) is something firmer and of a more truth-like character.
We shall thus have got rid of that unqualified theory which forbids
all definite conceptions of the intellect ([Greek: ka)\n ei) mê/
e)stin, a)ll' ê)/dê ge/ ti e)sti\ bebaio/teron kai\ a)lêthinô/teron,
kai\ tou= lo/gou a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)/êmen tou= a)kra/tou kai\
kôlu/onto/s ti tê=| dianoi/a| o(ri/sai]--p. 1009, a. 2).
Having thus completed his refutation of the "unqualified theory,"
which declares both members of the Antiphasis to be alike true,
Aristotle passes to the examination of the Protagorean doctrine "Homo
Mensura:" he affirms that it proceeds from the same mode of thinking,
and that the two must stand or fall together. For, if all things
which appear true are true, all things must be at once true and
false; since the opposition of men's opinions is a notorious fact,
each man thinking his own opinions true and his opponent's opinions
false (p. 1009, a. 16).
Aristotle here distinguishes between two classes of reasoners, both
of whom he combats, but who require to be dealt with in a very
different manner: (1) Those who are sincerely convinced of what they
affirm; (2) Those who have no sincere conviction, but merely take up
the thesis as a matter for ingenious argument ([Greek: lo/gou
cha/rin]), and will not relinquish it until they are compelled by a
strong case made out against them. The first require persuasion, for
their ignorance may be easily cured, and the difficulties whereby
they are puzzled may be removed; the second require to be constrained
by a forcible Elenchus or refutation, which may correct their misuse
of dialectic and language (p. 1009, a. 22).
Aristotle begins with the first class. The difficulties which perplex
them proceed from sensible things ([Greek: e)k tô=n ai)sthêtô=n]--p.
1009, a. 23). They perceive contrary things generated by the same;
and this leads them to believe that contraries are both alike real,
and that the two members of the Antiphasis are alike true. For, since
Non-Ens cannot be generated, both the two contraries must have
pre-existed together as Entia, prior to the generation in the thing
as it then stood (a. 25). This is the opinion of Anaxagoras, who
affirms that every thing is mixed in every thing; and of Demokritus,
who affirms that Plenum and Inane--in other words. Ens and
Non-Ens--exist alike and together in every part (a. 28). To these
reasoners we reply, that in a certain sense they are right, in a
certain sense wrong. The term Ens is used in two senses: the same
thing may therefore be at once Ens and Non-Ens, but not in the same
sense; moreover, from Non-Ens in one sense something may be generated,
but not from Non-Ens in the other. The same thing may be at once two
opposites _in power_, but not _in act_ ([Greek: duna/mei me\n ga\r
e)nde/chetai a(/ma tau)to\ ei)=nai ta\ e)nanti/a, e)ntelechei/a| d'
ou)/]--a. 35). We must farther remind these reasoners that the basis
on which they proceed is not universally admissible; for there are
various Entia of completely distinct and different essence, in which
there is neither movement nor generation nor destruction of any sort
(a. 38).
The doctrine held by Protagoras--That what appears true is truth,
comes from the same source as the other doctrine--That both members
of the Antiphasis are true. Both doctrines proceed from the sensible
world ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ ê( peri\ ta\ phaino/mena a)lê/theia
e)ni/ois e)k tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e)lê/luthen]--p. 1009, b. 2; [Greek:
o(moi/ôs] refers back to a. 23--[Greek: au(/tê ê( do/xa], the other
doctrine). Demokritus, Protagoras, and others observe that sensible
phenomena are differently appreciated by different men, by other
animals, and even by the same animal or man at different times. They
do not think that truth upon these points of difference can be
determined by a majority of voices. Demokritus says that either there
is nothing true, or that we cannot know what it is (b. 10). These
reasoners identified intelligence with sensible perception, and
considered that this latter implied a change in the subject (b. 13):
they conceived that what appeared to sense was necessarily true.
Empedokles, Demokritus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Homer, &c., all lay
down the doctrine, that the intelligence of men is varied with and
determined by their sensible perceptions. They thought that men of
wrong intelligence were nevertheless intelligent men, though their
intelligence did not carry them to the same conclusions (b. 30); that
if, both in one case and in the other, there were acts of
intelligence, there must be realities corresponding to both,
justifying the affirmative as well as the negative (b. 33).
