Aristotle
a mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken
into account in arranging and explaining the Categories.[130] I
apprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his
Categories by analysing various complete sentences, which would of
course include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is
also remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last
Categories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding
by adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a
substantive. There remains the important Category _Ad Aliquid_, which
has no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this
Category, though not represented by any part of speech, is
nevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way,
with close reference to the form of expression, and to the
requirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or
dative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the
mind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from
grammatical and syntactic forms.
[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 209: "Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den
erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die
grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht." P. 216:
"der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt."]
[Footnote 130: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn
ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| _schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as_
to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, ou) mê\n
a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon poio/n ti sêmai/nei.] &c.]
We may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them
with the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding
Aristotle's death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the
latter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new
arrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates.
Their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first
Category was [Greek: ti/], _Aliquid_ or _Quiddam_--[Greek: to\
u(pokei/menon], the _Substratum_ or Subject. Their second was [Greek:
poio/n], _Quale_ or Quality. Their third was [Greek: pô\s e)/chon],
_certo Modo se habens_. Their fourth was, [Greek: pro/s ti pô\s
e)/chon], _Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens_.[131]
[Footnote 131: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: [Greek: ta\
pô\s e)/chonta tri/ta ti/thesthai]. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p.
48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: [Greek: Oi( Stôi+koi\ ei)s e)la/ttona
suste/llein a)xiou=si to\n tô=n prô/tôn genô=n a)rithmo/n kai/ tina
e)n toi=s a)la/ttosin u(pêllagme/na paralamba/nousi. poiou=ntai ga\r
tê\n tomê\n ei)s te/ssara, ei)s u(pokei/mena, kai\ poia\, kai\ pô\s
e)/chonta, kai\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chonta.]
It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the
Stoics recognized one grand [Greek: **ge/nos] comprehending all the
above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi.
1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He
admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme
[Greek: ge/nos] comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but
treated all the ten as [Greek: prô=ta ge/nê], under an analogous
aggregate. I cannot but think that the **Stoics looked upon their
four [Greek: ge/nê] in the same manner; for I do not see what they
could find more comprehensive to rank generically above [Greek:
ti/].]
We do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of
Aristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by
its authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes
Laertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly
adverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some
Aristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this
evidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with
the [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a], First Essence or Substance of Aristotle.
It was exclusively Subject, and could never become Predicate; but it
was indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its
meaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general
notions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this
Category,[132] and were designated as [Greek: Ou)/tina],
Non-Individuals, or Non-Particulars. _Homo_ was counted by them, not
under the Category [Greek: ti/], _Quid_, but under the Category
[Greek: _poio/n_], _Quale_; in its character of predicate determining
the Subject [Greek: ti/s] or [Greek: ti/]. The Stoic Category _Quale_
thus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and
also the Aristotelian _differentia_. _Quale_ was a _species_-making
Category ([Greek: ei)dopoio/s]).[133] It declared what was the
Essence of the Subject [Greek: ti/]--the essential qualities or
attributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof,
coinciding with what is called the _proprium_ in Porphyry's Eisagoge.
It therefore came next in order immediately after [Greek: ti/]: since
the Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to
declare its Accidents.
[Footnote 132: Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: [Greek:
sumparalêpte/on de\ kai\ tê\n sunê/theian tô=n Stôi+kô=n peri\ tô=n
genikô=n poiô=n, pô=s ai( ptô/seis kat' au)tou\s prophe/rontai, kai\
pô=s _ou)/tina_ ta\ koina\ par' au)toi=s le/getai, kai\ o(/pôs para\
tê\n a)/gnoian tou= mê\ pa=san ou)si/an to/de ti sêmai/nein kai\ to\
_para\ to\n ou)/tina_ so/phisma gi/netai para\ to\ schê=ma tê=s
le/xeôs; oi(=on ei)/ ti/s e)stin e)n A)thê/nais, ou)k e)/stin e)n
Mega/rois; _ o( ga\r a)/nthrôpos ou)/tis e)sti/n, ou) ga/r e)sti/ tis
o( koino/s_, ô(s tina\ de\ au)to\n e)la/bomen e)n tô=| lo/gô|, kai\
para\ tou=to to\ o)/noma tou=to e)/schen o( lo/gos ou)/tis
klêthei/s.]
