Aristotle
of non-existence, yet not the power of non-existing at the moment
when it does exist, nor with reference to last year and to past time;
there being no power bearing upon past time, but only on present and
future time. (Sections 21 and 22 are hardly intelligible to me.)
On physical grounds also it appears impossible that what is eternal
in the past should be destroyed afterwards, or that what did not
exist at some former time should afterwards be eternal. Those things
which are destructible, are all of them generable and changeable
([Greek: gennêta\ kai\ a)lloiôta\ pa/nta]). Those things which
exist by nature, are changed by their opposites and by their
component materials, and are destroyed by the same agencies (s. 23).
. . . . . .
Book II.
CH. 1.--The Heaven has not been generated nor can it be destroyed, as
some (Plato) affirm: it is one and eternal, having neither beginning
nor end of the whole Æon, holding and comprehending in itself
infinite time. This we may believe not merely from the foregoing
reasonings, but also from the opinion of opponents who suppose the
Cosmos to be generated. For, since their opinion has been shown to be
inadmissible, and our doctrine is at least admissible, even thus much
will have great force to determine our faith in the immortality and
eternity of the Heaven. Hence we shall do well to assist in
persuading ourselves that the ancient doctrines, and especially those
of our own country, are true--That there is among the substances
endowed with motion one immortal and divine, whose motion is such
that it has itself no limit but is rather itself the limit of all
other motions, limit being the attribute of the circumscribing
substance. The circular motion of the Heaven, being itself perfect,
circumscribes and comprehends all the imperfect motions which are
subject to limit and cessation. It has itself neither beginning nor
end, but is unceasing throughout infinite time: in regard to other
motions, it is the initiatory cause to some, while it is the
recipient of the cessation of others (ss. 1, 2).
The ancients assigned Heaven to the Gods, as the only place which was
immortal, and our reasonings show that it is not merely
indestructible and ungenerable, but also unsusceptible of all mortal
defect or discomfort. Moreover it feels no fatigue, because it is not
constrained by any extraneous force to revolve contrary to its own
nature: if it were so, that would be tiresome, and all the more since
the motion is eternal; it would be inconsistent with any supremely
good condition. The ancients therefore were mistaken in saying that
the Heaven required to be supported by a person named Atlas: the
authors of this fable proceeded upon the same supposition as recent
philosophers; regarding the celestial body as heavy and earthy, they
placed under it, in mythical guise, an animated necessity ([Greek:
a)na/gkên e)/mpsuchon]), or constraint arising from vital force. But
they are wrong; and so is Empedokles, when he says that the Heaven is
kept permanently in its place by extreme velocity of rotation, which
counteracts its natural inclination downwards ([Greek: oi)kei/as
r(opê=s]). Nor can we reasonably suppose that it is kept eternally
in its place (_i.e._, contrary to its own nature) by the compulsion
of a soul or vital force ([Greek: u(po\ psuchê=s a)nagkazou/sês]):
it is impossible that the life of a soul thus acting can be painless
or happy. The motion which it causes, being accompanied with violence
and being also perpetual (as it is the nature of the First Body to
cause motion continuously throughout the Kosmos), must be a tiresome
duty, unrelieved by any reasonable relaxation; since this soul enjoys
no repose, such as the letting down of the body during sleep affords
to the soul of mortal animals, but is subjected to a fate like
Ixion's--ceaseless and unyielding revolution. Now our reasonings, if
admissible, respecting the First or Circular Motion ([Greek:
prô/tês phora=s]) afford not merely more harmonious conceptions
respecting its eternity, but also the only way of speaking in
language which will be allowed as consistent with the vague
impressions respecting the Deity ([Greek: tê=| mantei/a| tê=| peri\
to\n theo/n]). Enough, however, of this talk for the present
(ss. 3-6).
CH. 2.--Since the Pythagoreans and others recognize a Right and Left
in the Heaven, let us enquire whether such [Greek: a)rchai/] can
properly be ascribed to the body of the Universe; for, if these can
be ascribed, much more may the other [Greek: a)rchai/] prior to them
be ascribed to it. Of [Greek: a)rchai/ kinê/seôs] (_termini a
quibus_), there are three couples: (1) Upwards and Downwards;
(2) Forward and Backward; (3) Right and Left. All the three exist in
animals; but the first alone is found in plants. All the three are in
all perfect bodies, and in all animated bodies which have in
themselves a beginning of motion; but not in inanimate bodies, which
have not in themselves a beginning. Each of these three [Greek:
a)rchai/] or [Greek: diasta/seis] is true and appropriate as an
attribute; but among the three, Upwards and Downwards comes first in
the order of nature, Right and Left, last. The Pythagoreans are to be
blamed for dwelling on Right and Left, and not noticing the other two
pairs which are prior in the order of nature and more appropriate,
and for supposing that Right and Left are to be found in every thing.
