Aristotle
cannot be sure of interpreting rightly. None of the commentators are
perfectly satisfactory. The pronoun [Greek: e)kei=no] seems to refer
to [Greek: ê( no/êsis ê( kath' au(tê/n]--three lines back. The
contrast seems to be between the Prime Movent, and Noûs in general,
including the human Noûs. [Greek: To\ dektiko/n] cannot refer to the
Prime Movent, which has no potentiality, but must refer to the human
Noûs, which is not at first, nor always, in a state of actuality.
[Greek: Ma=llon] seems equivalent to [Greek: theio/teron]. The human
Noûs has [Greek: thei=o/n ti], by reason of its potentiality to
theorize.).
Thus it is wonderful, if God has perpetually an existence like that
of our best moments; and still more wonderful, if he has a better.
Yet such is the fact. Life belongs to him: for the actuality of Noûs
is life, and God is actuality. His life, eternal and best, is
actuality _per se_ (or _par excellence_). We declare God to be an
Animal Optimum Æternum, so that duration eternal and continuous
([Greek: ai)ô\n sunechê/s]) belongs to him: for _that_ is God
([Greek: tou=to ga\r o( theo/s]--p. 1072, b. 30).
The Pythagoreans and Speusippus are mistaken in affirming that
Optimum and Pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating
principle ([Greek: e)n a)rchê=|]); on the ground that the principles
of plants and animals are indeed causes, but that the beautiful and
perfect appears first in the results of those principles. For the
seed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals: the first is
not seed, but the perfect animal. Thus we must say that the man is
prior to the seed: I do not mean the man who sprang from the seed,
but the other man from whom the seed proceeded (p. 1073, a. 2).
From the preceding reasonings, it is evident that there exists an
Essence eternal, immoveable, and separated from all the perceivable
Essences. We have shown (in Physica; see Schwegler's note) that this
Essence can have no magnitude; that it is without parts and
indivisible (p, 1073, a. 6). For it causes in other subjects motion
for an infinite time; and nothing finite can have infinite power. For
this reason the Prime Movent cannot have finite magnitude; but every
magnitude is either finite or infinite, and there is no such thing as
infinite magnitude; therefore the Prime Movent can have no magnitude
at all. We have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality, and
without any affections ([Greek: a)pathe\s kai\ a)nalloi/ôton]). For
all other varieties of change are posterior as compared with
locomotive change or motion in space, which is the first of all. As
the Prime Movent is exempt from this first, much more is it exempt
from the others (a. 13).
We must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such Movent or
Essence only, or several of the same Essences? and, if several, how
many? Respecting the number thereof we must remember that our
predecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines ([Greek:
a)popha/seis], p. 1073, a. 16). The Platonic theory of Ideas includes
no peculiar research on this subject (a. 18). The Platonists call
these Ideas Numbers: about which they talk sometimes as if there were
an infinite multitude of them, sometimes as if they were fixed as
reaching to the dekad and not higher--but they furnish no
demonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad. We shall
proceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding
definitions and with the nature of the subjects (a. 23). The
Principium, the First of all Entia, is immoveable both _per se_ and
_per accidens_: it causes motion in another subject, to which it
imparts the first or locomotive change, one and eternal (a. 25). The
Motum must necessarily be moved by something; the Prime Movent must
be immoveable _per se_; eternal motion must be caused by an eternal
Movent; and one motion by one Movent (a. 30). But we see that, over
and above the simple rotation of the All (or First Heaven), which
rotation we affirm to be caused by the Primum Movens Immobile, there
are also other eternal rotations of the Planets; for the circular
Celestial Body, as we have shown in the Physica, is eternal and never
at rest (a. 32). We must therefore necessarily assume that each of
these rotations of the Planets is caused by a Movent Immoveable _per
se_--by an eternal Essence (a. 35). For the Stars and Planets are in
their nature eternal Essences: that which moves them must be itself
eternal, and prior to that which it causes to be moved; likewise that
which, is prior to Essence must itself be Essence, and cannot be any
thing else (a. 37). It is plain, therefore, that there must
necessarily exist a number of Essences, each eternal by nature,
immoveable _per se_, and without magnitude, as Movents to the
Heavenly Bodies and equal in number thereto (a. 38). These Essences
are arranged in an order of first, second, &c., corresponding to the
order of the planetary rotations (b. 2), But what the number of these
rotations is, we must learn from Astronomy--that one among the
mathematical sciences which is most akin ([Greek: oi)keiota/tês]) to
the First Philosophy; for Astronomy theorizes about Essence
perceivable but eternal, while Arithmetic and Geometry do not treat
of any Essence at all ([Greek: peri\ ou)demia=s ou)si/as]--b. 7).
That the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies, is
known to all who have any tincture of Astronomy; for each of the
Planets is carried round in more than one rotation (b. 10). But what
the exact number of these rotations is, we shall proceed to state
upon the authority of some mathematicians, for the sake of
instruction, that the reader may have some definite number present to
his mind: for the rest, he must both investigate for himself and put
questions to other investigators; and, if he learns from the
scientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down, he
must love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most
accurately ([Greek: philei=n me\n a)mphote/rous, pei/thesthai de\
toi=s a)kribeste/rois]--b. 16).
Aristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the
planetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling ([Greek:
a)nelittou/sas]) spheres implicated with them (p. 1073, b. 17--p.
1074, a. 14). He afterwards proceeds: Let the number of spheres thus
be forty-seven; so that it will be reasonable to assume the
Immoveable Movent Essences and Principles to be forty-seven also, as
well as the perceivable spheres ([Greek: ai)sthêta/s]--p. 1074, a.
16): we say _reasonable_ ([Greek: eu)/logon]), for we shall leave to
stronger heads to declare it necessary. But, since there cannot be
any rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the
Planets, and since we must assume that each Nature and each Essence
is exempt from extraneous affection and possessed _per se_ of the
Best as an end, so there will be no other Nature besides the
forty-seven above enumerated, and this number will be the _necessary_
total of the Essences (a. 21). For, if there were any others, they
would cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire
to ([Greek: kinoi=en a)\n ô(s te/los ou)=sai phora=s]--a. 23); but it
is impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that
have been enumerated.
We may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in
rotation ([Greek: e)k tô=n pherome/nôn]--p. 1074, a. 24). For, if
every carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried, and
if every current or rotation is a current of something carried, there
can exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of
some other current. Every current must exist for the sake of the
Planets, and with a view to their rotation. For, if one current
existed for the sake of another, this last must exist for the sake of
a third, and so on; but you cannot go on in this way _ad infinitum_;
and therefore the end of every current must be, one or other of the
Divine Bodies which are carried round in the heavens (a. 31).
That there is only one Heaven, we may plainly see. For, if there were
many heavens, as there are many men, the principium of each would be
one _in specie_, though the principia would be many _in numero_ (p.
1074, a. 33). But all things that are many in number, have Matter,
and are many, by reason of their Matter; for to all these many, there
is one and the same Form ([Greek: lo/gos])--definition or rational
explanation: _e.g._, one for all men, among whom Sokrates is one (a.
35). But the First Essence has no Matter; for it is an Actual
([Greek: to\ de\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai ou)k e)/chei u(/lên to\ prô=ton;
e)ntele/cheia **ga/r]--a. 36). The Primum Movens Immobile is
therefore One, both in definition and in number; accordingly, the
Motum--that which is moved both eternally and continuously--is One
also. There exists therefore only one Heaven (p. 1074, a. 38).
Now it has been handed down in a mythical way, from the old and most
ancient teachers (p. 1074, b. 1) to their successors, that these
(Eternal Essences) are gods, and that the divine element comprehends
all nature ([Greek: o(/ti theoi/ te/ ei)sin ou(=toi kai\ perie/chei
to\ thei=on tê\n o(/lên phu/sin]--b. 3). The other accompaniments of
the received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the
multitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest
(b. 4); wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to
some other animals, combined with other similar accompaniments. If a
man, abstracting from these stories, accepts only the first and
fundamental truth--That they conceived the First Essences as gods, he
will consider it as a divine doctrine ([Greek: thei/ôs a)\n
ei)rê=sthai nomi/seien]--b. 9), preserved and handed down as
fragments of truth from the most ancient times. For probably all art
and philosophy and truth have been many times discovered, lost, and
rediscovered. To this point alone, and thus far, the opinion of our
fathers and of the first men is evident to us (b. 14).
There are however various difficulties connected with the Noûs; for
it would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects,
and yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such (p.
1074, b. 17). For, if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of
slumber and inaction, what ground can there be for respecting it
([Greek: ti/ a)\n ei)/ê to\ semno/n]--b. 18)? And, if it cogitates
something actually, yet if this process depends upon something
foreign and independent (_i.e._, upon the Cogitatum), the Noûs cannot
be the best Essence; since it is then essentially not Cogitation in
act, but only the potentiality of Cogitation; while its title to
respect arises from actual Cogitation. Again, whether we assume its
Essence to be Cogitation actual or Cogitation potential, _what_ does
it cogitate? It must cogitate either itself, or something different
from itself; and, if the latter, either always the same Cogitatum, or
sometimes one, sometimes another. But is there no difference whether
its Cogitatum is honourable or vulgar? Are there not some things
which it is absurd to cogitate? Evidently the Noûs must cogitate what
is most divine and most honourable, without any change; for, if it
did change, it must change for the worse, and that very change would
at once ([Greek: ê)/dê]) be a certain motion; whereas the Noûs is
essentially immoveable (b. 27). First of all, if the Essence of the
Noûs be, not Cogitation actual but Cogitation potential, we may
reasonably conceive that the perpetuity of Cogitation would be
fatiguing to it (b. 29); next, we see plainly that there must exist
something else more honourable than the Noûs; namely, the Cogitatum;
for to cogitate, and the act of cogitation, will belong even to one