Aristotle
is plain by men's actual conduct that they have no real doubt upon
the point in any particular case; and both these enquiries arise from
the same fundamental mistake--that men require to have every thing
demonstrated, and will recognize nothing without demonstration.
(Alex. says in Scholia, p. 675, b. 3: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r pro\s a(\
e)k phu/seôs be/ltion e)/chomen ê)\ ô(/ste dei=sthai tê=s peri\
au)tô=n a)podei/xeôs; e)/sti de\ tau=ta ai(/ te ai)sthê/seis, kai\
ta\ a)xiô/mata kai\ ai( phusikai/ te kai\ koinai\ e)/nnoiai.]) Those
who sincerely and seriously feel this difficulty, may be expected to
acquiesce in the explanation here given (p. 1011, a. 2-14). But those
who put forward the difficulty merely for the sake of argument, must
be informed that they require an impossibility. They require to have
a refutative case made out against them (which can only be done by
reducing them to a [Greek: sullogismo\s a)ntipha/seôs]); yet they
themselves begin by refusing to acknowledge this refutation as
sufficient, for they maintain the thesis--That both members of the
Antiphasis are alike and equally true (a. 16; compare Alex. Schol.,
p. 675, b. 20-28).
Those who maintain this last-mentioned thesis say, in other words,
That every thing which appears true, is true. But this thesis of
theirs cannot be defended except by the admission that every thing is
relative, and that nothing is absolute. Accordingly they must take
care to announce their thesis, not in absolute terms as it now
stands, but in terms strictly relative: Every thing which appears
true, appears true to some individual--at a certain moment of
time--under certain circumstances and conditions (p. 1011, a. 24).
For, if they affirm, in absolute phrase, that all things are alike
false and true, on the ground that what appears true is true, urging
that the same things do not appear true either to different persons,
or to the same person at different times--nay, sometimes even to the
same person at the same time, as may be seen by handling a pebble
between two crossed fingers ([Greek: e)n tê=| e)palla/xei tô=n
daktu/lôn]--a. 33), so that it appears two to the touch, but only
one to the sight;--we shall reply, that there is no such
contradiction of judgment, if they confine themselves to the same
person, the same time, and one and the same sense. In these cases,
there is only one affirmation which appears to be true, and
therefore, according to their theory, that affirmation is true.
They are not, therefore, justified in concluding that every thing
is alike true and false (b. 1).
They can only escape this refutation by avoiding to say, This is
true, and by saying, This is true to such an individual, at such a
time, &c.; that is, by making every affirmation relative to some
person's opinion or perception. Hence the inference is, that nothing
either ever has occurred or ever will occur, without the antecedent
opinion of some person ([Greek: mêtheno\s prodoxa/santos]--p. 1011,
b. 6): if any thing ever has so occurred, it cannot be true that all
things are relative to opinion. Moreover, if the Relatum be one, it
must be relative to some one, some definite, Correlate; and, even if
the same Relatum be both half and equal, it will not be equal in
reference to a double Correlate, but half in reference to a double,
and equal in reference to an equal (b. 9). Moreover, if _homo_ and
_conceptum_ have both of them no more than a relative existence--that
is, if both of them exist only in correlation with a
_concipiens_--then the _concipiens_ cannot be _homo_; it will be the
_conceptum_ that is _homo_. And, if every individual thing have
existence only in relation to a _concipiens_, this _concipiens_ must
form the Correlate to an infinite number of Relata (b. 12). (All this
is very briefly and obscurely stated in Aristotle. The commentary of
Alexander is copious and valuable: one might suppose that he had
before him a more ample text; for it is difficult to find in the
present text all that his commentary states**.)
Let thus much be said to establish the opinion, That the two members
of the Antiphasis (the Affirmative and the Negative) are not both
true at the same time. We have shown whence it arises that some
persons suppose both to be true; and what are the consequences in
which those who hold this opinion entangle themselves. Accordingly,
since both sides of the Antiphasis cannot be truly predicated of the
same subject, it is impossible that opposite attributes can belong at
the same time to the same subject (p. 1011, b. 17: [Greek: ou)de\
ta)nanti/a a(/ma u(pa/rchein e)nde/chetai tô=| au)tô=|]). For one of
these opposites includes in itself privation, and privation of a
certain real essence; now privation is the negation of a certain
definite genus. And, since affirmation and negation cannot be truly
applied at the same time, it follows that opposite attributes cannot
belong at the same time to the same subject. At least it is only
possible thus far: one may belong to it absolutely, the other
_secundum quid_; or both of them _secundum quid_ only ([Greek: tô=n
me\n ga\r e)nanti/ôn tha/teron ste/rêsi/s e)stin ou)ch ê(=tton,
ou)si/as de\ ste/rêsis a)po/phasi/s e)stin a)po/ tinos ô(risme/nou
ge/nous]--b. 20).
But, also, there can be nothing intermediate between the two members
of the Antiphasis; we must of necessity either affirm or deny any one
thing of any other (p. 1011, b. 24). This will appear clearly, when
we have first defined what is Truth and Falsehood. To say that Ens is
not, or that Non-Ens is, is false: To say that Ens is, or that
Non-Ens is not, is true. Accordingly, he who predicates _est_--or he
who predicates _non est_--will speak truly or speak falsely, according
as he applies his predicate to Ens or to Non-Ens. But he cannot,
either in application to Ens or to Non-Ens, predicate _est aut non
est_ (b. 29). Such a predication would be neither true nor false, but
improper and unmeaning. (I follow at b. 27 the text of the Berlin
edition: [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ o( le/gôn ei)=nai ê)\ mê\ a)lêtheu/sei
ê)\ pseu/setai]--which seems to me here better than that of Bonitz,
who puts [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ o( le/gôn tou=to ei)=nai ê)\ mê\
a)lêtheu/sei ê)\ pseu/setai]--following Alexander's explanation,
Schol., p. 680, a. 33, which I cannot think to be correct, though
Bonitz praises it much. Aristotle defines Truth and Falsehood: When
you say _Ens est_, or _Non-Ens non est_, you speak truth; when you
say _Ens non est_, or _Non-Ens est_, you speak falsehood.
