Aristotle
Neither and Both--[Greek: ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera] (Plato,
Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something
intermediate between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: poio/tês], or
between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: sumbebêko/s].]
We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between
the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so
impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as
some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as
admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps
down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete
manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete
manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or
understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity,
Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of
_Substantia_ given by Spinoza--"_quod in se est et per se
concipitur_." It can no more be conceived or described without some
of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described
without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two
negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it
cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the **Subject of all
Predicates: it is _Unum numero_ and indivisible.[111] Not one of
these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we
have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to
them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is,
relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without
the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by
a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of
Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor
can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic
notion of Predicate.[112] All three lie together at the bottom of the
analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.
[Footnote 111: Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.]
[Footnote 112: Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by
[Greek: kath' au(to/--kath' au(ta/], in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p.
73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary
to include in [Greek: to\ kath' au(to\] of the Category [Greek:
Ou)si/a], all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation
of that Category understood.
M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his
translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the
Categories generally, and especially of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], as
simply naming (_i.e._ giving a proper name), and doing nothing more.
I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms _anterior_ and
_posterior_ can mean nothing more than _logical_ anteriority and
posteriority.
"Mais comment classer les mots?--C'est à la réalité seule qu'il faut
le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n'est que le réflet, dont
les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des
individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se
groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des
espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l'individu,
l'être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est
possible d'en dire en tant qu'être, on aura les classes les plus
générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme
français, les attributions, qu'il est possible de lui appliquer.
Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories.--Ce n'est pas du reste, une
classification des choses à la manière de celles de l'histoire
naturelle, qu'il s'agit de faire en logique: c'est une simple
énumération de tous les points de vue, d'**où l'esprit peut
considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l'esprit
lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs
appellations.--Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix
significations principales des mots.--La Catégorie de la Substance
est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première,
la plus essentielle, marque d'un être, c'est d'être. Cela revient à
dire qu'avant tout, l'être est, l'être existe. Par suite les mots qui
expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les
plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en
quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la
nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant
par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi
une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en
substance première et substance seconde.--Les espèces et les genres,
s'ils expriment la substance, ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa
pureté; c'est **déjà de la substance qualifié, comme le dit
Aristote.--Il n'y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des
espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent
pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence
se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi,
tout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes
de mots formeront les autres Catégories.--Ces modifications, ces
accidents, de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n'en
reconnaît pas davantage.--**Voilà donc les dix Catégories: les dix
seules attributions possibles. _Par la première, on nomme les
individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les
qualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il
est." Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp.
lxxii.-lxxvii.]
Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete
sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the
Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The
noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when
pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception
than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these
make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing
complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the
conception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu
sumplokê=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we
added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from
this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it
would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to
come; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by
the various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for
various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known
only as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure
to come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the
mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There
may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience,
belonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and
the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is
nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an
ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is
simultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of
the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all
imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is
the cause of the others.[114]
[Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more
than [Greek: a)rchê\n grammê=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a.
21).]
[Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\
a(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\ tê\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/thêsin,
mêdamô=s de\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/rô| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on
e)pi\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos;] &c.]
When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were
non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must
understand what he means by the term _first_. That term bears, in
this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here
it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the
extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence,
in the Categories, is a _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]),
illustrated by the examples _hic homo_, _hic equus_. Now, as thus
explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second
Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of
This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the
attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental
attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The
First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as
a mere _substratum_ without Second Substance and without any
Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet
indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what
its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are.
Being an individual (_Unum numero_), it unites in itself both the
essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes
peculiar to itself.[115] It is already understood as including
attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare
([Greek: dêlou=n--a)podido/nai][116]) what these attributes are. The
First or Complete _Ens_ embodies in itself all the Predicaments,
though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating
adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of
existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away
either one of the three, and the First _Ens_ disappears. But in
regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority,
founded on convenience and facility of understanding. The _Hoc
Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which intimates in general outline a
certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not
yet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally
as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and
specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential
attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a
specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential
attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a
specific name connoting other attributes.[117] The essential
characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are
domiciliated foreigners.[118]
[Footnote 115: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8.
[Greek: To\ d' a)/pan to/de Kalli/as ê)\ Sôkra/tês e)sti\n ô(/sper ê(
sphai=ra ê( chalkê= ê(di/, o( d' a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ zô=|on ô(/sper
sphai=ra chalkê= o(lôs.--to\ d' a(/pan ê)/dê to\ toio/nde ei)=dos e)n
tai=sde tai=s sarxi\ kai\ o)stoi=s Kalli/as kai\ Sôkra/tês; kai\
e(/teron me\n dia\ tê\n u(/lên, e(/tera ga/r, tau)to\ de\ tô=|
ei)/dei; a)/tomon ga\r to\ ei)=dos.]]
[Footnote 116: Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\
ta\s prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê
deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na _ga\r dêloi=_ tê\n prô/tên
ou)si/an tô=n katêgoroume/nôn.] &c.
[Footnote 117: Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on to\
badi/zon e(/tero/n ti o(\n badi/zon e)sti\ kai\ leuko/n, ê( d'
ou)si/a, kai\ o(/sa to/de ti sêmai/nei, ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o)/nta
o(/per e)sti/n.] Also p. 83, a. 31. [Greek: kai\ mê\ ei)=nai/ ti
leuko/n, o(\ ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o(\n leuko/n e)stin]: also p. 83, b.
22.]
[Footnote 118: Categor. p. 2, b. 31: [Greek: to\n ga/r tina
a)nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\
ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs_ a)podô/sei--tô=n d' a)/llôn o(/ ti
a)\n a)podidô=| tis, _a)llotri/ôs_ e)stai a)podedôkô/s], &c.]