Aristotle
the circle, the Form of the circle, by the right angle, the Form or
Essence thereof,--then this Form is posterior in regard to the
notional parts of which it is constituted, but prior in regard to the
particular circle or right angle. But, if by soul you meant the
entire concrete animal, by right angle or circle, these two figures
realized in brass or wood, then we must reply that any one of these
is prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted (a.
25).
Another reasonable doubt arises here ([Greek: a)porei=tai d'
ei)ko/tôs]--p. 1036, a. 26) as to which parts belong to the Form
alone, which to the entire Concrete. Unless this be made clear, we
can define nothing; for that which we define is the Universal and the
Form, and, unless we know what parts belong to the Matter and what do
not, the definition of the thing can never be made plain (a. 30).
Now, wherever the Form is seen to be superinduced upon matters
diverse in their own Form, the case presents no difficulty: every one
sees circles in brass, stone, wood, &c., and is well aware that
neither the brass, nor the stone, belongs to the Form or Essence of
the circle, since he easily conceives a circle without either. But,
if a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles, he would
have more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass,
and would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the Form
of circle; although, in point of fact, he would have no more logical
ground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed; for
the brass might still belong only to the Matter of circle (b. 2).
This is the case with the Form of man. It is always seen implicated
with flesh, bones, and such like parts. Are these parts of the Form
of man? Or are they not rather parts of the Matter, though we are
unable to conceive the Form apart from them, because we never see it
in conjunction with any other Matter? This is at least a possibility,
and we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted. Some
theorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther, and
apply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle. These theorists
contend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by
figure, lines, continuity, &c., which (they affirm) are only parts of
the Matter of circle and triangle; as flesh and bones are parts of
the Matter of man. They refer all of them to numbers as the Form, and
they affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of
a line (b. 12). Among the partisans of Ideas, some call the dyad
[Greek: au)togrammê/] others call it the Form of a line; saying that
in some cases the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same,
as the dyad and the Form of the dyad, but that this is not true about
line. (These two opinions seem to be substantially the same, and only
to differ in the phrase. [Greek: Au)togrammê/] means the same as
[Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s]: it seems to have been a peculiar
phrase adopted by some Platonists, but not by all. Others preferred
to say [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s].) These reasonings have
already misled the Pythagoreans, and are likely to mislead others
also: they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same
Form in many cases where the Form is manifestly different: they lead
us even to assume one single Form universally, reducing every thing
besides to be no Form, but merely Matter to that one single real
Form. By such reasoning, we should be forced to consider all things
as One (b. 20), which would be obviously absurd.
We see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the
theory of Definition, and how such difficulties arise. It is because
some persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing
and in abstracting altogether from Matter; for some things include
Matter along with the Form, or determined in a certain way, _i.e._,
this along with that, or these things in this condition (p, 1036, b.
22). The comparison which the younger Sokrates was accustomed to make
about the animal is a mistaken one (b. 24): it implies that man may
be without his material parts, as the circle may exist without brass.
But this analogy will not hold; animal is something perceivable by
sense and cannot be defined without motion; of course, therefore, not
without bodily members organized in a certain way (b. 30). The hand
is not a part of man, when it is in any supposable condition, but
only when it can perform its functions, that is, when it is animated;
when not animated, it is not a part (b. 32). Clearly the soul is the
first Essence or Form, the body is Matter, and man or animal is the
compound of both as an Universal; while Sokrates, Koriskus &c., are
as particulars to this Universal, whether you choose to take Sokrates
as soul without body, or as soul with body (p. 1037, a. 5-10: these
words are very obscure).
Respecting Mathematical Entia, why are not the notions of the
**parts parts of the notion of the whole? _e.g._, why is not the
notion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle? Perhaps it
will be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable
by sense: but this after all makes no difference; for some things
even not perceivable by sense involve Matter along with them, and
indeed Matter is involved in every thing which is not [Greek: t.ê.e.]
and Form [Greek: au)to\ kath' au(to/]. The semi-circles are not
included as parts of the notion of the universal circle; but they are
parts of each particular circle: for there is one Matter perceivable
and another cogitable (p. 1036, a. 34.--Bonitz remarks that these
words from p. 1036, a. 22 to p. 1037, a. 5, are out of their proper
place). Whether there be any other Matter, besides the Matter of
these Mathematical Entia, and whether we are to seek a distinct Form
and Essence for them--such as numbers, must be reserved for future
enquiry. This has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters
about perceivable Essences; for these last properly belong to the
province of Second Philosophy--of the physical theorist ([Greek: tê=s
phusikê=s kai\ deute/ras philosophi/as e)/rgon]--p. 1037, a. 15). The
physical philosopher studies not merely the Matter, but the Form or
notional Essence even more (a. 17).
