Aristotle
Of this mixed character, partly logical, partly ontological, is the
first distinction set forth in the Categoriæ--the distinction between
matters _predicated of_ a Subject, and matters which are _in_ a
Subject--the Subject itself being assumed as the _fundamentum_
correlative to both of them. The definition given of that which is
_in_ a Subject is ontological: viz., "_In_ a Subject, I call that
which is in anything, not as a part, yet so that it cannot exist
separately from that in which it is."[18] By these two negative
characteristics, without any mark positive, does Aristotle define
what is meant by being _in_ a Subject. Modern logicians, and Hobbes
among them, can find no better definition for an Accident; though
Hobbes remarks truly, that Accident cannot be properly defined, but
must be elucidated by examples.[19]
[Footnote 18: Aristot. Categ. p. 1, a. 24.]
[Footnote 19: Hobbes, Computation or Logic, part i. 3, 3, i. 6, 2,
ii. 8, 2-3.]
The distinction here drawn by Aristotle between being _predicated of_
a Subject, and being in a Subject, coincides with that between
essential and non-essential predication: all the predicates
(including the _differentia_) which belong to the essence, fall under
the first division;[20] all those which do not belong to the essence,
under the latter. The Subjects--what Aristotle calls the First
Essences or Substances, those which are essences or substances in the
fullest and strictest meaning of the word--are concrete individual
things or persons; such as Sokrates, this man, that horse or tree.
These are never employed as predicates at all (except by a distorted
and unnatural structure of the proposition, which Aristotle indicates
as possible, but declines to take into account); they are always
Subjects of different predicates, and are, in the last analysis, the
Subjects of all predicates. But besides these First Essences, there
are also Second Essences--Species and Genus, which stand to the first
Essence in the relation of predicates to a Subject, and to the other
Categories in the relation of Subjects to predicates.[21] These
Second Essences are less of Essences than the First, which alone is
an Essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense. Among the
Second Essences, Species is more of an Essence than Genus, because it
belongs more closely and specially to the First Essence; while Genus
is farther removed from it. Aristotle thus recognizes a graduation of
_more or less_ in Essence; the individual is more Essence, or more
complete as an Essence, than the Species, the Species more than the
Genus. As he recognizes a First Essence, _i.e._ an individual object
(such as Sokrates, this horse, &c.), so he also recognizes an
individual accident (this particular white colour, that particular
grammatical knowledge) which is _in_ a Subject, but is not
_predicated of_ a Subject; this particular white colour exists _in_
some given body, but is not _predicable of_ any body.[22]
[Footnote 20: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus
did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same
manner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in
[Greek: ta\ kath' u(pokeime/nou]. See Simplikius, ad Categorias,
Basil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry
careful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See
Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 701. b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p.
106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b.
26, [Greek: to\ de\ e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron e(te/rô|, kai\ to\
kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron, tau)to/n e)stin],
he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.]
[Footnote 21: Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it
is not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but
that First Essences are contained in Second Essences, _i.e._ in the
species which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a.
9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.]
[Footnote 22: Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: [Greek: A)nplô=s de\
ta\ a)/toma kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| kat' ou)deno\s u(pokeime/nou
le/getai, e)n u(pokeime/nô| de\ e(/nia ou)de\n kôlu/ei ei)=nai; ê(
ga/r tis grammatikê\ tô=n e)n u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n.] Aristotle here
recognizes an attribute as "individual and as numerically one;" and
various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say,
that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically,
and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is _Unum
Numero_? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of
different objects; and can we count it as _One_, in the same sense in
which we count each of these objects as _One_? I doubt whether _Unum
Numero_ be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the
[Greek: deute/ra ou)si/a] is not _Unum Numero_ like the [Greek:
prô/tê ou)si/a--ou) ga\r e)n e)sti to\ u(pokei/menon Ô(/sper ê(
prô/tê ou)si/a, a)lla\ kata\ pollô=n o( a)/nthrôpos le/getai kai\ to\
zô=|on (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he
ought to declare that the attribute is not _Unum Numero_; for though
it is not (in his language) _predicable of_ many Subjects, yet it is
_in_ many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called _Unum Numero_,
according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two
passages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; [Greek: D]. p. 1016,
b. 32: [Greek: a)rithmô=| me\n ô(=n ê( u(/lê mi/a], &c.]
Respecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places in the
commencement of this treatise on the Categories--between predicates
which are _affirmed of_ a Subject, and predicates which are _in_ a
Subject[23]--we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by
which you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species
and Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may be
_predicated of_ Sokrates, but are not _in_ Sokrates; while knowledge
is _in_ Sokrates, but cannot be _predicated of_ Sokrates; and may be
_predicated of_ grammar, but is not _in_ grammar. But if we look at
this comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the
predicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the
preceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal,
rational).[24] If, in place of these three last words, we substitute
the abstract words corresponding to them--humanity, animality,
rationality--we shall have to say that these are _in_ Sokrates,
though they cannot (in their abstract form) be _predicated of_
Sokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which
Aristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the
abstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise,
we can no longer say that this is _in_ Sokrates, and that it may be
_predicated of_ grammar. Abstract alone can be _predicated of_
abstract; concrete alone can be _predicated of_ concrete; if we
describe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The
Abstract is _in_ the Concrete--the Concrete contains or embodies the
Abstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when
described by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described
by the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different
Category.[25] The names Concrete and Abstract were not in the
philosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the
Categoriæ, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential
and predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to be _in_
the Subject, the former not to be in it, but to be _co-efficients of_
its essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this
distinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other
works. It seems to be a point of difference between the Categoriæ on
one side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the
Categoriæ he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on
verbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical
structure of a proposition.[26]
[Footnote 23: The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51,
b. 46) as follows:--[Greek: ai( prô=tai ou)si/ai u(pokeu=ntai pa=sin,
a)ll' ou)ch o(moi/ôs; toi=s me\n ga\r _pro\s u(/parxin_, tou/testi
toi=s sumbebêko/sin, toi=s de\ _pro\s katêgori/an_, tou/testi tai=s
katho/lou ou)si/ais.]]
[Footnote 24: Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this.--System der
Logik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.]
[Footnote 25: The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of
describing the Differentia--whether by the concrete word [Greek:
pezo\n], or by the abstract [Greek: pezo/tês]--gives occasion to an
objection against Aristotle's view, and to a reply from Dexippus not
very conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).]
[Footnote 26: Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a.
14-30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase
[Greek: e(/n tini]. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform
or consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the Categoriæ, pp. 44, 45,
53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br.,
we shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his
fluctuation. The doctrine of the Categoriæ was found especially
difficult in its application to the Differentia.
In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, [Greek: o(/sa de\
mê\ ou)si/an sêmai/nei, dei= kata/ tinos u(pokeime/nou
katêgorei=sthai], which is at variance with the language of the
Categoriæ, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be
said about Metaphys. B. p. 1001, b. 29; [Greek: D]. p. 1017, b. 13.
See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.
See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a.
31: [Greek: ou)the\n ga\r tô=n a)/llôn chôristo/n e)sti para\ tê\n
ou)si/an; pa/nta ga\r kath' u(pokeime/nou tê=s ou)si/as le/getai],
where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used [Greek: a)nti\ tou=
e)n u(pokeime/nô|] (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).]
Lastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting
those predicates which he describes as (not _in a Subject_ but)
_affirmed_ or _denied of_ a Subject--_i.e._ the essential predicates.
In these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied
of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the
Subject.[27] This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact
a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the
Syllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica
Priora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.
[Footnote 27: Categor. p. 1, b. 10-15.]
After such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds[28] to give the
enumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other
of which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of
entering into a proposition, must belong: 1. _Essence_ or
_Substance_; such as, man, horse. 2. _How much_ or _Quantity_; such
as, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3. _What manner of_ or
_Quality_; such as, white, erudite. 4. _Ad aliquid_--_To something_
or _Relation_; such as, double, half, greater. 5. _Where_; such as,
in the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6. _When_; such as, yesterday,
last year. 7. _In what posture_; such as, he stands up, he is sitting
down. 8. _To have_; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9. _Activity_;
such as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10. _Passivity_; such as, he
is being cut, he is being burned.
[Footnote 28: Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.]
_Ens_ in its complete state--concrete, individual, determinate--
includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First _Ens_
being the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question
be asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in