Aristotle
power to produce the concomitant accidents of the house. The house is
thus produced by necessity; its concomitant accidents not by
necessity--Alex. Schol. p. 738, a. 19-33.)
But whether this [Greek: to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuchen] is to be considered
as referable to Matter, End, or Movent, is a point important to be
determined (p. 1027, b. 15). Aristotle shows elsewhere that it is
referable to the last of the three--[Greek: to\ poiêtiko/n]
(Asklepius, p. 738, b. 41).
Having now said enough upon Ens _per Accidens_, we proceed to touch
upon the second variety of Ens--Ens as the True, Non-Ens as the
False.
This variety of Ens depends upon conjunction and disjunction, and
forms an aggregate of two portions separately exhibited and brought
together in the Antiphasis. Such conjunction and disjunction is not
in things themselves; but in the act of intelligence which thinks the
two things together and not successively: in regard to simple matters
and Essence, not even any special conjoining act of intelligence is
required; such things must be conceived together, or not conceived at
all (p. 1027, b. 27). The mental act of apprehension, in these cases,
is one and indivisible: you either have it entire at once, or not at
all.
The cause of this variety of Ens is to be found in a certain
affection of the intelligence; that of the preceding variety of Ens
is an undefined or indeterminate cause (b. 34). Both these two
varieties of Ens are peculiar, standing apart from what is most
properly and _par excellence_ Ens, _i.e._, from the Ens according to
the ten Categories, on which we shall now say something.
. . . . . .
Book Z.
We have already stated that Ens is a [Greek: pollachô=s
lego/menon]--distinguished according to the ten figures or genera
called Categories. The first is [Greek: ti/ e)stin], or [Greek:
ou)si/a] (_sensu dignissimo_)--Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15).
The remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing
it, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all
of them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All
the other Categories are called Entia only because they are
quantities, qualities, affections, &c., of this Essentia Prima. A man
may even doubt whether they are Entia or Non-Entia, since none of
them is either _per se_ or separable. We ought hardly to say that a
quality or an affection, enunciated abstractedly, is Ens at all--such
as _currere_, _sedere_, _sanitas_: we ought more properly to say that
_currens equus_, _sedens homo_, _sanus miles_, are Entia, enunciating
along with the quality the definite Essence or Individual Substance
to which it belongs (a. 24). The quality then becomes Ens, because
the subject to which it belongs is an individual Ens (a. 27).
Essentia Prima is first in reason or rational explanation ([Greek:
lo/gô|], a. 34), because in the rational explanation of each of the
rest that of Essentia is implicated. It is first also in cognition,
because we believe ourselves to know any thing fully, when we are
able to answer _Quid est_? and say that it is _homo_ or _ignis_; not
simply when we are able to answer _Quale_ or _Quantum est_? So that
in answering the great and often-considered question, _Quid est Ens_?
we shall first understand it as meaning Essentia (_hoc sensu
dignissimo_), and shall try to solve it so (b. 3, [Greek: peri\ tou=
_ou(/tôs_ o)/ntos]).
Essentia (understood in this sense) appears to belong in the most
manifest manner to bodies: we predicate it of animals, plants, the
parts thereof, the natural bodies such as fire, water, and such like,
as well as the parts and aggregates thereof, such as the heaven and
its parts, the stars, moon, and sun (p. 1028, b. 7-13). But are these
the only Essences, or are there others besides? Or again, is it an
error to call _these_ Essences, and are all Essences really something
different from these? This is a point to be examined. Some think that
the limits of bodies (surface, line, point, monad) are Essences even
more than the body and the solid: others admit no Essences at all
beyond or apart from Percipienda; others again recognize other
Essences distinct from and more eternal than the Percipienda; for
example, Plato, who ranks Ideas or Forms, and the Mathematica, as two
distinct Essences, while he places the Percipienda only third in the
scale of Essence. Speusippus even enumerates a still greater number
of Essences, beginning with the One, and proceeding to Numbers,
Magnitudes, Soul, &c., with a distinct [Greek: a)rchê/] or principle
for each (b. 21). Some others hold that Forms and Numbers have the
same nature, and that there are other things coming near to these,
such as lines and surfaces, in a descending scale to the Heaven and
the Percipienda (b. 24). We must thus investigate which of these
doctrines are true or false, whether there are any Essences beyond
the Percipienda; and, if so, how they exist: whether there is any
separable essence apart from Percipienda, and, if so, how and why; or
whether there is nothing of the kind. But first we must give a vague
outline what Essence is generally ([Greek: u(potupôsame/nois], b.
31).
There are four principal varieties of meaning in this Essentia,
[Greek: kuri/ôs] or _sensu dignissimo_: (1) [Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n
ei)=nai], (2) [Greek: to\ katho/lou], (3) [Greek: to\ ge/nos], (4)
[Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon].
We shall first speak about the fourth--Substratum--which is the
subject of all predicates, but never itself the predicate of any
subject. That which appears most of all to be Essentia is, [Greek:
to\ u(pokei/menon prô=ton]. This name applies, in one point of view,
to Matter; in another, to Form; in a third, to the total result of
the two implicated together (p. 1029, a. 1): _e.g._, the brass, the
figure, and the complete statue of figured brass. If, therefore, the
Form be _prius_, and more Ens, as compared with the Matter, it will
be also _prius_ and more Ens as compared with the complete result. We
get thus far in the adumbration of Essentia--that it is the subject
of all predicates, but never itself a predicate.