Compare Schol. p. 45**, a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as
well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of
departure [Greek: to\ **deu/teron u(pokei/menon], not [Greek: to\
prô=ton u(pokei/menon ( = tê\n a)/poion u(/lên)].]
[Footnote 133: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De
Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67.
Br. [Greek: Poia\] were distributed by the Stoics into three
varieties; and the abstract word [Greek: Poio/tês], in the Stoic
sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these
three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that [Geek:
poio/tês] had a narrower extension than [Greek: poio/n]: there were
[Greek: poia\] without any [Greek: poiotê\s] corresponding to them.
To the third Category, [Greek: Pô\s e)/chonta], which was larger and
more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding;
nor to the fourth Category, [Greek: Pro/s ti]. Hence, we may see one
reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term [Greek:
poio/têtes] to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the
[Greek: poio/têtes tô=n sôma/tôn] were themselves [Greek: sô/mata] or
[Greek: sômatika/]: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix.
p. 463, seq. ed. Kühn). The Stoics considered these qualities as
[Greek: a)e/ras tina/s], or [Greek: pneu/mata], &c., spiritual or
gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.
It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the
evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp.
67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between [Greek:
poia\] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta]. The Stoics considered [Greek:
poio/tês] to be [Greek: du/namis plei/stôn e)poistikê\ sumptôma/tôn,
ô(s ê( phro/nêsis tou= te phroni/môs peripatei=n kai\ tou= phron/môs
diale/gesthai] (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these [Greek: sumptô/mata]
were included under [Greek: poio/n], so that [Greek: o( phroni/môs
peripatô=n, o( pu\x protei/nôn] and [Greek: o( tre/chôn], were
[Greek: poioi/ tines] (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for
the third Category [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta] to comprehend; although,
according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most
comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among
themselves and to have written inconsistently.
Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even
Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik,
pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.]
The Third Stoic Category ([Greek: pô\s e)/chon]) comprised a portion
of what Aristotle ranked under _Quale_, and all that he ranked under
_Quantum_, _Ubi_, _Quando_, _Agere_, _Pati_, _Jacere_, _Habere_. The
fourth Stoic Category coincided with the Aristotelian _Ad Aliquid_.
The third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute
or non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood
as Relative Accidents.
The order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and
peremptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same
genus, but superordinate and subordinate,[134] the second
presupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and
attaching to the first, _plus_ the second; the fourth, presupposing
and attaching to the first, _plus_ the second and third. The first
proposition to be made is, in answer to the question _Quale Quid_?
You answer _Tale Aliquid_, declaring the essential attributes. Upon
this, the next question is put, _Quali Modo se habens_? You answer by
a term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental
attributes non-relative, _Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens_. Upon
this, the fourth and last question follows, _Quali Modo se habens ad
alia_? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category, _i.e._
a Relative. _Hic Aliquis--homo_ (1), _niger_ (2), _servus_ (3).
[Footnote 134: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429;
Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: [Greek: ka)kei=no a)/topon to\
su/ntheta poiei=n ta\ ge/nê e)k prote/rôn tinô=n kai\ deute/rôn ô(s
to\ pro/s ti e)k poiou= kai\ pro/s ti.] Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,
25-29.
Porphyry appears to include all [Greek: sumbebêko/ta] under [Greek:
poio\n] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chon]: he gives as examples of the
latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category [Greek:
kei=sthai] (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a.
30).]
In comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we
see that the first great difference is in the extent and
comprehension of _Quale_, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by
distinguishing from it _Essentia Secunda_), and enlarges on the other
(by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the
Essence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide
their third Category, but included therein all the matter of six
Aristotelian Categories,[135] and much of the matter of the
Aristotelian _Quale_. Both schemes agree on two points:--1. In taking
as the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual,
Substance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed
of the Relative--_Ad Aliquid_.
[Footnote 135: Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the
number of disparates ranked under [Greek: to\ pô\s e)/chon], which
has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is
curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the
decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.
Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between [Greek: to\
pro/s ti] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chon]; and Trendelenburg,
(pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which,
however, appears to be very obscure.]
Plotinus himself recognizes five _Summa_ or _Prima Genera_,[136] (he
does not call them Categories) _Ens_, _Motus_, _Quies_, _Idem_,