Aristotle
and destroyed in perpetual alternation. Now to affirm that it is
generated and yet that it is eternal, is an impossibility: we cannot
reasonably affirm any thing, except what we see to happen with all
things or with most things; and, in the case before us, what happens
is the very reverse of the foregoing affirmation, for all things
generated are seen to be destroyed. Again that which has no beginning
of being as it is now--that which cannot possibly have been otherwise
previously throughout the whole Æon--can never by any possibility
change; for, if it could ever change, there must exist some cause,
which, if it had existed before, would have compelled what is assumed
to be incapable of being otherwise, to be otherwise. To those who say
that the Kosmos has come together from materials previously existing
in another condition, we may reply**: If these materials were always
in this prior condition and incapable of any other, the Kosmos would
never have been generated at all; and, if it _has_ been generated, we
may be sure that the antecedent materials must have been capable of
coming into another condition, and were not under a necessity to
remain always in the same condition; so that aggregations once
existing were dissolved, and disgregations brought into combination,
many times over before the present Kosmos; at least they possibly may
have been so: and this is enough to prove that the Kosmos is not
indestructible (ss. 1-3).
Among those who maintain the Kosmos to have been generated yet to be
indestructible, there are some who defend themselves in the following
manner. They tell us that the generation of which they speak is not
meant to be affirmed as a real past fact, but is a mere explanatory
or illustrative fiction, like the generation of a geometrical figure,
introduced to facilitate the understanding by pupils. But such an
analogy cannot be admitted. For in geometry the conclusions are just
the same, if we suppose all the figures existing simultaneously; but
it is not so with the demonstrations which they tender about the
generation of the Cosmos, where the antecedent condition and the
consequent condition are the reverse of each other. Out of disorder
(they tell us) things came into order: these two conditions cannot be
simultaneous; generation must be a real fact, and distinction of time
comparing the one condition with the other; whereas in geometrical
figures no distinction of time is required (ss. 4-6).
To assume alternate generation and dissolution, over and over again,
is in fact to represent the Kosmos as eternal, but as changing its
form; as if you should suppose the same person to pass from boyhood
to manhood and then back again from manhood to boyhood--calling that
by the name of generation and destruction. For, if the elements come
together, the aggregation resulting will not be accidental and
variable but always the same, especially upon the assumptions of
these philosophers. So that, if the whole Kosmos, remaining
continuous, is sometimes arranged in one way, sometimes in another,
it is these arrangements which are generated and destroyed, not the
Kosmos itself (ss. 7, 8).
Total generation, and total destruction without any renovation, of
Kosmos might be possible, if there were an infinity of Kosmi, but
cannot be possible with only one; for anterior to the moment of
generation there existed the antecedent condition, which, never
having been generated, could not be destroyed (s. 9).
There are some who think (with Plato in Timæus) that the
non-generable may yet be destroyed, and that the generated may be
indestructible. We have combated this opinion on physical grounds,
respecting the Heaven specially. We shall now treat the subject upon
universal reasonings (_i.e._, belonging to Logic or
Metaphysics--[Greek: pro\s ou(\s phusikô=s me\n peri\ tou= ou)ra/nou
mo/non ei)/rêtai; katho/lou de\ peri\ a(/pantos skepsame/nois,
e)/stai kai\ peri\ tou/tou dê=lon]--s. 10).
CH. 11.--In this reasoning, the first step is to point out that
Generable and Non-Generable, Destructible or Indestructible, are
words used in many different senses, which must be discriminated
([Greek: pollachô=s lego/mena]). If a man uses these words in an
affirmative proposition without such discrimination, his affirmation
is indeterminate; you cannot tell in which of their many different
senses he intends to affirm. Non-Generable means: (1) That which now
is, having previously not been, even though without either generation
or change, as, to touch or to be moved; for, according to some
persons, touching or being moved are not cases of generation; you
cannot become touching, or become moved; you are moved, or you are
not moved; you touch, or you do not touch ([Greek: ou) ga\r ei)=nai
gi/nesthai/ phasin a(pto/menon, ou)de\ kinou/menon.] He means, I
presume, that to touch, and to be moved, are instantaneous acts,
though how they can be said to occur [Greek: a)/neu metabolê=s], I
do not see.). It means: (2) That which, though capable of coming to
pass or of having come to pass ([Greek: e)ndecho/menon gi/nesthai
ê)\ gene/sthai]), nevertheless is not; for this too is
non-generable, since it might have come to be. Again, it means:
(3) That which cannot by possibility sometimes exist, sometimes not
exist. Impossible has two meanings: (1) That of which you cannot
truly say that it might be generated ([Greek: o(/ti ge/noit' a)/n]);
(2) That which cannot be generated easily, or quickly, or well
([Greek: kalô=s]). So also the Generable ([Greek: to\ gennêto/n])
means: (1) That which, not existing previously, afterwards exists
at one time and not at another, whether generated or not (he seems
here to point to [Greek: to\ a(/ptesthai] or [Greek: to\
kinei=sthai]); (2) The possible, whether it be the strictly possible,
or the easily possible; (3) That of which there is generation out of
the nonexistent into existence, whether it now does actually exist,
or may exist hereafter. The Destructible and Indestructible ([Greek:
phtharto\n kai\ a)/phtharton]) have similar differences of meaning
(ss. 1-6).