We are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the
Analytica (Anal. Poster. II. p. 92, a. 27; also, De Interp. v. p. 17,
a. 13), but not completed, respecting Definition. How is it that the
definition is One? We define man _animal bipes_: How is it that this
is One and not Many? Man and white are two, when the latter does not
belong to the former: when it does so belong to and affects the
former, the two are One--white man (p. 1037, b. 16): that is, they
are One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos]. But the parts included in the
definition are not One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos], nor are they one
[Greek: kata\ me/thexin]; for the Genus cannot be said to partake of
the Differentiæ. If it did, it would at one and the same time partake
of Opposita, for the Differentiæ are Opposita to each other. And,
even if we say that the Genus does partake of the Differentiæ, the
same difficulty recurs, when the Differentiæ are numerous. The Genus
must partake alike and equally of all of them; but how is it that all
of them are One, and not Many? It cannot be meant that all of them
belong essentially to the thing; for, if that were so, all would be
included in the definition, which they are not. We want to know why
or how those Differentiæ which are included in the definition
coalesce into One, without the rest: for we call the _definiend_
[Greek: e(/n ti kai\ to/de ti] (b. 27).
In answering this question, we take, as a specimen, a definition
which arises out of the logical subdivision of a Genus (p. 1037, b.
28). Definition is given by assigning the Genus and Difference: the
Genus is the Matter, the Difference is the Form or Essence; the two
coalesce into one as Form and Matter. In the definition of
man--_animal bipes_--_animal_ is the Matter and _bipes_ the Form; so
that the two coalescing form an essential One. It does not signify
through how many stages the logical subdivision is carried, provided
it be well done; that is, provided each stage be a special and
appropriate division of all that has preceded. If this condition be
complied with, the last differentia will include all the preceding,
and will itself be the Form of which the genus serves as Matter. You
divide the genus animal first into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun--zô=|on
a)pou=n]; you next divide [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] into [Greek:
zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun--zô=|on u(po/poun polu/poun]; or perhaps
into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun schizo/pun--zô=|on u(po/poun
a)/schiston]. It is essential that the next subdivision applied to
[Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] should be founded upon some subordinate
differentia specially applying to the feet (p. 1038, a. 14: [Greek:
au(=tai ga\r diaphorai\ podo/s; ê( ga\r schizopodi/a podo/tês tis]).
If it does not specially apply to the feet, but takes in some new
attribute (_e. g._, [Greek: pterôto/n, a)/pteron]), the division will
be unphilosophical. The last differentia [Greek: zô=|on di/poun]
includes the preceding differentia [Greek: u(po/poun]: to say [Greek:
zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun] would be tautology. Where each differentia
is a differentia of the preceding differentiæ, the last differentia
includes them all and is itself the Form and Essence, along with the
genus as Matter (a. 25). The definition is the rational explanation
arising out of these differences, and by specifying the last it
virtually includes all the preceding (a. 29: [Greek: o( o(rismo\s
lo/gos e)sti\n o( e)k tô=n diaphorô=n, kai\ tou/tôn tê=s teleutai/as
kata/ ge to\ o)rtho/n]).
In the constituents of the Essence, there is no distinctive order of
parts; no subordination of _prius_ and _posterius_; all are equally
essential and coordinate ([Greek: ta/xis d' ou)k e)/stin e)n tê=|
ou)si/a|]--p. 1038, a. 33).
As we are treating now about Essence, it will be convenient to go
back to the point from which we departed, when we enumerated the four
varieties recognized by different philosophers. These were (1) The
Subject--Substratum--Matter, which is a subject of predicates in two
different ways: either as already an Hoc Aliquid and affected by
various accidents, or as not yet an Hoc Aliquid, but simply Matter
implicated with Entelechy (p. 1038, b. 6); (2) Form--Essence--the
[Greek: t.ê.e.]; (3) The Compound or Product of the preceding two;
(4) The Universal ([Greek: to\ katho/lou]). Of these four, we have
already examined the first three; we now proceed to the fourth.
Some philosophers consider the Universal to be primarily and
eminently Cause and Principle (p. 1038, b. 7). But it seems
impossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be
Essence. For that is the First Essence of each thing which belongs to
nothing but itself; but the Universal is by its nature common to many
things. Of which among these things is it the Essence? Either of all
or of no one. Not of all certainly; and, if it be the Essence of any
one, the rest of them will be identical with that one; for, where the
Essence is one, the things themselves are one (b. 15). Besides, the
Essence is that which is not predicated of any subject: but the
Universal is always predicated of a subject.
Perhaps, however, we shall be told, that the Universal is not
identical with [Greek: t.ê.e.], but is Essence which is immanent in
or belongs to [Greek: t.ê.e.], as animal in man and horse. But this
cannot be admitted. For, whether we suppose animal to be definable or
not, if it be essence of any thing, it must be the essence of
something to which it belongs peculiarly, as _homo_ is the essence of