Aristotle
concrete; but, when one thing is affirmed of another, as when we say
white man, this is not of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti], if [Greek:
to/de ti] belongs to Essences alone (a. 5). Thus it appears that
[Greek: to/de ti] belongs to all those matters of which the rational
explanation can be given by Definition. For to give the equivalent of
a name in many other words is not always to give a definition: if
this were so, a paraphrase of any length, even the Iliad, might be
called a definition. There can be no definition except of a primary
something; which is affirmed, without being affirmed as something
about another (a. 10). There will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.], therefore,
except for species of a genus; for in these alone what is affirmed is
not an affection or an accessory or by way of participation.
Respecting every thing besides, there will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.] or
definition, but there may be a rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos])
of what the name signifies, or a more precise explanation substituted
in place of a simpler (a. 16).
Yet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of
[Greek: t.ê.e.] and Definition? and ought we not rather to say, that
both the one and the other are used in many different senses (p.
1030, a. 18)? For the _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\ ti/ e)stin]) signifies
in one way Essence and Hoc Aliquid, and in different ways all the
other Categories each respectively. To all of them _Est_ belongs,
though not in like manner, but primarily to one and consequentially
to the rest; so also _Quid est_ belongs simply and directly to
Essence, but in a certain way to the others (a. 21). Respecting
Quale, Quantum, and the rest, we may enquire _Quid Est_? so that
Quale also comes under the _Quid est_, though not absolutely or
directly ([Greek: ou)ch a(plô=s], a. 25), but analogously to Non-Ens;
for some assert in words that _Est_ belongs to Non-Ens also though
not absolutely, viz., Non Ens _est_ Non-Ens--(a. 26).
Now we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any
particular matter, but we ought not to be less careful to determine
how the matter itself really stands (p. 1030, a. 27: [Greek: dei=
me\n ou)=n skopei=n kai\ to\ pô=s dei= le/gein peri\ e(/kaston, ou)
mê\n ma=llo/n ge ê)\ to\ pô=s e)/chei.] This contrast of [Greek: pô=s
dei= le/gein] with [Greek: pô=s e)/chei] appears to refer to what had
been said two lines before: [Greek: _logikô=s_ phasi/ tines ei)=nai
to\ mê\ o)/n]--verbal propositions distinguished from real.). The
phraseology used just before is clear, and we must therefore
recognize that [Greek: t.ê.e.], as well as [Greek: ti/ e)sti],
belongs absolutely and primarily to Essentia, but in a secondary way
to the other Categories; that is not absolutely, but [Greek: poiô=|
t.ê.e., po/sô| t.ê.e.], &c. (a. 31). For we must either declare the
Categories to be simply _æquivoca_, or we must recognize this
addition and subtraction of the separate title of each, like the
non-cognizable cognizable ([Greek: ô(/sper kai\ to\ mê\ e)pistêto\n
e)pistêto/n]--a. 33. I do not understand these words, nor does the
Scholiast or Bonitz explain them satisfactorily.). But the truth is,
that they are neither _æquivoca_ nor _univoca_, but in an
intermediate grade of relation--not [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek:
pro\s e(/n] (b. 3.). People may express this in what phrases they
like; but the truth is, that there is both [Greek: t.ê.e.] and
Definition, directly and primarily, of Essence; and of the other
Categories also, but not directly and primarily. Of white man, you
may give a rational explanation and a definition; but it will apply
in a different manner to white and to the essence of man (b. 12).
There is a farther difficulty to be noticed. How are you to define
any matter not simple but essentially compound, where two or more
elements coalesce into an indivisible whole, like hollow-nosedness
out of nose and hollowness. Here we have hollow-nosedness and
hollowness belonging to the nose _per se_, not as an affection or
accessory; not as white belongs to Kallias or man, but as male
belongs to animal, or equal to quantity, _i.e._, _per se_ (p. 1030,
b. 20). The subject is implicated with the predicate in one name, and
you cannot enunciate the one apart from the other. Such predicates
belong to their subject _per se_, but in a different sense (see
Bonitz's note). You cannot properly define them, in the sense given
above (b. 27). If definitions of such are to be admitted, it must be
in a different sense: Definition and [Greek: t.ê.e.] being recognized
both of them as [Greek: pollachô=s lego/mena]. Definition therefore
is the mode of explanation which declares the [Greek: t.ê.e.], and
belongs to Essences, either exclusively, or at least primarily,
directly, and chiefly (p. 1031, a. 7-14).
We have now to enquire--Whether each particular thing, and its
[Greek: t.ê.e.], are the same, or different (p. 1031, a. 15). This
will assist us in the investigation of Essence; for apparently each
thing is not different from its own Essence, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.]
is said to be the Essence of each thing.
In regard to subjects enunciated _per accidens_, the above two would
seem to be distinct. White man is different from the being a white
man. If these two were the same, the being a man would be the same as
the being a white man; for those who hold this opinion affirm that
man, and white man, are the same; and, if this be so, of course the
being a man must also be the same as the being a white man. Yet this
last inference is not necessary; for _same_ is used in a different
sense, when you say, Man and white man are the same, and when you
say, The being a man and the being a white man are the same. But
perhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same _per
accidens_ (_i.e._, by being truly predicated of the same subject);
and that, because you say truly, Sokrates is white--Sokrates is
musical, therefore you may also say truly, The being white is the
same as the being musical. But this will be denied ([Greek: dokei= d'
ou)/]--p. 1031, a. 28).
