Aristotle
generations, just as in Demonstration it is the beginning or
principle of all syllogisms (a. 33). In the combinations and growths
of Nature, the case is similar. The seed constructs, as Art
constructs its products; for the seed has in it potentially the Form,
and that from which comes the seed is, in a certain manner, of the
same name with the product (b. 1). For we must not expect to find
_all_ generations analogous to that of man from man--woman also is
generated from man, moreover, mule is not generated from mule--though
this is the usual case, when there is no natural bodily defect (b.
3). Spontaneous generation occurs in the department of Nature, as in
that of Art, wherever the Matter can be moved by itself in the same
manner as the seed moves it: wherever the Matter cannot be so moved
by itself, there can be no generation except the natural, from
similar predecessors (b. 7, [Greek: e)x au)tô=n]--compare Bonitz's
note: "non ex ipsis, sed [Greek: e)x au)tô=n tô=n poiou/ntôn]").
This doctrine--That the Form is not generated, does not belong to
Essence alone, but also to all the other Categories alike--Quality,
Quantity, and the rest (p. 1034, b. 9). It is not the Form Quality
_per se_ which is generated, but _tale lignum_, _talis homo_: nor the
Form Quantity _per se_, but _tantum lignum_ or _animal_ (b. 15). But,
in regard to Essence, there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as
compared with the other Categories: in the generation of Essence,
there must pre-exist as generator another _actual_ and _complete_
Essence; in the generation of Quality or Quantity, you need nothing
pre-existing beyond a _potential_ Quality or a _potential_ Quantity
(b. 16).
A difficult question arises in this way: Every definition is a
rational explanation consisting of parts; and, as the parts of the
explanation are to the whole explanation, so are the parts of the
thing explained to the whole thing explained. Now is it necessary or
not, that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in
the rational explanation of the whole (p. 1034, b. 22)? In some cases
it appears to be so; in others, not. The rational explanation of a
circle does not include that of its segments; but the rational
explanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters.
Moreover, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute angle
be a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the man, the
acute angle must be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the
man. Yet the contrary seems to be the truth: the right angle seems
prior, also the man; for the rational explanation of acute angle is
given from right angle, that of finger from man: in respect to
existing without the other, right angle and man seem _priora_. In
fact the word _part_ is equivocal, and it is only one of its meanings
to call it--that which quantitatively measures another (b. 33). But
let us dismiss this consideration, and let us enquire of what it is
that Essence consists, as parts (b. 34). If these are (1) Matter,
(2) Form, (3) The Compound of the two, and if each of these three be
Essence, Matter must be considered, in a certain way, as a part of
something, yet in a certain way as not so; in this latter point of
view, nothing being a part except those elements out of which the
rational explanation of the Form is framed (p. 1035, a. 2). Thus,
flesh is not a part of flatness, being the matter upon which flatness
is generated or superinduced, but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness;
the brass is a part of the entire statue, but not a part of the
statue when enunciated as Form, or of the ideal statue. You may
discriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as Form
(apart from the complete statue); but you cannot so discriminate the
material part _per se_, or the statue considered as Matter only (a.
7). Hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain
that of the segments of the circle; but the rational explanation of
the syllable does contain that of the component letters. The letters
are parts of the Form, and not simply the Matter upon which the Form
is superinduced; but the segments are parts in the sense of being the
Matter upon which the Form of the circle is superinduced (a. 12):
they are, however, nearer to the Form than the brass, when the Form
of a circle or roundness is generated in brass (a. 13). In a certain
way, indeed, it cannot be said that _all_ the letters are contained
in the rational explanation of the syllables; _e.g._, the letters
inscribed in wax are not so contained, nor the sounds of those
letters vibrating in the air; both these are a part of the syllable,
in the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof (a. 17: [Greek:
ô(s u(/lê ai)sthêtê/]). If a man be destroyed by being reduced to
bones, ligaments, and flesh, you cannot for that reason say, that the
man is composed of these as of parts of his Essence, but as parts of
his Matter: they are parts of the entire man, but not of the Form,
nor of what is contained in the rational explanation; accordingly
they do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational
explanation, but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or
concrete subject (a. 23). Hence, in some cases, things are destroyed
into the same _principia_ out of which they are formed; in other
cases, not. To the first class, belong all things which are taken in
conjunction with Matter, such as the flat-nosed or, the brazen
circle; to the second class, those which are taken disjoined from
Matter, with Form only. Objects of the first class, (_i.e._, the
concretes) have thus both _principia_ and parts subordinate; but
neither the one nor the other belong to the Form alone (a. 31). The
plaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster, the brazen circle
into brass, Kallias into flesh and bones; and even the circle, when
understood in a certain sense, into its segments, for the term circle
is used equivocally, sometimes to designate the Form of a circle,
sometimes to designate this or that particular circle--particular
circles having no name peculiar to themselves (b. 3).