If we say that a man can raise a weight of 100 pounds, or march 100
stadia, we speak always with reference to a certain extreme, meaning
to imply that he can also raise a weight of 50, 40, 30 pounds, and
that he can also walk 50, 40, 30 stadia. If we say that he cannot
raise a weight of 100 pounds, we mean to imply, _à fortiori_, that he
cannot raise a weight of 110 pounds. In regard to sight and hearing,
the case is opposite; he who can see a small object, can certainly
see a large one; he who can hear a faint sound, can certainly hear a
loud one. But he who can see a large object, is not necessarily able
to see a small one; he who can hear a loud sound, is not necessarily
able to hear a faint one. In sight and hearing, superior power is
indicated by the less including the greater; in motion, by the
greater including the less (ss. 7-8).
CH. 12.--If there are some things capable both of existence and of
nonexistence, we must define on which falls the major portion of
time; for, if we cannot in either case define the time, and can only
say that it is greater than any assumed length of time and never less
than any assumed length,--the same thing will be capable both of
existence and of non-existence for an infinite time; which is an
impossibility. We must take our departure from this principle:
Impossibility is one thing, Falsehood another. Both the impossible
and the false are, however, either conditional (as when it is said to
be impossible that the triangle should have its three angles equal to
two right angles, if such and such things are granted, and that the
diameter should be commensurate with the periphery, if such and such
positions were true), or absolute. But there are matters absolutely
false, which are not absolutely impossible. When you are standing, I
affirm that you are sitting: this is absolutely false, but not
absolutely impossible. On the other hand, if I affirm that you are at
the same time sitting and standing, or that the diameter is
commensurable with the periphery, the proposition is not merely
absolutely false, but absolutely impossible. An assumption simply
false is not the same thing as an assumption absolutely impossible:
from an impossible assumption there follow other impossibilities. The
power of sitting or standing means that you can do either one at any
given time--one at one time, the other at another; but not that you
can do both at the same time. But, if any thing has throughout an
infinite time the power of doing more things than one, it must have
the power of doing more things than one at the same time; for this
infinite time comprehends its whole existence. Accordingly, if any
thing existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible,
this means that it has the possibility not to exist. This being a
possibility, let us imagine it realized: then the thing in question
will both exist actually for an infinite time and yet not exist;
which is a consequence not only false, but impossible, and thus
proves the premiss assumed to be impossible (_i.e._, that a thing
existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible). We thus
see that what exists always is absolutely indestructible (ss. 1-3).
It is also ungenerable; for, if generable, there will be a
possibility that at some time or other it did not exist. That is
generable, which may possibly have not existed at some anterior time,
finite or infinite: so that, if [Greek: to\ a)ei\ o)/n] cannot
possibly not exist, it cannot be generable. Now that which is always
possible to exist, has, for its correlate negative ([Greek:
a)po/phasis]), that which is not always possible to exist; and that
which is always possible not to exist, has, for its contrary, that
which is not always possible not to exist. These two negatives must
of necessity be true of the same subject: there must be something of
which we may truly say--It has no possibility always to exist--It has
no possibility always not to exist. This therefore is something
intermediate between that which always exists, and that which always
exists not, viz., That which may exist and may not exist ([Greek:
kai\ ei)=nai me/son tou= a)ei\ o)/ntos kai\ tou= a)ei\ mê\ o)/ntos,
to\ duna/menon ei)=nai kai\ mê\ ei)=nai]); for both the negative
predicates will find application, if it do not exist always. The
possible to exist, and the possible not to exist, must therefore be
the same thing--a mean between the two above-mentioned extremes (ss.
4, 5).
After a long metaphysical deduction, occupying from sections 6 to 17,
Aristotle proceeds as follows.
We may also discern in the following manner that nothing which has
been once generated, can continue indestructible; nothing which is
ungenerable and which always existed heretofore, can ever be
destroyed. For it is impossible that any thing which arises
spontaneously ([Greek: a)po\ tou= au)toma/tou]) can be either
indestructible or ungenerable. The Spontaneous, and the Casual
([Greek: to\ a)po\ tê=s tu/chês]), are in antithesis to the always
or the most frequently Ens or Fiens ([Greek: para\ to\ a)ei\ kai\ to\
ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ ê)\ o)\n ê)\ gino/menon]--s. 18); but that
which has existed for an infinite or a very long tine, must belong to
this last category. Accordingly, such things must by nature sometimes
exist, sometimes not exist. In them, both sides of the contradiction
are alike true, owing to the matter of which they are composed: they
exist, and they do not exist. But you cannot say with truth now that
the thing exists last year; nor could you say last year that it
exists now. Having once been non-existent, it cannot be eternal for
future time; for it will still possess in future time the possibility