Aristotle
The remarks of Boêthus and Simplikius upon this point deserve
attention. Schol. pp. 50-54, Br.; p. 54, a. 2: [Greek: ou) peri\ tê=s
a)sche/tou u(/lês e)sti\n o( parô\n lo/gos, a)lla\ tê=s ê)/dê
sche/sin e)chou/sês pro\s to\ ei)=dos. to\ de\ su/ntheton dêlo/noti,
o(/per e)sti\ to\ a)/tomon, e)pide/chetai to\ to/de.] They point out
that the terms Form and Matter are not mentioned in the Categories,
nor do they serve to illustrate the Categories, which do not carry
analysis so far back, take their initial start from [Greek: to/de
ti], the [Greek: su/ntheton] of Form and Matter,--[Greek: ou)si/a
kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê].
Simplikius says (p. 50, a. 17):--[Greek: dunato\n de\ tou= mê\
mnêmoneu=sai tou= ei)/dous kai\ tê=s u(/lês ai)/tion le/gein, kai\
to\ tê\n tô=n Katêgoriô=n pragmatei/an _kata\ tê\n pro/cheiron kai\
koinê\n tou= lo/gou chrê=sin_ poiei=sthai; to\ de\ tê=s u(/lês kai\
tou= ei)/dous o)/noma kai\ ta\ u(po\ tou/tôn sêmaino/mena ou)k ê)=n
toi=s polloi=s sunê/thê], &c. Compare p. 47, a. 27. This what
Dexippus says also, that the Categories bear only upon [Greek: tê\n
prô/tên chrei/an tou= lo/gou kath' ê(\n ta\ pra/gmata dêlou=n
a)llêlois e)phie/metha] (p. 13, ed. Spengel; also p. 49).
Waitz, ad Categor. p. 284. "In Categoriis, non de ipsâ rerum naturâ
et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi
vitâ homini philosophiâ non imbuto."
We may add, that Aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--Form
and Matter--not only to the Category [Greek: ou)si/a] but also to
that of [Greek: poio\n] and [Greek: poso/n] (De Coelo, iv. 312, a.
14.)]
[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 23. [Greek:
o(sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei].]
Confining ourselves (as I have already observed that Aristotle does
in the Categories) to those perceptible or physical subjects which
every one admits,[72] and keeping clear of metaphysical entities, we
shall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine
questions here put may all be put and answered; that the two last are
most likely to be put in regard to some living being; and that the
last can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person
(including man, woman, or child). Every individual person falls
necessarily under each of the ten Categories; belongs to the Genus
animal, Species man; he is of a certain height and bulk; has certain
qualities; stands in certain relations to other persons or things; is
doing something and suffering something; is in a certain place; must
be described with reference to a certain moment of time; is in a
certain attitude or posture; is clothed or equipped in a certain
manner. Information of some kind may always be given respecting him
under each of these heads; he is always by necessity _quantus_, but
not always of any particular quantity. Until such information is
given, the concrete individual is not known under conditions
thoroughly determined.[73] Moreover each head is separate and
independent, not resolvable into any of the rest, with a reservation,
presently to be noticed, of Relation in its most comprehensive
meaning. When I say of a man, that he is at home, lying down, clothed
with a tunic, &c., I do not predicate of him any quality, action, or
passion. The information which I give belongs to three other heads
distinct from these last, and distinct also from each other. If you
suppress the two last of the ten Categories and leave only the
preceding eight, under which of these eight are you to rank the
predicates, Sokrates is _lying down_, Sokrates is _clothed with a
tunic_, &c.? The necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth
Categories (_Jacere_ and _Habere_) as separate general heads in the
list, is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the
Categories which precede. The ninth and tenth are of narrower
comprehension,[74] and include a smaller number of distinguishable
varieties, than the preceding; but they are not the less separate
heads of information. So, among the chemical elements enumerated by
modern science, some are very rarely found; yet they are not for that
reason the less entitled to a place in the list.
[Footnote 72: Ibid. Z. p. 1028, b. 8, seq.: p. 1042, a. 25. [Greek:
ai( ai)sthêtai\ ou)si/ai--ai( o(mologou/menai ou)si/ai].]
[Footnote 73: Prantl observes, Geschichte der Logik, p. 208:--"Fragen
wir, wie Aristoteles überhaupt dazu gekommen sei, von Kategorien zu
sprechen, und welche Geltung dieselben bei ihm haben, so ist unsere
Antwort hierauf folgende: Aristoteles geht, im Gegensatze gegen
Platon, davon aus, dass die Allgemeinheit in der Concretion des
Seienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser Realität von dem
menschlichen Denken und Sprechen ergriffen werde; der
Verwirklichungsprocess des concret Seienden ist der Uebergang vom
Unbestimmten, jeder Bestimmung aber fähigen, zum allseitig
Bestimmten, welchem demnach die Bestimmtheit überhaupt als eine
selbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des Menschen Rede von
ihm ausgesagt wird. Das grundwesentliche Ergebniss der Verwirklichung
ist sonach: die zeitlich-räumlich concret auftretende und hiemit
individuell gewordene Substanzialität, in einer dem Zustande der
Concretion entsprechenden Erscheinungsweise; diese letztere umfasst
das ganze habituelle Dasein und Wirken der concreten Substanz, welche
in der Welt der räumlichen Ausdehnung numerären Vielheit erscheint.