But this is not sufficient to define it: there still remains
obscurity. It would seem that Matter is Essentia; and that, if it be
not so, nothing else is discernible to be so; for, if every thing
else be subtracted, nothing (save Matter) remains. All things else
are either affections, or agencies, or powers, of bodies; and, while
length, breadth, depth, &c., are quantities belonging to Essence,
Quantity is not Essence, but something belonging to Essence as First
Subject. Take away length, breadth, depth, and there will remain only
that something which these three circumscribe; in other words,
Matter--that which, in itself and in its own nature, is neither
Quantity, nor Quality, but of which, Quantity, Quality, and the other
Categories, are predicated. All these Categories are predicated of
Essence, and Essence of Matter; so that Matter is the last remaining
_per se_ (p. 1029, a. 12-24). Take away Matter, and there remain
neither affirmative nor negative predicates; for these negative
predicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others
(a. 25).
Upon this reasoning, it seems that Matter is the true Essence. Yet,
on the other hand, this will be seen to be impossible. For the
principal characteristic of Essence is to be separable and Hoc
Aliquid. So that either Form, or the Compound of Form and Matter
together, must be the true Essence. But this last, the Compound, may
be dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry, not less than
Matter separately; for it is manifestly posterior to either of the
two components (p. 1029, a. 30). We must therefore investigate the
Form, though it is full of difficulty (a. 33).
We shall begin the investigation from some of the Percipienda, which
are acknowledged as Essence; for it is useful to go across from this
starting-point to what is more cognizable ([Greek: pro\ e)/rgou ga\r
to\ metabai/nein ei)s to\ gnôrimô/teron]--p. 1029, b. 3. These words
ought properly to come immediately after [Greek: zêtête/on
prô=ton]--p. 1028, a. 35, and the intervening words now standing in
the text, [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)n a)rchê=|--peri\ au)tou=], ought to be
transferred to a more proper place some lines lower down, immediately
before the words, [Greek: kai\ prô=ton ei)/pômen]--p. 1029, b. 12.
Bonitz has made this very just correction in his Observatt. pp.
129-130, referred to in his Notes on the Metaphysica.). Every man
learns in this way--by proceeding from what is less cognizable by
nature to what is more cognizable by nature. And the business ([Greek:
e)/rgon]) of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to
nature, most cognizable to ourselves also; just as, in practical
matters, proceeding from what is good for each, to make what is good
by nature good also for each man's self. For it will often happen
that things first and most cognizable to each man's self, are only
faintly cognizable, and have little or nothing of Ens (b. 9). Yet
still, we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable, by
beginning with things poorly knowable, but knowable to us (b. 12).
Taking up these Percipienda, for the purpose of searching for
Essentia in them, we shall first advert to [Greek: ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai],
which we discriminated as one of the characteristics of Essentia,
saying something about the rational explanation or definition of it
(p. 1029, a. 12). The [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each subject is what is
affirmed of it _per se_ ([Greek: e)/sti to\ t.ê.e. e(ka/stô| o(\
le/getai kath' au(to/]--a. 13). Your essence is not to be musical;
you are not musical by yourself: your essence is, what you are _by
yourself_. Nor does it even include all that you are by yourself.
Surface is not included in the essence of white; for the essence of
surface is not the same thing as the essence of white. Moreover white
surface, the compound of both, is not the essence of white; because
white itself is included in the definition of white--which cannot be
tolerated. The definition, which explains [Greek: t.ê.e.], must not
include the very word of which you intend to declare the [Greek:
t.ê.e.] If you intend to declare the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of white surface
by the words smooth surface, this does not declare it all: you only
declare that white is identical in meaning with smooth (b. 22).
Now, since there are compounds in every one of the Categories, we
must enquire whether there is a [Greek: t.ê.e.] belonging to each of
these. Is there, for example, a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for white man? Let
the meaning of these two words be included in the single word
garment. Is there a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for garment? What is it to be a
garment? You cannot answer; for neither is this an enunciation _per
se_ (p. 1029, b. 29). Are we to say, indeed, that there are two
distinct sorts of enunciation _per se_: one including an addition
([Greek: e)k prosthe/seôs]), the other, not? You may define by
intimating something to which the matter defined belongs; _e.g._, in
defining white you may give the definition of white man. Or you may
define by intimating something which is not essential but accessory
to the matter defined; _e.g._, garment signifying white man, you may
define garment as white. Whereas the truth is, that, though a white
man is white, yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him
(p. 1030, a. 1).
But can we in any way affirm that there is any [Greek: t.ê.e.] to
garment (taken in the above sense)? Or ought we to say that there is
none (p. 1030, a. 2; Bonitz. Obss. p. 120)? For the [Greek: t.ê.e.]
is of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti] ([Greek: o(/per ga\r to/de ti
e)/sti to\ t.ê.e.]--a. 3), or Hoc Aliquid, _i.e._, a particular