Accordingly, when you employ the predicate _est_, or when you employ
the predicate _non est_, you will speak truly or falsehood, according
as the subject with which you join it is Ens or is Non-Ens. But
neither with respect to the subject Ens nor with respect to the
subject Non-Ens, can you employ the disjunctive predicate--_est aut
non est_.**)
Again, a medium between the two horns of the Antiphasis must be
either a medium between opposites, like grey between white and black,
or like the neither between man and horse. If it be the latter, it
will never change; for all change is either from a negative to its
affirmative (_non-bonum_ to _bonum_) or _vice versâ_: now that which
is both _non-homo_ and _non-equus_ must change, if it change at all,
into that which is both _homo_ and _equus_; but this is impossible.
We see change always going on; but it is always change either into
one of the two extremes or into the medium between them. But can we
assume that there is such a medium (so that the case supposed will
belong to the analogy of grey, halfway between white and black)? No,
we cannot assume it; for, if we granted it, we should be forced to
admit that there was change into white not proceeding from that which
is not white: now nothing of the kind is ever perceived. There cannot
therefore be any admissible medium halfway between the two members of
the Antiphasis--something which is neither white nor not-white,
neither black nor not-black (p. 1011, b. 35: [Greek: ei) d' e)/sti
metaxu/]--if such medium be admitted--[Greek: kai\ ou(/tôs ei)/ê a)/n
tis ei)s leuko\n ou)k e)k mê\ leukou= ge/nesis; nu=n d' ou)ch
o(ra=tai]).
Furthermore, whatever our intelligence understands or reasons upon,
it deals with as matter affirmed or denied. The very definition of
truth and falsehood recognizes them as belonging only to affirmation
or negation: when we affirm or deny in a certain way we speak truth;
when in another way, we speak falsely. Nothing is concerned but
affirmation and denial (_i.e._, there is no mental operation midway
between the two--p. 1012, a. 2-5). If there be any such medium or
midway process, it is not confined to this or that particular
Antiphasis, but belongs alike to all, and must lie apart from all the
different Antiphases--at least if it is to be talked of as a reality,
and not as a mere possible combination of words; so that the speaker
will neither speak truth, nor not speak truth; which is absurd (a.
7). It must also lie apart both from Ens and from Non-Ens; so that we
should be compelled to admit a certain mode of change of Essence,
which yet shall neither be generation nor destruction; which is
impossible. **(According to Aristotle's definition, all change of
[Greek: ou)si/a] must be either Generation, _i.e._, passage from
[Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\ o)/n], or Destruction, _i.e._,
passage from [Greek: to\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n].--See Alex.
Schol. p. 681, b. 30-40**.)
Again, there are certain genera in which negation carries with it the
affirmation of an opposite; such as odd and even, in numbers. In such
genera, if we are to admit any medium apart from and between the two
members of the Antiphasis, we should be forced to admit some number
which is neither odd nor even (p. 1012, a. 11). This is impossible:
the definition excludes it. (Alexander gives this as the definition
of number: [Greek: pa=s ga\r a)rithmo\s ê)\ a)/rtio/s e)stin ê)\
peritto/s, kai\ _a)rithmo/s e)stin o(\s ê)\ a)/rtio/s e)stin ê)\
peritto/s_]--Schol. p. 682, a. 16.)
Again, if the Antiphasis could be divided, and a half or intermediate
position found, as this theory contends, the division of it must be
admissible farther and farther, _ad infinitum_. After bisecting the
Antiphasis, you can proceed to bisect each of the sections; and so
on. Each section will afford an intermediate term which may be denied
with reference to each of the two members of the original Antiphasis.
Two new Antiphases will thus be formed, each of which may be bisected
in the same manner; and so bisection, with the formation of
successive new Antiphases, may proceed without end (p. 1012, a. 13).
Again, suppose a questioner to ask you, Is this subject white? You
answer, No. Now you have denied nothing else than the being-white:
this is the [Greek: a)po/phasis], or negative member of the
Antiphasis. But you have neither denied nor affirmed the intermediate
stage between the affirmative and the negative; nor is there any
answer possible by which you could do so. Therefore there is no real
intermediate stage between them ([Greek: e)/ti o(/tan e)rome/nou ei)
leuko/n e)stin ei)/pê| o(/ti ou)/, ou)the\n a)/llo a)pope/phêken ê)\
to\ ei)=nai; a)po/phasis de\ to\ mê\ ei)=nai]--p. 1012, a. 15; see
Alex. Schol. p. 682, b. 15-38, and Bonitz's note. Bonitz suggests,
though timidly, [Greek: a)pope/phêken] instead of the common reading
[Greek: a)pope/phuken], which none of the commentators explain, and
which seems unintelligible. I think Bonitz is right, though [Greek:
a)pope/phêken] is an unknown tense from [Greek: a)po/phêmi]: it is
quite as regular as [Greek: a)pophê/sô] or [Greek: a)pe/phêsa]**.).
The doctrines which we have been just controverting (Aristotle says)
arise, like other paradoxes, either from the embarrassment in which