Aristotle
sumbai/nei sunalêtheu/ein kata\ mo/nên tê\n e)ndechome/nên;] &c.]
It is thus that Aristotle explains the distinctions of meaning in
propositions, arising out of the altered collocation of the negative
particle; the distinction between (1) _Non est justus_, (2) _Est non
justus_, (3) _Est injustus_. The first of the three is the only true
negative, corresponding to the affirmative _Est Justus_. The second
is not a negative at all, but an affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs], or by transposition, as Theophrastus afterwards called
it). The third is an affirmative, but privative. Both the second and
the third stand related in the same manner to the first; that is, the
truth of the first is a necessary consequence either of the second or
of the third, but neither of these can be certainly inferred from the
first. This is explained still more clearly in the Prior Analytics;
to which Aristotle here makes express reference.[28]
[Footnote 28: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 31. [Greek: tau=ta me\n
ou)=n, ô(/sper e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s le/getai, ou(/tô te/taktai.]
Waitz in his note suggests that instead of [Greek: te/taktai] we
ought to read [Greek: teta/chthô]. But if we suppose that the formal
table once existed in the text, in an order of arrangement agreeing
with the Analytica, this conjectural change would be unnecessary.
Waitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter, which appear
to me partly for the better, partly not for the better. Both Bekker
and Bussemaker (Firmin Didot) retain the old text; but this old text
was a puzzle to the ancient commentators, even anterior to Alexander
of Aphrodisias. I will here give first the text of Bekker, next the
changes made by Waitz: my own opinion does not wholly coincide with
either. I shall cite the text from p. 19, b. 19, leaving out the
portion between lines 30 and 36, which does not bear upon the matter
here discussed, while it obscures the legitimate sequence of
Aristotle's reasoning.
(Bekker.)--[Greek: O(/tan de\ to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai,
ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis. le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti
di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai
o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=| katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara
e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\ me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\
a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\ stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\
du/o, ou)/. le/gô d' o(/ti to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ _tô=| dikai/ô|
proskei/setai_ ê)\ tô=| _ou) dikai/ô|_] (25), [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ ê(
a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai.] (Here follow the first pairs of
Antitheses, or the first Quaternion of propositions in the order as
given)--
(A) [Greek: e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos] ... ... (B) [Greek: ou)k
e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos.]y
(C) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos] ... (D) [Greek: ou)k
e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos.]
[Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ _ou)k e)/sti tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]_ (30).--[Greek:
Au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\
ou)k _a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti] (38) [Greek:
_prostethe/n_.] (Here follow the second pairs of Antitheses, or the
second Quaternion of propositions, again in the order from which I
have departed above)--
(E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... ... (F) [Greek:
Ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]
(G) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (H) [Greek:
Ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]
[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai
de\] (the second Quaternion) [Greek: chôri\s e)kei/nôn] (first
Quaternion) [Greek: au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati
tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.]
In this text Waitz makes three alterations:--1. In line 24, instead
of [Greek: ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he
reads, [Greek: ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou)k
a)nthrô/pô|].
2. In line 30 he makes a similar change; instead of [Greek: tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he reads, [Greek:
tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|].
In line 38, instead of [Greek: prostethe/n], he reads [Greek:
prostethe/ntos].
Of these three alterations the first appears to me good, but
insufficient; the second not good, though the passage as it stands in
Bekker requires amendment; and the third, a change for the worse.
The purpose of Aristotle is here two-fold. First, to give the reason
why, when the propositions were _tertii adjacentis_, there were two
Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions; whereas in
propositions _secundi adjacentis_, there was only one Quaternion or
two couples of antithetical propositions. Next, to assign the
distinction between the first and the second Quaternion in
propositions _tertii adjacentis_.
Now the first of these two purposes is marked out in line 25, which I
think we ought to read not by substituting the words of Waitz in
place of the words of Bekker, but by retaining the words of Bekker
and inserting the words of Waitz as an addition to them. The passage
after such addition will stand thus--[Greek: le/gô d' o(/ti to\
_e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\
ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| ê)\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|, ô(/ste kai\ ê(
a)po/phasis. te/ttara _ou)=n_ e)/stai.] Here Aristotle declares the
_reason why_ ([Greek: ou)=n]) there come to be four couples of
propositions; that reason is, because [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek:
ou)k e)/sti] may be joined either with [Greek: di/kaios] or [Greek:
ou) di/kaios] and either with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] or with [Greek:
ou)k a)/nthrôpos]. Both these alternatives must be specified in order
to make out a reason why there are two Quaternions or four couples of
antithetical propositions. But the passage, as read by Bekker, gives
only one of these alternatives, while the passage, as read by Waitz,
gives only the other. Accordingly, neither of them separately is
sufficient; but both of them taken together furnish the reason
required, and thus answer Aristotle's purpose.
Aristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two Quaternions,
and then proceeds to line 30, where the reading of Bekker is
irrelevant and unmeaning; but the amendment of Waitz appears to me
still worse, being positively incorrect in statement of fact. Waitz
reads [Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha] (in the first
Quaternion, which has just been enunciated) [Greek: kai\ to\ _ou)k
e)/stin_ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ _tô=| ou)k
a)nthrô/pô|_]. These last words are incorrect in fact, for [Greek:
ou)k a)/nthrôpos] does not appear in the first Quaternion, but is
reserved for the second. While the reading of Waitz is thus evidently
wrong, that of Bekker asserts nothing to the purpose. It is useless
to tell us merely that [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin]
attach both to [Greek: di/kaios] and to [Greek: ou) di/kaios] in this
first Quaternion ([Greek: e)ntau=tha]), because that characteristic
is equally true of the second Quaternion (presently to follow), and
therefore constitutes no distinction between the two. To bring out
the meaning intended by Aristotle I think we ought here also to
retain the words of Bekker, and to add after them some, though not
all, of the words of Waitz. The passage would then stand
thus--[Greek: to\ ga\r e)/stin e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ ou)k e)/sti tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|,
_a)ll' ou)_ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|.] Or perhaps [Greek: _kai\ ou)_
tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|] might suffice in the last clause (being a
smaller change), though [Greek: a)ll' ou)] seem the proper terms to
declare the meaning. In the reading which I propose, the sequence
intended by Aristotle is clear and intelligible. Having first told us
that [Greek: e)/stin] and [Greek: ou)k e)/sti] being joined
alternately with [Greek: di/kaios] and with [Greek: ou) di/kaios] and
also with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos], make up
two Quaternions, he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character
belonging to the first Quaternion of the two, viz., that in it
[Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin] are joined both with
[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios], and also with [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos] _but not with_ [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_], This is
exactly the truth.
Aristotle next proceeds to the second Quaternion, where he points
out, as the characteristic distinction, that [Greek: ou)k
a)/nthrôpos] comes in and [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] disappears, while
[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios] remain included, as in
the first. This is declared plainly by Aristotle in line 37:--[Greek:
au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (referring to the two pairs of
antithetical propositions in the first Quaternion), [Greek: _a)/llai
de\ pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;
e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k
a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou)
di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k
a)/nthrôpos.] When we read these words, [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o
pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n], as
applied to the second Quaternion, we see that there must have been
some words preceding which excluded [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_] from
the first Quaternion. Waitz contends for the necessity of changing
[Greek: prostethe/n] into [Greek: prostethe/ntos]. I do not concur
with his reasons for the change; the words that follow, p. 20, line
2, [Greek: ô(s o)no/mati tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai
(proschrô/menai)], are a reasonable justification of [Greek:
prostethe/n--_ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s _u(pokei/meno/n ti_ prostethe/n]
being very analogous to [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s o)/noma].
This long note, for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure
text, will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the
perplexities and complaints of the ancient Scholiasts, revealed by
Ammonius and Boethius. Even earlier than the time of Alexander
(Schol. p. 122**, b. 47) there was divergence in the MSS. of
Aristotle; several read [Greek: tô=| dikai/ô|] (p. 19, b. 25),
several others read [Greek: tô=| a)nthrô/pô|]. I think that all of
them were right in what they retained, and wrong by omission only
or mainly.]
After this very subtle and obscure distinction between propositions
_secundi adjacentis_, and those _tertii adjacentis_, in respect to
the application of the negative, Aristotle touches on the relation of
_contrariety_ between propositions. The universal affirmation _Omne
est animal justum_ has for its contrary _Nullum est animal justum_.
It is plain that both these propositions will never be true at once.
But the negatives or contradictories of both may well be true at
once: thus, _Non omne animal est justum_ (the contradictory of the
first) and _Est aliquid animal justum_ (the contradictory of the
second) may be and are both alike true. If the affirmative
proposition _Omnis homo est non justus_ be true, the negative _Nullus
est homo justus_ must also be true; if the affirmative _Est aliquis
homo justus_ be true, the negative _Non omnis homo est non justus_
must also be true. In singular propositions, wherever the negative or
denial is true, the indefinite affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs], in the language of Theophrastus) corresponding to it
will also be true; in universal propositions, the same will not
always hold. Thus, if you ask, Is Sokrates wise? and receive for
answer No, you are warranted in affirming, Sokrates is not wise (the
indefinite affirmation). But if you ask, Are all men wise? and the
answer is No, you are not warranted in affirming, All men are not
wise. This last is the contrary of the proposition, All men are wise;