Die ontologische Basis demnach der Kategorien ist der in die
Concretion führende Verwirklichungsprocess der Bestimmtheit
überhaupt."]
[Footnote 74: Plotinus, among his various grounds of exception to the
ten Aristotelian Categories, objects to the ninth and tenth on the
ground of their narrow comprehension (Ennead. vi. 1, 23, 24).
Boêthus expressly vindicated the title of [Greek: e)/chein] to be
recognized as a separate Category, against the Stoic
objectors.--Schol. ad Categ. p. 81, a. 5.]
If we seek not to appreciate the value of the Ten Categories as a
philosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind
of Aristotle when he framed it, we shall attend, not much to the
greater features, which it presents in common with every other scheme
of classification, as to the minor features which constitute its
peculiarity. In this point of view the two last Categories are more
significant than the first four, and the tenth is the most
significant of all; for every one is astonished when he finds
_Habere_ enrolled as a tenth _Summum Genus_, co-ordinate with
_Quantum_ and _Quale_. Now what is remarkable about the ninth and
tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only
Subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the
same time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least
frequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in
some particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his
horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover
animals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal
Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined
by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to
know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten
Categories, as _Summa Genera_ for all predications which can be made
about any given Subject, the Subject which he has wholly, or at least
principally, in his mind is an individual Man. We understand, then,
how it is that he declares _Habere_ and _Jacere_ to be so plain as to
need no farther explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his
clothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.[75] But
when Aristotle treats of _Habere_ elsewhere, he is far from
recognizing it as narrow and plain _per se_. Even in the
Post-Predicamenta (an appendix tacked on to the Categoriæ, either by
himself afterwards, or by some follower) he declares _Habere_ to be a
predicate of vague and equivocal signification; including portions of
_Quale_, _Quantum_, and _Relata_. And he specifies the personal
equipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of
signification. He takes the same view in the fourth book ([Greek:
D].) of the Metaphysica, which book is a sort of lexicon of
philosophical terms.[76] This enlargement of the meaning of the word
_Habere_ seems to indicate an alteration of Aristotle's point of
view, dropping that special reference to an individual man as
Subject, which was present to him when he drew up the list of Ten
Categories. The like alteration carried him still farther, so as to
omit the ninth and tenth almost entirely, when he discusses the more
extensive topics of philosophy. Some of his followers, on the
contrary, instead of omitting _Habere_ out of the list of Categories,
tried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it
bears in the Metaphysica. Archytas ranked it fifth in the series,
immediately after _Relata_.[77]
[Footnote 75: In the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Mr. James
Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, there is a learned and valuable
illustration of these two last Aristotelian Categories. I think,
however, that he gives to the Predicament [Greek: Kei=sthai]
(_Jacere_) a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in
the treatise Categoriæ; and that neither he, nor the commentators
whom he cites (p. 317), take sufficient notice of the marked
distinction drawn in that treatise between [Greek: kei=sthai] and
[Greek: the/sis] (Cat. p. 6, b. 12). Mr. Harris ranks the arrangement
of words in an orderly discourse, and of propositions in a valid
syllogism, as cases coming under the Predicament [Greek Kei=sthai];
which is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the
Aristotelian Categories. At the same time he brings out strongly the
fact, that living beings, and especially _men_, are the true and
special subjects of predicates belonging to [Greek: Kei=sthai] and
[Greek: E)/chein]. The more we attend to this, the nearer approach
shall we make to the state of Aristotle's mind when he drew up the
list of Categories; as indeed Harris himself seems to recognize
(chap. ii. p. 29).]
[Footnote 76: Aristot. Categor. p. 15, b. 17; Metaphys. [Greek: D].
p. 1023, a. 8.]
[Footnote 77: See the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 80, b. 7, seq.; p.
92, b. 41, Brand.; where the different views of Archytas, Plotinus,
and Boêthus, are given; also p. 59, b. 43: [Greek: proêgei=tai ga\r
ê( sumphuê\s tô=n pro/s ti sche/sis tô=n e)piktê/tôn sche/seôn, ô(s
kai\ tô\| A)rchu/ta| dokei=.] In the language of Archytas, [Greek:
ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] were the equivalent of the Aristotelian
[Greek: e)/chein].]
The narrow manner in which Aristotle conceives the Predicament
_Habere_ in the treatise Categoriæ, and the enlarged sense given to
that term both in the Post-Predicaments and in the Metaphysica, lead
to a suspicion that the Categoriæ is comparatively early, in point of
date, among his compositions. It seems more likely that he should
begin with the narrower view, and pass from thence to the larger,
rather than _vice versâ_. Probably the predicates specially
applicable to Man would be among his early conceptions, but would by
later thought be tacitly dropped,[78] so as to retain those only
which had a wider philosophical application.
[Footnote 78: Respecting the paragraph (at the close of the
Categoriæ) about [Greek: to\ e)/chein], see the Scholion in Waitz's
ed. of the Organon, p. 38.
The fact that Archytas in his treatise presented the Aristotelian
Category [Greek: e)/chein] under the more general phrase of [Greek:
ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] (see the preceding note), is among the
reasons for believing that treatise to be later than Aristotle.]
I have already remarked that Aristotle, while enrolling all the Ten