In regard to subjects enunciated _per se_, the case is otherwise:
here each thing is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.] Suppose, _e.g._,
there exist any Essentiæ (such as Plato and others make the Ideas)
prior to all others; in that case, if the [Greek: au)toagatho/n] were
distinct from [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai], and the [Greek:
au)tozô=|on] distinct from [Greek: to\ zô/|ô| ei)=nai], there must be
other Essences and Ideas anterior to the Platonic Ideas. If we
believe [Greek: t.ê.e.] to be Essentia, it must be an Essentia
anterior and superior in dignity to these Ideas of Plato. Moreover,
if the Essentiæ or Ideas, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.], be disjoined
([Greek: a)polelume/nai]--p. 1031, b. 3), the first will be
uncognizable, and the last will be non-existent ([Greek: ta\ d' ou)k
e)/stai]--b. 4). For to have cognition of a thing, is, to know its
[Greek: t.ê.e.] This will be alike true of all [Greek: t.ê.e.]; all
of them are alike existent or alike non-existent (b. 9). If [Greek:
to\ o)/nti ei)=nai] be not identical with [Greek: to\ o)/n], neither
is [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] identical with [Greek: to\
a)gatho/n], &c. But that of which [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] is
not truly predicable, is not [Greek: a)gatho/n] (b. 11).
Hence we see that of necessity [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n] is one and the
same with [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai]; likewise [Greek: to\
kalo/n], with [Greek: to\ kalô=| ei)=nai]; and so in all cases where
the term enunciates a subject primarily and _per se_, not a predicate
of some other and distinct subject (p. 1031, b. 13: [Greek: o(/sa mê\
kat' a)/llo le/gêtai, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ kai\ prô=ta]). This last is
the characteristic and sufficient mark, even if the Platonic Ideas be
not admitted; and even more evidently so, if they be admitted (b.
14). It is at the same time clear that, if the Ideas be what Plato
declares them to be, the individual perceivable subjects here cannot
be Essences; for the Ideas are necessarily Essences, but not as
predicable of a subject. If they were Essences, in this last sense,
they would be Essences _per participationem_; which is inconsistent
with what is said about them by Plato ([Greek: e)/sontai ga\r kata\
me/thexin]--b. 18).
These reasonings show that each separate thing, enunciated _per se_
and not _per accidens_, is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that to
know each thing, is, to know its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that, if you
proceed to expose or lay them out, both are one and the same ([Greek:
ô(/ste kata\ tê\n e)/kthesin a)na/gkê e(/n ti ei)=nai a)/mphô]--p.
1031, b. 21; with Bonitz's explanation of [Greek: e)/kthesis] in his
Note).
But that which is enunciated _per accidens_ (_e.g._, _album_,
_musicum_) cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its
[Greek: t.ê.e.], because it has a double signification: it signifies
both the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs; so
that in a certain aspect it is identical with its [Greek: t.ê.e.],
and in another aspect it is not identical therewith (p. 1031, b. 26).
The being a man, and the being a white man, are not the same; but the
subject for affection is the same in both (b. 28: [Greek: ou)
tau)to\, pa/thei de\ tau)to/]--obscure). The absurdity of supposing,
that the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a thing is different from the thing
itself, would appear plainly, if we gave a distinct name to the
[Greek: t.ê.e.] For there must be another [Greek: t.ê.e.] above this,
being the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of the first [Greek: t.ê.e.]; and it would
be necessary to provide a new name for the second [Greek: t.ê.e.];
and so forward, in an ascending march _ad infinitum_. What hinders us
from admitting some things at once, as identical with their [Greek:
t.ê.e.], if the [Greek: t.ê.e.] be Essentia? (b. 31). We see from the
preceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with
its [Greek: t.ê.e.], but that the rational explanation ([Greek:
lo/gos]) of both is the same; for One, and the being One, are one and
the same not _per accidens_, but _per se_ (p. 1032, a. 2). If they
were different, you would have to ascend to a higher [Greek: t.ê.e.]
of the being One; and above this, to a higher still, without end (a.
4).
It is therefore clear that, in matters enunciated _per se_ and
primarily, each individual thing is one and the same with its [Greek:
t.ê.e.] The refutations brought by the Sophists against this
doctrine, and the puzzles which they start, _e.g._, Whether Sokrates
and the being Sokrates are the same,--may be cleared up by the
explanations just offered (p. 1032, a. 8). It makes no difference
what particular questions the objector asks: one is as easy to solve
as another (a. 10).
Of things generated, some come by Nature, some by Art, some
Spontaneously. All generated things are generated out of something,
by something, and into or according to something (p. 1032, a. 12).
The word _something_ applies to each and all the Categories. Natural
generation belongs to all the things whose generation comes from
Nature ([Greek: e)k phu/seôs]); having [Greek: to\ e)x ou(=]--what we
call Matter, [Greek: to\ u(ph' ou(=]--one of the things existing by
nature ([Greek: tô=n phu/sei ti o)/ntôn]--a. 17), and [Greek: to\
ti/], such as a man, a plant, or the like, which we call Essences in
the fullest sense ([Greek: ma/lista ou)si/as]). All things generated
either by Nature or Art have Matter: it is possible that each of them
may be, or may not be; and this is what we call Matter in each (a.
20). As an universal truth ([Greek: katho/lou]), Nature includes (1)
That _out of which_, or Matter; (2) That _according to which_
([Greek: kath' o(/]), every thing which is generated having a