Upward is the principle of length; Right, of breadth; Forward, of
depth. Again, from upward movement comes growth; movement from the
right is local movement; movement from before is movement of sense
([Greek: ê( kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin]), or the line in which
sensible impressions are propagated ([Greek: e)ph' ô(=|
ai)sthê/seis]). Up is the source from whence motion originates
([Greek: to\ o(/then ê( ki/nêsis]--s. 6); Right, the point from
which the direction of the motion starts; Forward, the point towards
which it goes ([Greek: to\ e)ph' o(/]). In inanimate bodies (which
are either not moved at all, or only moved in one manner and
direction, as fire only upwards, earth only downwards), we speak of
above and below, right and left, only with reference to ourselves,
and not as attributes really belonging to these objects; for by
inverting the objects these attributes will be inverted also, right
will become left, and left will become right. But in animated
objects, which have in themselves an [Greek: a)rchê\ kinê/seôs], a
real right and left, a real upward and downward, are to be
recognized: of course therefore in the Heaven, which is an animated
object of this character ([Greek: e)/mpsuchos]). For we must not make
any difficulty in consequence of the spherical figure of the
universe, or suppose that such a figure excludes real right and left,
the parts being all alike and all in perpetual motion. We must
conceive the case as like that of a person having a real right and
left, distinct in attributes, but who has been enclosed in a hollow
sphere: he will still have the real distinct right and left, yet to a
spectator outside he will appear not to have it. In like manner, we
must speak of the Heaven as having a beginning of motion; for, though
its motion never did begin, yet there must be some point from which
it would have taken its departure, if it ever had begun, and from
which it would recommence, if it ever came to a standstill. I call
the length of the Heaven, the distance between the poles--one of the
poles above, the other below. Now the pole which is above us, is the
lower pole; that which is invisible to us, is the upper pole. For
that is called right, in each object, from whence local movement
takes its departure, or where local movement begins. But the
revolution of the Heaven begins on the side where the stars rise;
this, therefore, is the true right, and the side on which they set,
is left. If, therefore, it begins from the right, and revolves round
to the right ([Greek: e)pi\ ta\ de/xia periphe/retai]), the invisible
pole must be the upper pole; for, if the visible pole were the upper,
the movement of the Heaven would be to the left, which we deny to be
the fact. The invisible pole is therefore the upper, and those who
live near it are in the upper hemisphere, and to the right ([Greek:
pro\s toi=s dexi/ois]); we on the contrary are in the lower
hemisphere, and to the left. The Pythagoreans are in error when they
say that we are in the upper hemisphere, and to the right, and that
inhabitants of the southern hemisphere are in the lower hemisphere
and to the left. But, speaking with reference to the second
revolution ([Greek: tê=s deute/ras periphora=s]) or that of the
planets, which is in the contrary direction to the first revolution
or that of the First Heaven, it is we who are in the upper hemisphere
and on the right side; it is the inhabitants of the southern
hemisphere, who are in the lower hemisphere and on the left side:
that is, it is we who are on the side of the beginning of motion,
they who are on the side of the end (ss. 1-10).
CH. 3.--I have previously laid it down, that circular movement is not
opposite to circular. But, if this be the case, what is the reason
that there are many different revolutions in the Heaven? This is what
I shall now enquire, fully aware of the great distance from which the
enquiry must be conducted ([Greek: po/r)r(ôthen])--not so much a
distance in place, as owing to the small number of accompanying facts
which can be observed by the senses respecting them.
The cause must be looked for in this direction. Every thing which
performs a work, exists for the sake of that work. Now the work of
Deity is immortality, or eternal life; so that the divine substance
must of necessity be in eternal motion. The Heaven is a divine body
and has for that reason the encyclical body, whose nature it is to be
moved for ever in a circle. But why is not the whole body of the
Heaven thus constituted (_i.e._, encyclical)? Because it is necessary
that some portion of its body should remain stationary in the centre;
and no portion of the encyclical body can possibly remain stationary,
either in the centre or elsewhere. For, if it could, its natural
motion (_i.e._, the motion of that supposed portion) would be towards
the centre; whereas its natural motion is circular; and it cannot
move towards the centre contrary to its nature, because on that
supposition its motion would not be eternal: no motion contrary to
nature can be eternal. Moreover that which is contrary to nature is
posterior to that which is natural; it is a deviation therefrom
arising in the course of generation (s. 1).
Hence it is necessary that earth should exist, the nature of which it
is to rest in the centre (_i.e._, the divine encyclical body will not
suffice alone, without adjuncts of different nature). I assume this
for the present; more will be said about it anon.
But, if earth exists, fire must exist also; for of two contraries, if
the one exist by nature, the other must exist by nature also. For the
matter of contraries is the same, and Form (positive and affirmable)
is prior by nature to Privation (for example, hot is prior to cold);
now rest and gravity denote the privation of motion and lightness (s.
2--_i.e._, fire is prior in nature to earth, as having the positive
essences motion and levity, while earth has for its essence the
privation thereof).
Again, if fire and earth exist, the two other elements intermediate
between them must also exist; for each of the four elements has its
peculiar mode of contrariety with reference to each. At least let
this be assumed now: I shall show it at length presently.
Now, these points being established, we see that generation must
necessarily come to pass, because no one of the four elements can be