That sincere and diligent enquirers should fall into these errors is
very discouraging; but we must remark that their errors originated
from this--that, while investigating the truth respecting Entia, they
supposed that Entia were only the Percepta or Percipibilia (p. 1010,
a. 2). Now in these Entia Perceptionis there is a great deal of the
Indefinite and of mere Potential Entity (a. 3). Hence the theories of
these reasoners were plausible, though not true. They saw that all
the Entia Perceptionis were in perpetual movement, and they thought
it impossible to predicate any thing with truth respecting what was
at all times and in every way changing (a. 9). Kratylus and the
Herakleitizers pushed this to an extreme. Even against their
reasoning, we have something to say in reply. We grant that they have
some ground for imagining that what undergoes change does not exist
at the moment when it changes (a. 16). Yet even here there is room
for dispute; for that which is in the act of casting off, still
retains something of that which is being cast off; and of that which
is being generated, something must already be in existence. As a
general doctrine, if something is in course of being destroyed,
something must be in existence; and, if something is in course of
being generated, there must exist something out of which it proceeds
and by which it is being generated; nor can this go back _ad
infinitum_ (a. 22). Dropping this argument, however, let us advance
another. Change as to Quantity is not the same as change as to
Quality or Form. Let us grant that, as to Quantity, there is change
continuous and perpetual--growth or decay--no such thing as
stationary condition. But all our knowledge relates to Quality or
Form, in which there is no continuous change (a. 24: [Greek: kata\
me\n ou)=n to\ poso/n, e)/stô mê\ me/non; a)lla\ kata\ to\ ei)=dos
a(/panta gignô/skomen.]--Compare Alex. Schol., p. 671, b. 5-22; p.
670, a. 36: Bonitz has good remarks in his note, pp. 202-204**.).
Again, we have a farther reproach to make to these reasoners. Their
argument is based only on the Percepta or Percipienda; yet, even as
to these it is true only as to the minority and untrue as to the
majority. It is true merely as far as the sublunary Percepta; but as
to the superlunary or celestial it is the reverse of truth. Our earth
and its neighbourhood is indeed in continual generation and
destruction; but this is an insignificant part of the whole. In
affirming any thing respecting the whole, we ought to follow the
majority rather than the minority (p. 1010, a. 28-31**).
Lastly, we must repeat against these reasoners the argument urged
just now. We must explain to them, that there exists, apart from and
besides all generation, destruction, change, motion, &c., a certain
Immovable Nature ([Greek: a)ki/nêto/s tis phu/sis]--a. 34). Indeed
their own doctrine--That all things both are and are not--would seem
to imply an universal stationary condition rather than universal
change (a. 38). There can be no change; for there is no prospective
terminus which can be reached by change. Every thing is assumed as
already existing.
We have now to remark upon the special doctrine of
Protagoras--[Greek: pa=n to\ phaino/menon a)lêthe/s]. If we grant that
perception is always true upon matters strictly belonging to it, still
phantasy is not identical with perception and we cannot say that what
appears to the phantasy is always true ([Greek: to\
phaino/menon]--which implies a reference to [Greek: phantasi/a]--p.
1010, b. 2), Besides, it is strange that thinkers should puzzle
themselves about the questions: Whether the magnitude and colour of
objects is that which appears to a spectator near or to a spectator
far off? and to a spectator healthy or jaundiced? Whether the weight
of an object is as it appears to a weak or to a strong man? Whether
objects are truly what they appear to men awake or to men asleep?
Their own actions show that they do not think there is any doubt; for
if, being in Libya, they happen to dream that they are in Athens, none
of them ever think of going to the Odeium (b. 5-11). Moreover,
respecting the future, as Plato remarks, the anticipations of the
ignorant man are not so trustworthy as those of the physician, whether
a patient will recover or not (b. 14). Then, again, in respect of
present sensations, the perception of sight is not equally trustworthy
with the perception of smell about a question of odour (b. 17); and
the perception of smell will never report at the same time and about
the same thing, that it is at once fragrant and not fragrant; nor,
indeed, at different times about the affection itself, but only about
the subject to which the affection belonged (b. 20). The same wine
which tasted sweet last month, may now taste not sweet; but the sweet
taste itself is the same now and last month, and the reports of the
sense are never contradictory on this point. The sweet taste which is
to come in the future will be of necessity like the sweet taste in
the past. Now such necessity is abrogated by all those reasonings
which affirm at once the two members of the Antiphasis. These
reasonings disallow all essence of every thing, and all necessity;
for whatever is necessary, cannot be at once both thus and not thus
(b. 21-30).
On the whole, if nothing exist except Percepta, nothing can exist
without animated beings; since without these last there can be no
perception. It is indeed true, perhaps, that under such a supposition
there exist neither Percepta nor acts of Perception (which are
affections of the Percipient); but that the Substrata which cause
Perception should not exist even without Perception--is an
impossibility (p. 1010, b. 33: [Greek: to\ de\ ta\ u(pokei/mena mê\
ei)=nai, a(\ poiei= tê\n ai)/sthêsin, kai\ a)/neu ai)sthê/seôs,
a)du/naton]). Perception is not perception of itself; there exists
besides, apart from perception, something else which must necessarily
be prior to perception. For the Movens is by nature prior to the
Motum; and this is not the less true, though each of these two is
enunciated in relation to the other (b. 35).
A difficulty is often started, and enquiry made, Who is to be the
judge of health and sickness? Whom are we to recognize as the person
to judge rightly in each particular case? Persons might as well raise
difficulty and make enquiry, Whether we are now awake or asleep? It