That which has been already said is the truth; yet let us try to
recapitulate it in a still clearer manner (p. 1035, b. 4). The parts
of the rational explanation or notion, into which that notion is
divided, are prior to the notion, at least in some instances. But the
notion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one
of the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided;
for you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right
angle into your definition, nor can you define the semicircle without
introducing the circle, nor the finger without introducing the
man--the finger being such and such a part of the man. The parts into
which man is divided as Matter, are posterior to man; those into
which man is divided as parts of his Form or Formal Essence, are
prior to man--at least some of them are so (b. 14). Now, since the
soul of animals (which is the Essence of the animated being--b. 15)
is the Essence and the Form and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a suitably
arranged body; and, since no good definition of any one part can be
given, which does not include the function of that part, and this
cannot be given without the mechanism of sense (b. 18), it follows
that the parts of this soul, or some of them at least, are prior to
the entire animal, alike in the general and in each particular case.
But the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or Form, and
into these, as parts, the entire man (not the Essence or Form) is
divided. These parts are, in a certain sense, prior to the entire
man, and, in a certain sense, not; for they cannot even exist at all
separately (b. 23): the finger is not a finger unless it can perform
its functions, _i.e._, unless it be animated by a central soul; it is
not a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs;
after death, it is merely a finger by equivocation of language. There
are, however, some parts, such, as the brain or heart, to which the
Form or Essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor
posterior but _simul_ to the entire animal (b. 25).
Man, horse, and such like, which are predicated universally of
particular things, are not Essentia; they are compounds of a given
Form and a given Matter (but of that first Matter) which goes to
compose Universals. It is out of the last Matter, which comes lowest
in the series, and is already partially invested with Form, that
Sokrates and other particular beings are constituted (p. 1035, b.
30).
Thus, there are parts of the Form or [Greek: t.ê.e.], parts of the
Matter, and parts of the Compound including both. But it is only the
parts of the Form that are included as parts in the rational
explanation or notion; and this notion belongs to the Universal; for
circle and the being a circle, soul and the being a soul--are one and
the same (p. 1036, a. 2). Of the total compound (this particular
circle), no notion, no definition, can be given: whether it be a
particular circle perceivable by sense, in wood or brass, or merely
conceivable, such as the mathematical figures. Such particular
circles are known only along with actual perception or conception (a.
6. [Greek: Noei=n] here means the equivalent of [Greek: a)phairei=n =
chôri/zein tê=| dianoi/a|]--"die Thätigkeit des Abstrahirens, durch
welche das Mathematische gewonnen wird"--Schwegler ad loc. Comm., p.
101, Pt. II.): when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or
imagination, we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or
not; but we always talk of them and know them by the rational
explanation or definition of the universal circle (a. 7: [Greek:
a)peltho/ntas d' e)k tê=s e)ntelechei/as ou) dê=lon po/tero/n pote/
ei)sin ê)\ ou)k ei)si/n, a)ll' a)ei\ le/gontai kai\ gnôri/zontai tô=|
katho/lou lo/gô|.] I apprehend that Aristotle is here speaking of the
[Greek: ku/klos noêto/s] only, not of the [Greek: ku/klos
ai)sthêto/s] or [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos]. He had before told us
that, when the [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek:
e)ntele/cheia] or [Greek: phthei/retai], it passes into [Greek:
chalko/s]. He can hardly therefore mean to say that, when the [Greek:
chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia], we do not
clearly know whether it exists or not. But respecting the [Greek:
ku/klos noêto/s] or mathematical circle, he might well say that we
did not clearly know whether it existed at all under the
circumstances supposed: if it cease to exist, we cannot say [Greek:
ei)s o(\ phthei/retai]). Matter is unknowable _per se_ ([Greek: kath'
au(tê/n]--a. 9, _i.e._, if altogether without Form). One variety of
Matter is perceivable by sense, as brass, wood, and all moveable
matter; another variety is conceivable, viz., that which exists in
the perceivable variety, but not _quâ_ perceivable--the mathematical
figures ([Greek: noêtê\ de\ ê( e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s u(pa/rchousa
mê\ ê(=| ai)sthêta/, oi(=on ta\ mathêmatika/]--a. 12; _i.e._, making
abstraction of the acts of sense, or of what is seen and felt by
sense, viz., colour by the eye, resistance by the touch; and leaving
behind simply the extension or possibility of motion, which is a
geometrical line).
We have now laid down the true doctrine respecting Whole and Part,
Prius and Posterius. And, if any one asks whether the right angle,
the circle, the animal, is prior or not to the parts into which it is
divided and out of which it is formed, we cannot answer absolutely
either Yes or No. We must add some distinguishing words, specifying
what we assert to be prior, and to what it is prior (p. 1036, a. 19).
If by the soul you mean the Form or Essence of the living animal, by